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CARPE DIEM:
PRIVACY PROTECTION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
Ariana R. Levinson*
“Just over the horizon are more technology breakthroughs and
refinements that we cannot even envision today. Unless we begin now
to define privacy—and in particular workplace privacy—as a value
worth protecting, these new technologies will be upon us before we are
ready for them. Weighing these issues will allow us to be the masters of
the technology, instead of its slaves.”1
“Privacy protection in the United States has often been criticized,
but critics have too infrequently suggested specific proposals for
reform.”2
Scholars generally agree that the law in the United States fails to
adequately protect employees from technological monitoring by their
employers. And groups as diverse as the ACLU and a coalition of multinational businesses are calling for legislation to address privacy
concerns stemming from the rise of new technologies. Yet, few, if any,
academic articles have proposed an actual draft of legislation designed
to protect employees from technological monitoring by their employers.
If recent calls for privacy protection to address emerging technologies
are to succeed, blueprints for legislation must be provided. This article,
thus, contributes to the call for reform by proposing a federal statute to

* Assistant Professor, University of Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law; J.D., University
of Michigan Law School. The author thanks Forrest Kuhn and Rexéna Napier for valuable research
assistance. She also thanks Bill Herbert for taking the time to comment on an earlier draft of the
manuscript. All views are solely those of the author, as are all errors.
1. 139 CONG. REC. S 6121 (1993) (Senator Paul Simon introducing the Privacy for
Consumers and Workers Act).
2. Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 357, 358 (2006).
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protect employees’ privacy from technological monitoring by their
employers.
The article surveys potential sources of law and legislation that,
while inadequate on their own to protect employees’ privacy, serve as a
foundation for the proposed legislation. While each of these sources has
been reviewed by scholars in the past, consideration of all as a potential
source upon which to model legislation is a notable strength underlying
the proposed statute. The basic framework of the proposed statute is to
provide protection based on the degree of intrusiveness of the privacy
invasion. The framework provides baseline protection for on-duty
actions, intermediate protection for on-duty communications and use of
employer communications technology, and the greatest protection for
off-duty behavior. Other notable features of the proposal include the
comprehensive nature of the proposal, in comparison to most prior
scholarly proposals; the flexibility the statute provides to employers to
engage in necessary monitoring; provisions designed to foster employee
involvement in implementing and enforcing workplace technological
monitoring policies; and the involvement of a government agency, the
Department of Labor, in educating interested parties about employee
privacy issues and in enforcing the statute. While passage of legislation
protecting employees’ privacy from employer technological monitoring
may face an uphill battle, it is possible and should be done.
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VII. Conclusion ......................................................................... 432
I. INTRODUCTION
A group of security officers used their locker area to store personal
belongings and to change. Their employer installed a video camera that
recorded the area for at least several weeks.3 Another employee
received personal electronic mail (“e-mail”) through a company e-mail
system and then stored the e-mails in a folder that was password
protected with a password known only to him. His employer accessed
the messages.4 Yet another employer used a “powerful camera lens” to
observe, through an open window, an employee while he was inside his
home. 5
What these employees have in common is that their employers
technologically monitored them, invading their privacy, yet their
lawsuits were dismissed.6 Indeed, scholars generally agree that the law
in the United States fails to adequately protect private sector employees
from technological monitoring by their employers.7
This article proposes a solution: federal legislation intended to
permit private sector employers to monitor their employees when
necessary but to also provide their employees adequate privacy
protection.8 Section II reviews the nature and extent of the problem of
technological monitoring of employees by their employers.
Section III surveys the laws and proposed legislation that serve as a
foundation for the Proposed Act and articulates the strengths and

3. Thompson v. Johnson County Cmty. Coll., 930 F. Supp. 501, 503-04 (D. Kan 1996)
(discussed in Alexandra Fiore & Matthew Weinick, Undignified in Defeat: An Analysis of the
Stagnation and Demise of Proposed Legislation Limiting Video Surveillance in the Workplace and
Suggestions for Change, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 525, 526 (2008)).
4. McClaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, at *2
(May 28, 1999).
5. Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Mich. App. 1989) (discussed in
Clyde W. Summers, Individualism, Collectivism and Autonomy in American Labor Law, 5
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 453, 469 (2001)).
6. Thompson, 930 F. Supp. at 506-08 (reasoning that silent video does not violate the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act and that the employees had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the area and dismissing the pendant state claims); McClaren, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS
4103, at *12 (reasoning that the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-mail
messages); Saldana, 443 N.W.2d at 384 (reasoning that the employee’s “privacy was subject to the
legitimate interests of his employer.”).
7. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 531 and accompanying text for reasons the Proposed Act is limited to the
private sector.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss2/1

4

Levinson: Carpe Diem: Privacy Protection in Employment Act

LEVINSON - FINAL WESTERN.DOC

2010]

CARPE DIEM: PRIVACY PROTECTION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

5/3/2010 11:28 AM

335

weaknesses of the various approaches in comparison to that of the
Proposed Act. It reviews several disparate but relevant sources,
arbitration decisions, federal legislation that failed to pass, state
legislation, and the privacy framework in use in the European Union.
While each of these sources has been reviewed by scholars in the past,
consideration of all as a potential source upon which to model legislation
is a notable strength underlying the Proposed Act.
Section IV illustrates how the Proposed Act flows from but is
different than the prior work of scholars addressing the issue. Many
scholars either endorse the approach of one of the several sources
considered in drafting the Proposed Act or propose legislation that is less
comprehensive than the Proposed Act, either because it is limited to
protection of one type of activity, such as blogging, or from one means
of monitoring, such as a global positioning system (“GPS”).9 Some
scholars do, however, propose more comprehensive protections similar
to the Proposed Act.10 The Proposed Act, however, aims to provide
employers more flexibility to monitor than these prior proposals.11 The
Proposed Act does so, in part, by providing employers with an array of
safe-harbor policies that they can elect to implement in compliance with
the Proposed Act.12
Perhaps most significantly, few, if any, academic articles have
proposed an actual draft of legislation designed to protect employees
from technological monitoring by their employers. Yet if recent calls for
privacy protection to address emerging technologies are to succeed,
blueprints for legislation must be provided. Thus, Section V is a draft of
the Proposed Act.
The basic framework of the Proposed Act is to provide legal
protections based upon the degree of intrusiveness of the employer’s
surveillance because of the type of employee behavior being monitored
rather than based upon the particular employee activity being monitored,
means of monitoring, or seniority of the employee.13 The framework
provides baseline protection for on-duty actions, intermediate protection
for on-duty communications and use of employer communications
technology, and the greatest protection for off-duty behavior.14 The
9. See infra notes 379-380 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 382 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text discussing the Privacy for Consumers and
Workers Act’s different levels of protections based on the seniority level of the employees.
14. See Ariana R. Levinson, Industrial Justice: Privacy Protection for the Employed, 18
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 609-10 (2009). This article uses the term “actions” to exclude
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rationale is that monitoring of on-duty actions is invasive to the degree
that it captures behavior much more systematically and continually than
direct observation. However, it tends to capture predominately workrelated conduct even given the overlap between private life and work.
Thus, employees have the lowest level of privacy interest in on-duty
actions while employers have the greatest need to monitor on-duty
actions.15 Monitoring of on-duty communications and use of employers’
communications technology16 is generally more invasive because
personal non-work related thoughts and associations are more likely to
be monitored. Employers have a need to monitor their communications
technology and employees’ on-duty communications, but employees
also have a relatively high privacy interest because of the likelihood that
thoughts or associations that they desire to keep private will be
monitored. Most invasive is monitoring of employee behavior while off
duty. 17 Off-duty behavior tends to be largely unrelated to work, and
employees have a high privacy interest in their off-duty behavior.
Section VI discusses the decisions underlying the drafting of the
Proposed Act. Notable features of the Proposed Act, in addition to the
basic framework, include provisions designed to foster employee
involvement in implementing and enforcing workplace technological
monitoring policies and the involvement of a government agency, the
United States Department of Labor (“DOL”), in educating interested
parties about employee privacy issues and in enforcing the Proposed
Act. Section VII concludes by exhorting that while passage of
legislation protecting employees’ privacy from employer technological
monitoring may face an uphill battle, it is possible and should be done.
“communications and use of employer communications technology” and the term “behavior” to
include “actions” and “communications and use of employer communications technology.”
15. One note states that video is arguably the most intrusive means of monitoring. Fiore &
Weinick, supra note 3, at 557. However, video in the workplace generally captures largely workrelated conduct. The potential severe intrusiveness of viewing bodily functions or parts is easily
reduced by barring video in places most likely to be used for changing, which the Proposed Act
does.
16. All monitoring of employees’ use of employer-issued computers, including visiting
websites and e-mailing, is addressed alongside monitoring of communications. While monitoring
website use may be less likely than monitoring of e-mail to reveal personal behavior, the risk of
such revelation is significant enough to include all monitoring of computer use under one set of
requirements. Moreover, employers and employees are more likely to understand one unified
policy governing computer use. Levinson, supra note 14, at 657.
17. Robert Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States
and Its De-Evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 91 (2008) (discussing
how “as more workers bring their work into their home and private lives, ‘workplace’ restrictions
will erode the one last bastion of privacy—one’s home. Thus, the concern is no longer limited to
‘workplace privacy’ but employee privacy.”).
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II. THE PROBLEM: LACK OF PROTECTION FROM EMPLOYER
TECHNOLOGICAL MONITORING
The lack of adequate protections for employees’ right to privacy
from employer technological monitoring has been well documented by
numerous scholars.18

18. MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW, 346 (2d ed. 2003); Marc A.
Sherman, Webmail at Work: The Case for Protection Against Employer Monitoring, 23 TOURO L.
REV. 647, 664 (2007) (“The law generally allows employers to monitor workers’ private
communications . . . .); Colette Cuijpers, ICT and Employer-Employee Power Dynamics: A
Comparative Perspective of United States’ and Netherlands’ Workplace Privacy in Light of
Information and Computer Technology Monitoring and Positioning of Employees, 25 J. MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 37, 52 (2007) (“The foregoing statements lead to the overall conclusion
that in general, U.S. employees have no right to privacy with regard to their use of Internet and email in the workplace.”); Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber-Shirking?: A First Principles
Examination of Electronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV. 289, 293 (2002) (“This
Article begins by establishing the failure of statutory law or common law in the United States to
guarantee a right of electronic privacy in the workplace.”); Lawrence E. Rothstein, Privacy or
Dignity?: Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 399
(2000) (“There are several putative sources of the legal protection of workers from electronic
surveillance and monitoring in the workplace; on close investigation, however, these sources
provide little protection.”); Summers, supra note 5, at 475; S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the
Public/Private Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 838 (1998)
(“A great deal of scholarly energy has been devoted to pointing out the inadequacies of the existing
protections for employee privacy in the private sector, and it would be unproductive to attempt to
catalog all of these efforts.”); William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the
Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 103 (2003) (“[E]lectronic monitoring is an area where
technology has outstripped the law, leaving employees largely unprotected.”); Robert G. Boehmer,
Artificial Monitoring and Surveillance of Employees: The Fine Line Dividing the Prudently
Managed Enterprise from the Modern Sweatshop, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 739, 739 (1992) (“[T]he law
supplies employees with precious little protection from the assault on workplace privacy”); see also
Robert Sprague, Rethinking Information Privacy in an Age of Online Transparency, 25 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 395, 403 (2008) (“In the employment context, employers have generally been
found to invade the privacy of employees only in the most extreme circumstances, such as prying—
in detail—about an employee’s sex life.”); Sprague, supra note 17, at 134 (“Unless the courts
abandon the approach that any potential disclosure eliminates the right to privacy, and rebalance the
priority of employer property rights versus employee privacy rights, employees will have no right to
privacy as to their employers—at work or at home.”); Gaia Bernstein, The Parodoxes of
Technological Diffusion: Genetic Discrimination and Internet Privacy, 39 CONN. L. REV. 241, 276
(2006) (“The law has, in effect, authorized email and Internet monitoring by employers.”); Shaun B.
Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 912,
(2002) (arguing that “expectation-driven nature of privacy” gives rise to a need for great “structural
reform” in the area of workplace privacy); Laura Evans, Comment, Monitoring Technology in the
American Workplace: Would Adopting English Privacy Standards Better Balance Employee
Privacy and Productivity?, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2007) (“Currently, U.S. employment law
does not sufficiently regulate employers’ collection and use of private data about employees.”). But
see James A. Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance: Employer Regulation of Off-Duty
Behavior, 43 GA. L. REV. 133, 136 (2008) (arguing that off-duty activity/lifestyle discrimination
statutes are unnecessary and employees’ privacy is better protected “by the market than by the
law.”); Alan F. Westin, Privacy in the Workplace: How Well Does American Law Reflect American
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Employment at will governs in the United States in all states but
one.19 Those who follow discharge cases understand what it means in
concrete terms for employers to have the right to fire an employee for no
reason at all. In one case, for example, an employee’s laptop was stolen.
He was reissued a new one. The wireless use on the new laptop was
high. The employer investigated and found child pornography running
on the computer. The employer, therefore, terminated the employee and
criminal charges were brought against the employee. The defense
attorney discovered that the pornography was invisible to the viewer,
including the employee. A defect in the virus program, loaded onto the
machine by the employer, caused the pornography to run in the
background. Thus, the criminal charges were dropped. Was the
termination rescinded? No, it remained in place–after all the employee
was employed at will.20
While that case addresses issues of accuracy and reliability of
employer technological monitoring, the cases directly addressing privacy
issues are no less bleak.
In one case, an employer monitored an employee to dispute the
extent of injuries claimed for workers’ compensation purposes. The
investigator took video of the man urinating in his yard. The court found
that the monitoring did not violate the employee’s right to privacy
because his activity “could have been observed by any passerby.”21
Another seminal case confirms that employees generally lack
privacy protection from employer technological monitoring.22 The
employer assured the employees that their e-mail was “confidential and
privileged” and would not be “intercepted and used as a grounds for

Values?, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 271, 283 (1996) (arguing that laws governing employee privacy
“strike[] the right balances between privacy and other social interests”).
19. Montana requires employers to show just cause for discharge. Rafael Gely & Leonard
Bierman, Social Isolation and American Workers: Employee Blogging and Legal Reform, 20
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 315 (citing Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, Mont.
Code Ann. §§ 39-2-901 to 915 (2005)). Additionally, “[t]he Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico also
depart from the at-will standard.” Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap
Between At-Will Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 70 (2008).
20. Marcia L. McCormick, Job Termination Nightmare of the Week, June 18, 2008,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2008/06/job-termination.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2010).
21. I.C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 685, 689-90 (Ala. 2000).
22. Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101. (E.D. Pa. 1996). But see Quon v. Arch
Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 910 (2008) (review of text messages violated ECPA);
Brahmana v. Lembo, No. C-09-00106 RMW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42800, *7-*10 (N.D. Ca. May
20, 2009) (denying motion to dismiss a claim that employer monitoring keyboard strokes to obtain
private e-mail password violated the ECPA).
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termination.”23 Nevertheless, when an employee sent an e-mail
disparaging of management from his home computer to his supervisor,
the employer intercepted the e-mail and terminated the employee. The
court held that the employer had not violated the employee’s right to
privacy and upheld the termination.24
Further evidence of the lack of adequate protection for employees’
privacy is found in the United States’ international reputation. Europe
considers the United States a country with inadequate protections for
employees’ privacy.25 Thus, data transfers containing information about
monitoring of employees from the European Union to the United States
are prohibited unless the employer has taken precautions greater than
those mandated by United States law.26
As for the scope of the problem, surveys suggest that the use of
technology in the workplace “has been steadily increasing over the past
decade.”27 And with it, employer technological monitoring has increased
as well.28 An estimated 77 percent of employers technologically monitor
their employees.29 Approximately, 14 million “are under ‘continuous’
surveillance . . . for their Internet access or e-mail usage.”30 Yet, one
study estimates that approximately two out of every three “corporate
workplaces have no policy requiring their employees to manifest consent

23. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98.
24. Id. at 101.
25. William A. Herbert, Workplace Electronic Privacy Protections Abroad: The Whole Wide
World is Watching, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 379, 383 (2008) (“The limits of American
electronic privacy protections were highlighted almost a decade ago, when a European
governmental entity concluded that the ‘current [American] patchwork of narrowly-focused sectoral
laws and voluntary self-regulation cannot at present be relied upon to provide adequate protection in
all cases for personal data transferred from the European Union,” quoting Opinion 1/99 of the
Working Party Concerning the Level of Data Protection in the United States and the Ongoing
Discussions Between the European Commission and the U.S. Government, at 2 WP (1999) 15 final
(Jan.
26,
1999),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1999/wp15en.pdf (last visited Nov. 19,
2008)); Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 925-26 (2009) (“In 1999,
the Working Party of EU Data Protection Commissioners found that U.S. privacy law did not meet
the adequacy standard.”); Stephen B. Moldof, International Employee Privacy Issues Panel:
Union/Employee
Perspective,
10
(May
1,
2008),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/labor/mw/2008/tech/pdf/LEL-Tech-Materials.pdf.
26. See infra note 337 and accompanying text (discussing three methods by which U.S.
companies can adequately secure data).
27. Levinson, supra note 14, at 615.
28. Levinson, supra note 14, at 616-17.
29. Levinson, supra note 14, at 616.
30. Levinson, supra note 14, at 616.
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to electronic monitoring or acknowledging their workplace monitoring
activities.”31
Employers have always monitored.32 But new technology creates a
monitoring different in degree if not in kind. An employee’s every
movement can be monitored by GPS33 or keystroke technology in a way
not possible when a limited number of humans were available to
monitor. Additionally, the possibility of monitoring personal rather than
only work related behavior has increased exponentially with the
availability of devices to monitor computer use.34 GPS and computer
technology also have a greater potential to monitor off-duty behavior.35
III. PARTIAL SOLUTIONS: POTENTIAL SOURCES
OF LEGISLATIVE LANGUAGE
Potential sources upon which to model legislation36 that would
adequately protect private sector employees’ privacy, while permitting
employers to engage in necessary technological monitoring, include the
following: protections for privacy provided by arbitration in the
unionized sector, previously proposed federal legislation that failed to
pass, the little state legislation that is currently in force to address the
problem, and the laws of other countries that more adequately protect
employees’ right to privacy.37
31. Levinson, supra note 14, at 616.
32. See Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector: Tortious and
Ethical Aspects, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1263, 1265 (1993).
33. See New York v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441 (2009) (“GPS is not a mere enhancement
of human sensory capacity, it facilitates a new technological perception of the world in which the
situation of any object may be followed and exhaustively recorded over, in most cases, a practically
unlimited period.”).
34. See Sonne supra note 18, at 146-47 (discussing blurring of working and non-working
time).
35. William A. Herbert, No Direction Home: Will the Law Keep Pace with Human Tracking
Technology to Protect Individual Privacy and Stop Geoslavery?, 2 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 409, 472 (2006) (discussing “growing portability of tracking devices that enables an
employer to monitor an employee while working or not working and within the employee’s own
dwelling”).
36. But see Corbett, supra note 18 at 96 (arguing common law should respond “to the
emerging workplace problems of electronic monitoring” with legislation following later only if
necessary).
37. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) is the federal statute that currently
governs technological monitoring. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §
2510 et seq. (2002). While it provides privacy protections outside of the employment context, and
even some limited protection to employees, the overwhelming majority of commentators agree that
with the advent of new technology, such as the Internet and e-mail, it provides inadequate
safeguards for employees from employer technological monitoring. Lisa Smith-Butler, Workplace
Privacy: We’ll Be Watching You, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 53, 67 (2009) (“Three exceptions render the
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The Law of the Shop

The law of the shop as reflected in the decisions of labor arbitrators
who decide cases in the unionized sector serves as one good starting
point for developing adequate protections for employees’ right to
privacy from technological monitoring. 38
The author’s recent survey of published arbitration decisions on
employer technological monitoring suggests that arbitrators use twelve
safeguards to protect employees’ right to privacy. Use of these
ECPA almost meaningless in the work place.”); Cuijpers, supra note 18, at 44 (“Even though this
Act prohibits intercepting of wire, oral and electronic communications . . . and accessing stored
communications, the exceptions to these prohibitions diminish their effect, making them virtually
non-existent in the employment relationship.”); Jill Yung, Big Brother is Watching: How Employee
Monitoring in 2004 Brought Orwell’s 1984 to Life and What the Law Should Do About It, 36 SETON
HALL L. REV. 163, 195 (2005) (mentioning that ECPA specifically excludes tracking devices,
including GPS); Leonard Court & Courtney Warmington, The Workplace Privacy Myth: Why
Electronic Monitoring is Here to Stay, 29 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 15, 26 (2004) (“[T]he exceptions
to the Act nearly swallow the rule, making any expectation of privacy illusory under most
circumstances.”); William G. Porter II & Michael C. Griffaton, Between the Devil and the Deep
Blue Sea: Monitoring the Electronic Workplace, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 65, 66 (2003) (“In reality,
however, the act provides employees little protection from monitoring of their workplace
communications”); Kesan, supra note 18, at 299 (“In sum, the ECPA is ineffective in regulating the
employer/employee relationship”); Stuart J. Kaplan, E-mail Policies in the Public Sector
Workplace: Balancing Management Responsibilities with Employee Privacy Interests, 15 LERC
MONOGRAPH SER. 103, 107 (1998) (“[T]hree broad exceptions in the ECPA would seem to allow
most forms of E-mail monitoring by both private and public employers.”); Lee Nolan Jacobs, Note
and Comment, Is What’s Yours Really Mine?: Shmueli v. Corcoran Group and Penumbral
Property Rights, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 837, 876 (2006) (“With the continued evolution of technology,
any protections afforded by the ECPA have become practically irrelevant.”); Ira David, Note,
Privacy Concerns Regarding the Monitoring of Instant Messaging in the Workplace: Is It Big
Brother or Just Business?, 5 NEV. L.J. 319, 328 (2004) (“For E-mail, the protection of the Stored
Communications Act has been diluted by the low standard imposed by the courts in recognizing
implied authorization . . .”); Jeremy U. Blackowicz, Note, E-mail Disclosure to Third Parties in the
Private Sector Workplace, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 80, 104 (2001) (“Commentators are practically
unanimous in calling for statutory solutions in the form of both amendments and revisions to the
ECPA or a new statutory scheme to give employees some form of protection.”); Rothstein, supra
note 18, at 401 (“The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 . . . has generally proven
ineffective in protecting employees in the workplace from their employers’ monitoring.”). Minielectronic communications privacy acts enacted by states may sometimes provide a higher level of
protection than the ECPA, such as by requiring consent by both, rather than only one, parties to a
communication, but state acts generally mirror the ECPA and its inapplicability to many
employment-related disputes arising out of monitoring via new technology. Larry O. Natt Gantt, II,
An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail Monitoring in the Private Sector Workplace, 8
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345, 395-97 (1995). Additionally, while unlikely to provide protection for
privacy from technological monitoring, traditional employment exceptions to the at-will rule of
employment might be considered as potential sources of protection. See Scott R. Grubman, Note,
Think Twice Before You Type: Blogging Your Way to Unemployment, 42 GA. L. REV. 615, 627-29
(2008) (discussing possibility of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied contractual
obligation, or public policy protecting employees who are discharged for blogging).
38. Levinson, supra note 14, at 638.
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safeguards permits employers the flexibility to monitor when necessary
but protects employees from an unwarranted level of intrusion.
These safeguards are the following: 1) the right to affirmatively
refuse monitoring; 2) notice of monitoring; 3) notice of the particulars of
monitoring; 4) notice of infractions related to the use of new technology;
5) notice of resulting discipline for those infractions; 6) consistent
enforcement of policies relating to technology; 7) confidential review of
information discovered through monitoring; 8) limited collection of
information through technological monitoring; 9) reasonable suspicion
of an infraction before monitoring; 10) assessment of the accuracy and
reliability of the information produced by the monitoring; 11)
compensation for a violation of privacy; and 12) restrictions on
discipline imposed based on information gathered as a result of
monitoring.39
These safeguards are unevenly applied by arbitrators who are most
often asked to determine whether discipline was for just cause.40 Thus,
the focus of many disputes is not providing protection for employee
privacy, but rather on providing employees job security.41 Nevertheless,
the safeguards provide a level of protection for employees’ privacy not
generally found in the United States outside the unionized sector.42 And
the safeguards, thus, serve as a workable starting point for protecting
employees’ privacy and are the basis of many of the substantive
provisions of the Proposed Act.
B.

Federal Proposals

Two federal bills have previously been proposed to address the
problem of inadequate protection of employees’ privacy from employer
technological monitoring: the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act

39. Levinson, supra note 14, at 640.
40. Levinson, supra note 14, at 637, 638.
41. See Levinson, supra note 14, at 637.
42. See Marvin Hill & Emily Delacenseri, Procrustean Beds and Draconian Choices:
Lifestyle Regulations and Officious Intermeddlers-Bosses, Workers, Courts, and Labor Arbitrators,
57 MO. L. REV. 51, 55 (1992) (“While at common law no nexus between the conduct complained of
and a private-sector employee’s job need be shown, it is difficult to justify according some
protection from arbitrary dismissal to public-sector employees and individuals covered under
collective bargaining agreements while in most cases denying any protection to common law ‘atwill’ employees.”). But see Edward Hertenstein, Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: How
Arbitrators Have Ruled, 52-ALT. DISP. RESOL. J. 36, 44 (1997) (“Arbitration history and case law
suggest that employers have great latitude in administering surveillance and monitoring [of]
employees.”).
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(“Workers Act” or “PCWA”)43 and the Notice of Electronic Monitoring
Act (“Notice Act” or “NEMA”).
1. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act
The Workers Act was initially introduced in 1990.44 The most cited
version is S. 984, introduced in 1993 by Senator Paul Simon.45 That bill
“received the broadest support” in the Senate with 130 cosponsors.46 A
similar bill considered in the House, during 1992, H.R. 1218, had 168
co-sponsors.47
The Workers Act broadly defines “electronic monitoring” as “the
collection, storage, analysis, or reporting of information concerning an
employee’s activities by means of a computer, electronic observation
and supervision, telephone service observation, telephone call
accounting, or other form of visual, auditory or computer-based
technology which is conducted by any method other than direct
observation by another person . . . .”48 The definition appears to broadly
encompass any type of technological monitoring, whether currently
invented or not. However, it excludes “the interception of wire,
electronic, or oral communications as described in chapter 119 of title
18, United States Code,”49 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(“ECPA”). Thus, certain types of technological monitoring, such as
telephone wiretapping, would have been routinely excluded while other
types of technological monitoring, such as of e-mail, would have been
excluded depending upon whether or not an interception was involved.
It is unclear why the Workers Act did not extend protection to
monitoring of these types.50

43. The act is typically referred to as the PCWA, but in an effort to avoid acronyms and ease
the reader’s understanding, the author is using a shortened title instead.
44. Lee Nolan Jacobs, supra note 37, at 861 (citing National Workrights Institute, Privacy
Under Siege:
Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace 19 (2005), available at
http://www.workrights.org/issue_electronic/NWI_EM_Report.pdf).
45. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, S. 984, 103d Cong. (1993).
46. Kaplan, supra note 37, at 110.
47. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, H.R. 1218, 102d Cong. (1992).
48. S. 984, at § 2(2)(A); H.R. 1218, at § 2(1)(A).
49. S. 984, at § 2(2)(C) (i). The House version did not include this exclusion but instead
exempted wiretapping. H.R. 1218, at § 1(C).
50. Because courts interpret e-mail to be stored at most points, it may not be covered by
chapter 119 of title 18. See Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch Your E-mail! Employee E-mail Monitoring
and Privacy Law in the Age of the “Electronic Sweatshop,” 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 172
(1994).
[I]f the ECPA is held to be applicable to employee E-mail actions, then the accessing
and reading of E-mail files may fall outside of the proposed legislation. Under the
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The Workers Act would have required that the Secretary of Labor
provide employers a standard notice, such as that in use for the Fair
Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) or the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”), to hang in a prominent place. The notice would have
informed employees of their rights under the Workers Act, including
when an employer must provide notice of monitoring.51
The Workers Act also would have required that employers provide
notice of monitoring practices to each employee at the time employment
is offered to the employee, if not before. The notice would have been
required to specify the following: 1) the type of electronic monitoring
that will be used; 2) the type of personal data that will be collected; 3)
“the hours and days per calendar week” that monitoring will occur; 4)
“the use to be made of personal data collected”; 5) interpretations of the
data collected that are used;52 6) “[e]xisting production standards and
work performance expectations;” 7) the methods for determining those
standards and expectations;53 8) “a description of the electronic
monitoring”; 54 and 9) an alert to the exception for monitoring without
notice.55
The exception permits monitoring without otherwise applicable
limitations on access,56 intent,57 or use of video58 and without notice
where the employer has a reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct or
“willful gross misconduct” and where that conduct “has a significant
adverse effect involving economic loss or injury to the employer or the
employer’s employees.”59 In such circumstances, an employer would

ECPA, the prior consent or business use exemptions may pertain, and monitoring may be
found permissible, at least on an interstate basis.
Id. But see Gantt, supra note 37, at 409 (“First although the House bill supplements ECPA
protections for E-mail, the Senate version specifically excludes ‘the interception of wire, electronic,
or oral communications as described in [the ECPA],’ and thus E-mail, from its definition of
‘electronic monitoring.’”).
51. S. 984, at § 4; H.R. 1218, at § 4.
52. Required only when the interpretation may affect one of the employees.
53. Required only if the methods affect the employees.
54. S. 984, at § 4(b)(8).
55. S. 984, at § 4(b). The Workers Act also contained provisions to protect prospective
employees and customers. While discussion of such protections is beyond the scope of this article,
it would certainly be workable to integrate such related protections into a unified law governing
workplace privacy.
56. See infra note 75.
57. See infra note 71.
58. See infra note 76.
59. S. 984, at § 5(c)(1)(B). The House of Representatives version had a different exception
limited to unlawful activity that “adversely affects the employer’s interest or the interests of such
employer’s employees.” H.R. 1218, at § 5(c)(1)(B).
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have been permitted to monitor the suspected employee or the area in
which the suspected activity is occurring. Before doing so, however, the
employer would need to document “with particularity the conduct which
is being monitored and the basis for the monitoring” and “the specific
economic loss or injury to the business . . . or the employer’s
employees.”60 The employer would have been required to sign the
statement and retain it for three years from the date of the monitoring or
“until judgment is rendered in an action brought by an employee” under
the Workers Act.61
In addition to providing for notice, the Workers Act would have
prohibited random and periodic monitoring of certain groups of
employees. Periodic or random electronic monitoring of new hires with
sixty or fewer working days of employment was permissible. Random
or periodic monitoring of those with sixty-one days to five years of
employment was permitted if their work group62 was monitored only for
two hours or less per calendar week.63 Periodic or random monitoring of
employees with more than five years’ employment was prohibited.64
The Workers Act would not have prohibited continuous electronic
monitoring. But employers could not simultaneously review any data
from continuous electronic monitoring on a periodic or random basis
“unless the electronic data was obtained from the use of an electronic
identifier or accessor, such as an electronic card or badge access system,
[or] telephone call accounting system” or unless “the data is
continuously monitored by an employer or appears simultaneously on
multiple television screens or sequentially on a single screen.”65
Additionally, an employer could have reviewed data from continuous
electronic monitoring after the monitoring was complete “only if review
was limited to specific data that the employer has reason to believe
contains information relevant to an employee’s work.”66
The Workers Act would also have provided a right of review for
the employee. In all cases except those involving monitoring for
reasonable suspicion, the employer was required to provide the

60. S. 984, at §5 (c)(2)(B).
61. S. 984, at § 5(c).
62. S. 984, at § 5(b) (defining a work group as “a group of employees employed in a single
facility and engaged in substantially similar work at common time and in physical proximity to each
other.”).
63. S. 984, at § 5(b)(2) (requiring the notice of monitoring to be provided to these employees
between twenty-four and seventy-two hours before the monitoring).
64. S. 984, at § 5(b).
65. S. 984, at § 6(a).
66. S. 984, at § 6(b).
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employee “with a reasonable opportunity to review . . . a copy of all
personal data obtained or maintained by electronic monitoring . . . .”67
The collective bargaining representative and an authorized agent would
have the same right. All would have the additional right to request a
copy of the data.68
In cases involving monitoring for reasonable suspicion, the
employee would have a more limited right of review. The employee
would have a right to review the data after the investigation was
completed or when disciplinary action had been initiated, whichever
occurred first. The employee would also be able to request a copy of the
data and to review and request a copy of any interpretation of the data.69
The Workers Act also would have provided limitations on
discipline based on technological monitoring. Data could be used as a
basis for discipline only if all provisions of the Workers Act were
followed. Additionally, quantitative data obtained through monitoring
could not be used as the sole basis for performance evaluations or
“setting production quotas or work performance expectations . . .”70
except when an employer had only the data as a basis for evaluation of
telecommuters.
The Workers Act would have prohibited intentionally collecting
“personal data about an employee through electronic monitoring if the
data are not confined to the employee’s work.”71 Yet collection of some
data not confined to work was permissible as long as the purpose and
principle effect was to collect work-related data.72 And, the Workers
Act would not have applied to “electronic monitoring conducted by
employers in connection with the investigation of a workers’
compensation claim unless there is reasonable suspicion of fraud or the
claim involves at least $25,000.”73 Indeed, the House bill only applied
to monitoring conducted on the employer’s worksite.74
Additionally, employers would not be permitted to monitor
bathrooms, locker rooms, or dressing rooms.75

67. S. 984, at § 7 (a).
68. Id.
69. S. 984, at § 7(b)(2).
70. S. 984, at § 8(b)(2).
71. S. 984, at § 10(a); Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, H.R. 1218, 102d Cong. §
9(a)(1) (1992).
72. S. 984, at § 10(f).
73. S. 984, at § 13(b).
74. S. 984, at § 12(b).
75. S. 984, at § 10(b).
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Additional prohibitions included one prohibiting monitoring with a
video camera that is not visible to the subject unless the monitoring was
based on reasonable suspicion.76
The Workers Act also provided that: “An employer shall not
intentionally use or disseminate personal data obtained by electronic
monitoring of an employee when the employee is exercising First
Amendment rights,” but such data could permissibly be incidentally
collected.77
The Workers Act also would have restricted which employers could
access the information collected. An employer could access data only if
“the employer’s employee who maintains such data is not available” and
the employer had an “immediate business need for specific data.”78
Even in this instance, the employer could not access “visual images,
audio impressions or data that can be used to create visual or auditory
information.”79 Rather, the employer could access only alphanumeric
data, defined as “data consisting entirely of letters, numbers, and other
symbols.”80 The data obtained could not be “used for the purpose of
discipline or performance evaluations,” and the employer must, within a
reasonable time after accessing the data, notify “the employee who
maintains such data that the employer has accessed such data.”81
The employee who would collect the personal data obtained by
electronic monitoring could not disclose it to others except in limited
circumstances. These included disclosure to “officers and employees of
the employer who have a legitimate need for the information in the
performance of their duties” and to “the exclusive bargaining
representative.”82 The House bill included an exception for disclosure
“pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.”83
The provisions would have applied to third parties engaging in
monitoring on behalf of employers.84
The Workers Act included an anti-retaliation provision.85

76. S. 984, at §§ 11(2), 13(b).
77. S. 984, at § 10(c) (1993); Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, H.R. 1218, 102d
Cong. § 8(c)(1) (1992).
78. S. 984, at §9(a).
79. S. 984, at §9(b).
80. Id.
81. S. 984, at § 9(a)(3).
82. S. 984, at § 10(d).
83. H.R. 1218, at § 9(b)(C).
84. S. 984, at § 13(d).
85. S. 984, at § 11(4).
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The Workers Act included the following enforcement provisions
and penalties. It included a civil penalty up to $10,000. The Secretary
of Labor would determine the amount of the penalty after considering
“the previous record of the person in terms of compliance with this Act
and the gravity of the violation.”86
The Workers Act would have provided jurisdiction for the federal
district courts to decide actions brought by the Secretary of Labor. The
district courts could “restrain violations” of the Workers Act and issue
injunctive relief requiring compliance with the Workers Act, and legal,
equitable, and declaratory relief incident thereto, including “reasonable
attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.”87
The Workers Act also would have provided a private right of action
for aggrieved employees in any “Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction.”88 The same relief available in an action brought by the
Secretary of Labor was available in a private suit.89
The Workers Act included a three-year statute of limitations.90
No right or procedure provided by the Workers Act was waivable
“by contract” or otherwise unless part of a “written settlement agreed to
and signed by the parties to a pending action or complaint under this
Act.”91
The Workers Act would not “restrict, limit, or eliminate a
requirement of the Federal Government, or a State or political
subdivision of a State or of a collective bargaining agreement relating to
privacy or electronic monitoring that is more stringent than any
requirement of this Act.”92
The Secretary of Labor was to issue regulations to carry out the
Workers Act.93
The Workers Act would have been a solid framework to protect
employees’ privacy from technological monitoring. Further, at least
some employer representatives recognized that the Workers Act would

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

S. 984, at §12(a)(2).
S. 984, at § 12(b).
S. 984, at §12(c)(2).
S. 984, at § 12(c).
S. 984, at § 12(c)(3).
S. 984, at § 12(d).
S. 984, at § 15.
S. 984, at § 14.
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also provide assurance to employers acting in compliance with it that
they were acting appropriately when monitoring their employees.94
The Workers Act was purportedly defeated, however, because it
was perceived as containing burdensome notice requirements and
regulating employers in too great of detail.95 Yet, notice requirements
are necessary and important to provide adequate protection for
employees and respect for their dignity. Notice requirements are not
generally unduly burdensome for employers, many of whom adopt
policies on human resources matters simply as a matter of good business
practice. Nevertheless, the Proposed Act contains notice requirements
that are slightly less onerous than those of the Workers Act. The
exception providing for monitoring without notice encompasses more
circumstances than the Workers Act, permitting employers to use other
safeguards in lieu of notice. When notice is required, the annual
individual notice96 need not include the times monitoring will occur or
the methods for determining standards and expectations.97 The Proposed
Act does not require a poster notice. The Proposed Act does, however,
require employers to notify employees of a right to consultation before
instituting a technological monitoring policy.
Moreover, the Proposed Act provides employers greater latitude to
monitor employees, provided appropriate safeguards are in place, than
did the Workers Act, particularly when monitoring on-duty conduct. It
contains no ban on random monitoring of any category of employees’
workplace actions or communications. While using seniority is a
laudable safeguard that makes sense given that generally long-term

94. Christopher S. Miller & Brian D. Poe, Employment Law Implications in the Control and
Monitoring of E-mail Systems, 6 U. MIAMI BUS. L.J. 95, 96, 118 (1997) (encouraging voluntary
compliance with the Workers Act should it pass).
95. Kaplan, supra note 37, at 110 (discussing how employer lobbying, including arguments
that notice was unduly burdensome, defeated the bill); Yung, supra note 37, at 212 (discussing how
requiring both general notice of monitoring and a detailed individual notice is not necessary and
suggesting just the individualized notice with signed acknowledgment).
96. Boehmer, supra note 18, at 817 (discussing how requiring a new notice “each time that
one of the seven required elements of the notice is changed in any respect” is “unduly onerous”).
97. Laurie Thomas Lee, supra note 50, at 171 (1994) (discussing how providing “exact days
and hours . . . may go too far in stripping employer of the ability to access company computer files
outside of specified monitoring periods.”); Shefali N. Baxi & Alisa A. Nickel, Big Brother or Better
Business: Striking a Balance in the Workplace, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 145 (1994) (“A
requirement of notice so time-specific that it details the days and hours monitoring will take place
allows employees to conform their behavior to the standards of their employer during monitoring
and to do substandard work the rest of the time.”); Donald R. McCartney, Comment, Electronic
Surveillance and the Resulting Loss of Privacy in the Workplace, 62 UMKC L. REV. 859, 887
(1994) (“When the employees realize that they will be monitored at a specific time, it may cause
them to conduct work at lower performance levels at other times.”).
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employees have proven that they have the employer’s interest at heart,
some employers may feel the need to monitor long-term employees
because of difficulties targeting only certain employees or because of
poor morale, even among long-term employees, at their workplace.98
While the Proposed Act is designed to permit employers more
flexibility to monitor,99 in some respects it guarantees employees a
greater level of privacy than the Workers Act. For instance, types of
monitoring covered by the ECPA are not excluded, providing employees
safeguards from types of technological monitoring that were not covered
by the Workers Act. Additionally, the Proposed Act places somewhat
greater restrictions on monitoring off-duty employees. It prohibits
monitoring within the home100 and in secluded areas and requires that an
employer have “reasonable grounds to believe that the employee is
engaging in conduct that will cause a significant concrete harm to the
employer” before monitoring an off-duty employee.101
2. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act
The Notice Act was initially introduced in 2000 by Senator Charles
Schumer and Representative Charles Candy.102 A “‘less ambitious’”
piece of legislation “than its predecessor,”103 it simply would have
required that employers provide notice before monitoring employees’

98. Lee, supra note 50, at 171 (discussing how “restrictions that limit monitoring to only new
employees . . . are too inflexible”); Baxi & Nickel, supra note 97, at 145 (discussing how
technology, like a video camera, may be unable to differentiate by longevity of worker and how
some long-term employees “may have become complacent”); Alexander I. Rodriguez, Comment,
All Bark, No Byte: Employee E-Mail Privacy Rights in the Private Sector Workplace, 47 EMORY
L.J. 1439, 1465 (1998) (discussing how PCWA created “an unreasonably strict standard for
employers to justify the monitoring of experienced employees, regardless of the type of work with
which an older worker may be involved”). Recently, for example, in Kentucky, an employee of
approximately nine years, responsible for inspecting mine safety, allegedly failed to perform any
mine inspections for at least a year. R.G. Dunlop, Worker Faked Mine Reports, State Says,
COURIER-JOURNAL, April 20, 2009.
99. Boehmer, supra note 18, at 740 (“In addition, increased flexibility is needed in certain
aspects of pending legislative proposals.”).
100. The Proposed Act includes an exception for monitoring the employer’s equipment.
101. The Workers Act requires only that the employer “has reason to believe [the reviewed
data obtained from continuous monitoring] contains information relevant to an employee’s work.”
This distinction may be particularly relevant in cases where employees blog or tweet.
102. Jacobs, supra note 37, at 865.
103. Yung, supra note 37, at 207 (quoting Charles E. Frayer, Employee Privacy and Internet
Monitoring: Balancing Workers’ Rights and Dignity with Legitimate Management Interests, 57
BUS. LAW. 857, 869 n.86 (2002)).
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communications and computer use in the workplace.104 It would have
barred such monitoring without providing notice before monitoring and
annually thereafter.105 Notice would also have to be provided “[b]efore
implementing a material change in an electronic monitoring practice.”106
The Notice Act did not cover employees’ actions (which might be
monitored by silent video or GPS) and may not have extended to
monitoring of employees’ communications and computer use outside the
workplace.107
The Notice Act required “clear and conspicuous notice.”108
Moreover, the notice must have “in a manner reasonably calculated to
provide actual notice” described: 1) the “form of communication or
computer usage that will be monitored”; 2) “the means by which such
monitoring will be accomplished”; 3) “the kinds of information that will
be obtained through such monitoring, including whether
communications or computer usage not related to the employer’s
business are likely to be monitored”; and 4) “how information used by
such monitoring will be stored, used, or disclosed.”109
There are some very limited circumstances in which notice would
not have been necessary. An employer could monitor when it “has
reasonable grounds to believe” 1) that an employee is violating the
“legal rights of the employer or another person” and thereby causing
significant harm to the victim and 2) that the monitoring will provide
evidence of the violation.110
An employee would have been able to bring a civil action in United
States District Court if an employer violated the Notice Act.111

104. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2000). The operative
language might be interpreted to extend protection to any type of monitoring of computer usage
whether electronic or not, but given the statement of purpose, the drafters more likely intended only
intentional monitoring by electronic means to be covered. “[A]n employer who intentionally, by
any electronic means, reads, listens to, or otherwise monitors any wire communication, oral
communication, or electronic communication of any employee of the employer, or otherwise
monitors the computer usage of an employee of the employer . . .” H.R. 4908, at § 2(a)(1)(B). The
National Workrights Institute recommends a Workplace Privacy Act that is substantially the same
as the Notice Act. NATIONAL WORKRIGHTS INSTITUTE, PRIVACY UNDER SIEGE: ELECTRONIC
MONITORING
IN
THE
WORKPLACE
20-22
(2004),
http://www.workrights.org/issue_electronic/NWI_EM_Report.pdf.
105. H.R. 4908, at § 2(a)(1)(B).
106. Id.
107. H.R. 4908, at §§ 2, 2(a)(1)(B). While the operative language provides no such limitation,
the statement of purpose and two titles indicate the bill addresses monitoring in the workplace.
108. H.R. 4908, at § 2(a)(1)(B).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Remedies were: 1) actual damages, “but not less than liquidated
damages in the amount of $5,000”; 2) punitive damages; 3) reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs; and 4) other preliminary and equitable relief.112
Money damages could not exceed $20,000, and an aggregate award for
one violation could not exceed $500,000.113
The Notice Act would have imposed a two-year statute of
limitations.114
The Notice Act was a straightforward attempt to provide a
minimum level of protection for employees. While it was limited in
scope, covering only a sub-set of technologies and possibly limited only
to workplace monitoring, it would have been relatively easy to interpret
and apply. It purportedly failed to pass because of employer opposition,
referencing the increased workload for human resources employees and
the potential increase in litigation.115 Others, however, criticized the
Notice Act for providing notice but no actual protection of employees’
privacy.116
In some respects, the Proposed Act provides more flexibility to
employers than the Notice Act117 but is intended to provide a higher
level of protection for employees’ privacy. The Proposed Act extends to
monitoring of employees’ actions, not only their communications, and
covers all employee behavior, whether within or outside of the
workplace. The Proposed Act also provides employees more significant
protections beyond notice, including a right to review certain categories
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Nathan Watson, Note, The Private Workplace and the Proposed “Notice of Electronic
Monitoring Act”: Is “Notice” Enough?, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 79, 80 (2001). (“Unfortunately,
employer groups succeeded in getting the Judiciary committee to pull the bill from further
consideration. They cited a potential increase in litigation and more work for human resources
professionals in complying with NEMA. The bill also languished in the Senate.”). Some
employers typically object to any legislation of the employment field. Yet, as noted by several
scholars, several good reasons counsel passage of legislation protecting employees’ privacy despite
these protests: 1) employees “are now subject to oppressive invasions of monumental caliber” that
require redress; 2) international standards, particularly those of Europe, are creating pressure to
provide more adequate privacy protection; and 3) arguably, monitoring without restraint actually
creates high costs to employers “in lost productivity and profit.” Laura B. Pincus & Clayton
Trotter, The Disparity Between Public and Private Sector Employee Privacy Protections: A Call
for Legitimate Privacy Rights for Private Sector Workers, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 51, 81-82 (1995);
Wilborn, supra note 18, at 885-86.
116. Todd M. Wesche, Reading Your Every Keystroke: Protecting Employee E-mail Privacy,
1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 101, 114 (2002) (“NEMA’s focus is disclosure, not elimination, of monitoring,
and the requirement of notice may operate more as a disclaimer of liability as opposed to an actual
protection of employee’s privacy.”).
117. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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of collected information and prohibitions on monitoring in certain
locations, such as changing areas within the workplace and employees’
homes.118
C.

State Legislation

There are several different kinds of state legislation providing some
protection for employees’ privacy from employer monitoring. Two
states require notice of electronic monitoring;119 two states provide
protection from monitoring, whether technological or not, of nonemployment activities; and four states protect against discharge or
adverse action because of lawful off-duty conduct.120
1. Notice of Electronic Monitoring
Two states, Connecticut and Delaware, require that employers
provide employees notice of electronic monitoring.121
a. Connecticut’s Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act
Connecticut has a statute governing “employers engaged in
electronic monitoring”122 (“Connecticut Act”). The Connecticut Act
118. An exception is provided for monitoring the employer’s property.
119. Similar legislation has been considered, but not implemented in other jurisdictions. See
Matthew E. Swaya & Stacey R. Eisenstein, Emerging Technology in the Workplace, 21 LAB. LAW.
1, 13 (2005) (discussing proposal in California); Jarrod J. White, Commentary, E-Mail@work.com:
Employer Monitoring of Employee E-mail, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1099 (1997) (discussing
proposals in Arkansas and Oklahoma).
120. Lawful activity bills were considered but failed to pass in Michigan and Pennsylvania.
Sonne, supra note 18, at 176-77. At least six states “provide ‘a criminal sanction for employers
who restrict their employees’ freedom to shop, trade, or patronize where they will.’” Sonne, supra
note 18, at 172 (quoting Finkin, supra note 18, at 425). Four states also prohibit “employers from
embedding radio frequency identification chips in their employees.” Sprague, 42 supra note 17, at
86. The Proposed Act absolutely prohibits technological monitoring of certain off-duty behavior
and permits other such monitoring only with substantial justification. It would apply to RFID chips
as well as any other form of technological monitoring, but the topic of legislation particularly
addressing RFID chips is beyond the scope of this article.
121. Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: The United States
Law, 23 COMP. LAB. & POL’Y J. 471, 477-78, n.36, n.37 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d
(1999), DEL. LAWS CODE, tit. 19, § 705(b) (Supp. 2002)).
122. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d (2008). The ACLU has proposed a Model Electronic Privacy
Act. American Civil Liberties Union, Legislative Briefing Kit on Electronic Monitoring, ACLU,
Mar. 11, 2002, http://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/14798res20020311.html. It is a notice act which
contains provisions similar to the Workers Act, the Notice Act, and the Connecticut Act. See id.
Rather than prohibiting monitoring, it permits monitoring at the workplace that is related to work,
including incidental collection of non-work related information. See id. § 2. It requires “prior
written notice” of all electronic monitoring, including notice of the “times at which the monitoring
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prohibits only monitoring which takes place at the workplace.123 The
definition of electronic monitoring is broader than that in the Notice Act
because it includes monitoring an employee’s “activities or
communications by any means other than direct observation.”124 It
exempts “collection of information for security purposes in common
areas of the employer’s premises which are held out for use by the
public.”125
Before monitoring, an employer must provide written notice “to all
employees who may be affected.”126 The notice must state “the types of
monitoring which may occur.”127 Notice of “the types of” monitoring in
which “the employer may engage” must be posted in a “conspicuous
place.”128
The Connecticut Act includes an exception from notice when the
“employer has reasonable grounds to believe that employees are
engaged in conduct . . . which violates the law” and the “monitoring may
produce evidence of this misconduct.”129

is to occur” and “the location of the monitoring equipment.” See id. § 3. The exception to
providing notice mirrors that in the Notice Act. See id. § 3(b); supra note 110 and accompanying
text. When employers randomly monitor, they must additionally provide notice at the time of actual
monitoring, unless doing so as part of a specific defined type of quality control program. See
American Civil Liberties Union, supra, at § 4. It also contains a provision similar to the Workers
Act prohibiting monitoring in private areas. See id. § 5. It prohibits disclosure of collected
information except to law enforcement agencies or “officers, employees, or authorized agents of the
employer who have a legitimate need for the information” unless the employee provides “prior
written consent” that “shall not be a condition of employment.” See id. § 6.
123. Electronic monitoring is defined to include only “collection of information on an
employer’s premises.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d(a)(3) (2008). Two unpublished decisions
confirm that monitoring off of the employer’s premise is not addressed by the act. Gerardi v. City
of Bridgeport, No. CV084023011S, 2007 WL 4755007, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2007);
Vitka v. City of Bridgeport, No. CV0804022961S, 2007 WL 4801298, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec.
31, 2007).
124. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d(a)(3) (2008).
125. § 31-48d(a)(3).
126. § 31-48d(b)(1).
127. Id.
128. Id. While the statute’s language suggests that the posted notice satisfies the requirement
of providing employees prior written notice by stating: “Such posting shall constitute such prior
written notice,” the Attorney General has stated that, “[t]his section requires that written notice be
given to each employee whose conversations will be monitored and the posting of notices regarding
the monitoring.” 2001 Conn. AG LEXIS 1 (2001).
129. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d(b)(2) (2008) (The exception also applies when there is
“reasonable grounds to believe” the employee’s conduct “violates the legal rights of the employer”
or a co-employee or “creates a hostile” work “environment.” But these would seem to be
encompassed by the broader first exception.).
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No individual remedy appears to be provided by the statute.130
Instead, the Connecticut Labor Commissioner may “levy a civil
penalty.”131 The penalty for the first offense is $500; for the second
offense, the penalty is $1000; and for each offense thereafter the penalty
is $3000.132 Additionally, the Labor Commissioner may request the
Attorney General to seek an additional penalty of $300 for each
violation.133 The additional penalty is deposited for use by the Labor
Department in enforcing the act and other employment regulations.134
The Connecticut Act probably serves an important educational
function by alerting some employees that their behavior in the workplace
may be monitored and by explaining the types of monitoring that may
occur. Additionally, the broad definition of electronic monitoring will
likely ensure that the Connecticut Act keeps apace with changing
technology. For this reason, the Proposed Act adopts a similar definition
of technological monitoring. 135
Additionally, the Connecticut Act provides for a penalty to fund the
Connecticut Department of Labor’s enforcement mechanisms which is a
reasonable means to address concerns about the cost of enforcing
employees’ privacy rights.136 The Proposed Act also provides for a civil
penalty to help fund the Department of Labor’s enforcement efforts.
The Connecticut Act does not, however, appear likely to provide
significant actual protection of employees’ privacy. The permissive
wording of the notice, indicating an employer “may” monitor would not
definitively indicate to employees that monitoring is occurring. Indeed,
in a workplace where monitoring does not normally take place,
employees may have a false sense of security that monitoring is not
actually taking place,137 but the notice would permit the employer to
assert the employee was warned that monitoring “may” take place.
Thus, when notice is required by the Proposed Act, the notice must be
130. See Stephen B. Harris, 14 CONN. PRAC., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3:3 (2008) (“No private
right of action is provided for in the Electronic Monitoring Act.”). Despite the apparent lack of a
private right of action, the Connecticut Superior Court has decided in two cases seeking injunctive
relief that the Connecticut Act was not violated. Gerardi v. City of Bridgeport, No. CV084023011S,
2007 WL 4755007, *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2007); Vitka v. City of Bridgeport, No.
CV0804022961S, 2007 WL 4801298, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2007).
131. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d(c) (2008).
132. § 31-48d(c). There is an exemption from the section for criminal investigations. § 3148d(c).
133. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-69a(a) (2008).
134. § 31-69a(b).
135. See infra notes 532-33 and accompanying text.
136. § 31-69a(b).
137. Levinson, supra note 14, at 669 & n.306.
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more explicit in explaining that monitoring is occurring. Additionally,
the Connecticut Act fails to provide protection from monitoring in the
cases where monitoring is most intrusive: when the employee is off-duty
and away from the workplace. Moreover, the apparent lack of an
individual remedy is likely to lead to under-enforcement.138
b. Delaware’s Notice of Monitoring Requirement
Delaware prohibits monitoring of “telephone transmissions,
electronic mail and Internet usage” without notice (“Delaware Act”).139
The Delaware Act applies inside and outside the workplace, but only to
these narrow categories of behavior.
The employer must provide one of two types of notice: 1) an
electronic notice “at least once during each day the employee accesses
the employer-provided e-mail or Internet access services” or 2) a written
or electronic notice, before monitoring, of the governing policies, which
is acknowledged by the employee “in writing or electronically.”140
There is an exception for “processes that are designed to manage
the type or volume of incoming or outgoing electronic mail or telephone
voice mail or Internet usage, that are not targeted to monitor or intercept
the electronic mail or telephone voice mail or Internet usage of a
particular individual, and that are performed solely for the purpose of
computer system maintenance and/or protection.”141
The Delaware Act is enforceable in court and imposes a civil
penalty of $100 for each violation.142
The Delaware Act is a laudable attempt to ensure that employees
have notice before their communications are monitored. It extends
protection outside the workplace to off-duty behavior, the monitoring of
which is highly likely to intrude on an employee’s privacy.143 The
Delaware Act, however, lacks clarity about what content the notice must
contain. Must it merely state that “communications may be monitored”?
Must it specify which communications are being monitored? Must it
specify particular details about not only which communications are
being monitored but the method by which they are being monitored?

138. See Cynthia Estlund, The Story of NLRB v. Washington Aluminum, in EMPLOYMENT
LAW STORIES 175, 209 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester, eds., Foundation Press, 2007)
(discussing how fear of litigation “can be an excellent stimulus” for internal employer reforms).
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 705, 705(b) (2008).
140. tit. 19, §§ 705(b)(1), (b)(2).
141. tit. 19, § 705(e).
142. tit. 19, § 705(c).
143. tit. 19, § 705
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Unfortunately, the requirement has not been fleshed out in any decisions
that the author could obtain.
Overall, the Delaware Act is unlikely to provide adequate
protection for employees.
The notice provisions lack clarity; the
Delaware Act fails to provide safeguards other than notice for
employees’ privacy; and the penalty is minimal and obtainable only
through court action. Moreover, the Delaware Act targets limited types
of communications, likely failing to protect communications made by
newly developed and future technologies.144 Thus, the Proposed Act
specifies different types of notice that should be provided, varying with
the level of intrusion; includes safeguards beyond notice; and contains
more substantial penalties, available either through administrative
procedure or court action.145 Additionally, the Proposed Act contains a
broad definition of technological monitoring enabling it to adapt to the
development of new technology.146
2. Prohibitions on Monitoring Related to Integrity of Personnel
Records
Two states, Michigan and Illinois, integrate prohibitions on
collecting information, by technological monitoring or otherwise, about
certain employee behavior into statutes which govern the use of
personnel records.147
a. Michigan’s Prohibition on Monitoring
Michigan forbids employers from gathering or keeping a record of
“an employee’s associations, political activities, publications, or
communications of nonemployment activities” (“Michigan Act”).148 If,
however, the employee authorizes, in writing, such monitoring, then the
employer may gather or keep a record of such information.149
Additionally, the prohibition does not apply to “activities that occur on
the employer’s premises or during the employee’s working hours . . .

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Bullard-Plawecki Employee Right to Know Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.508 (2008);
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/9 (2008); see also Finkin, supra note 121, at 491 & n.112.
148. “Keeping record of employee’s nonemployment activities prohibited, exception; part of
personnel record.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.508(8)(1) (2008).
149. § 423.508(8)(1). The law also permits keeping a record of information the employee
provides in writing.
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that interfere with the performance of the employee’s duties or duties of
other employees.”150
An employee may sue an employer who is engaging in prohibited
monitoring for an order to cease monitoring and for actual damages and
costs. If the employee proves the violation was “willful and knowing”
the court will award “$200.00 plus costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and
actual damages.”151
The Michigan Act also provides that any record permissibly kept
because of the employee’s authorization or because of the exception for
interference with duties must be part of the employee’s personnel
record.152
The Michigan Act provides employees the right to review the
personnel record approximately twice in a calendar year at a reasonable
time and location convenient to the employee.153 After reviewing the
record, the employee may obtain a copy, for which the employer may
charge a fee equal to actual copying costs. Alternatively, if an employee
is unable to review the record “at the employing unit,” the employer will
mail a copy to the employee per written request.154
Employees also have a right to contest erroneous information
contained in the personnel record. If the employer does not agree that
the information is incorrect then an employee statement addressing the
allegedly incorrect information, of a limited length, must be included in
the personnel record. Additionally, the employee or the employer, may
sue to have information knowingly placed “in the personnel record” that
“is false” removed.155
The Michigan Act permits, however, keeping information gathered
when the “employer has reasonable cause to believe that an employee is
engaged in criminal activity which may result in loss or damage to the
employer’s property or disruption of the employer’s business operation”
separate from the personnel record.156 The employee has no right to
review such information but must receive notice of the investigation,

150. § 423.508(8)(1) (While it is possible to read the language as indicating that all monitoring
on the employer’s premises is exempt, the restrictive clause “that interfere with the performance of
the employee’s duties . . .” probably modifies that phrase.).
151. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.511 (2008).
152. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.508(2) (2008).
153. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.503 (2008).
154. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.504 (2008).
155. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.505 (2008). Additionally, the law protects against employers
using information about employees in judicial and “quasi-judicial proceedings” without the
employee having an opportunity to review the information. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.502 (2008).
156. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.509 (2008).
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upon its completion or within two years, “whichever comes first.”157 If
disciplinary action does not result, the material must be destroyed.158
The Michigan Act provides one potential framework to protect
employees from some range of technological monitoring both on and off
duty.159 The right of review and to contest records of monitoring is an
important safeguard against collection of personal information without
an employee’s knowledge and against maintenance of incorrect
information. The Proposed Act adopts a similar review procedure,
absent the right to sue for removal of information. The ability to contest
the accuracy of information via a statement should sufficiently protect
employees without imposing the costs of a suit on the employee,
employer, and court system.
Yet, the Michigan Act’s protections are more limited than those of
the Proposed Act, which extends protection to technological monitoring
of all on-duty and off-duty behavior. Moreover, the Michigan Act’s
authorization requirement probably effectively permits most monitoring,
leaving only the safeguard of a right to review and contest.
Authorization, similar to consent, is not generally a realistic protection in
the workplace because of the unequal bargaining power, in most
instances, between an employer and an employee.160 Most employees
157. Id.
158. Id..
159. A relatively recent unpublished decision may considerably narrow the categories of
prohibited monitoring. Goodrich v. Home Depot, No. 281652, 2009 WL 154341, at *3-4 (Mich. Ct.
App. Jan. 22, 2009). The decision appears to apply the modifier “nonemployment activities” to
each listed type of activity rather than only to communications (an interpretation potentially
suggested by the section title “Keeping record of employee’s nonemployment activities
prohibited.”). Id. at *3. Additionally, the decision holds that an activity prohibited by an employer
policy, in this case a romantic relationship with a subordinate, is an employment activity, with the
caveat that whether an activity constitutes a nonemployment activity must be “decided on a case-bycase basis.” Id. Under this rationale, an employer could, for instance, ban any non-work use of a
computer and then argue that a personal e-mail is an employment activity.
160. See Gantt, supra note 37, at 407 (“Especially considering the recent decline in the
percentage of employees involved in collective bargaining, employees today often must either
accept the employer monitoring, protest and face possible termination, or voluntarily terminate
employment.”); Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship,
57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 720 (1996) (“While theorists may disagree about the conditions under which
consent is truly voluntary, the courts have increasingly been willing to acknowledge that in the
employment context ‘freedom of contract’ may at times be illusory. Because employer and
employee ‘do not stand on equal footing,’ employer power may be wielded to achieve socially
undesirable ends.”); Boehmer, supra note 18, at 814 (“Of course, the employee who is unwilling to
modify her expectations always has the theoretical option to terminate the employment relationship
or to assert pressure on the employer to cease the monitoring as a condition of maintaining the
employment relationship. These theoretical alternatives are unlikely to be practical alternatives to
the vast majority of workers, who do not have the luxury of quitting based on a difference in
principle with the employer and who stand in an inferior bargaining position to the employer.”);
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do not have multiple job opportunities at one time and so will be under
great pressure to sign a consent form rather than lose their jobs. While
consent, as a form of notice, and a right of review may adequately
protect employees’ privacy from monitoring of on-duty conduct where
the privacy intrusion is least invasive, the Proposed Act provides greater
protection from monitoring of on-duty communications and computer
use and of off-duty behavior because the privacy intrusion is greater in
those situations.
Further, as to on-duty communications, it may be difficult for
employers not to monitor “communications of nonemployment
activities” because an employer may incidentally monitor personal
nonemployment communications while monitoring employment
communications.161 The Proposed Act adopts a framework that is
intended to provide employers greater guidance and more flexibility to
monitor employees’ communications while at the same time providing
adequate protection for employees from monitoring of non-employment
related communications.
The exception in the Michigan Act effectively permits monitoring
on-duty behavior that “interferes with the performance of employees’
duties”162 with only a right to review and contest the gathered
information. The Proposed Act attempts to more clearly define the
standards under which monitoring of on-duty behavior is appropriate
and to provide employers more flexibility to monitor. It also provides
employees with safeguards in addition to the right to review and contest
because of the invasive nature of secret monitoring.
Ultimately the Michigan Act is a laudable attempt to protect
employees from collection and recording of private information.

Michael Ford, Two Conceptions of Worker Privacy, 31 INDUS. L.J. 135, 154 (2002) (“An individual
model of information and consultation is hardly sufficient, since it will suffer from the same
difficulties that bedevil consent: in the context of unequal bargaining power it will rarely be
genuine.”). See Childrey v. Capital Area Cmt. Sers., Inc., Nos. 204050, 207843, 1999 WL
33453925, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1999) (affirming the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment to the defendant for the plaintiff’s claim under the Employee Right to Know Act, noting
that the while the plaintiff refused to authorize the defendant to collect her personal information, the
plaintiff failed to show that the defendant actually collected such information).
161. For instance, even if an employer requested employees to mark e-mail “personal,” an
employee might forget resulting in monitoring of a personal e-mail. Or an employer might
reasonably believe an employee is using e-mail marked personal to share trade secrets, but discover
it is incorrect after monitoring the e-mail.
162. The standard for the exception is not clear. The employer may have to have concrete
outside evidence from non-monitoring that the activity is interfering with work before monitoring.
Or, for example, the employer may be able to assert that use of e-mail for personal purposes
generally interferes with work and, thus, will monitor all e-mail use without further safeguard.
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However, a law such as the Proposed Act, that more directly and
extensively addresses protection from technological monitoring, whether
as a stand alone bill, part of a personnel record act, or part of another
privacy scheme, would more adequately balance the protection of
employees’ rights to privacy with employers’ legitimate needs to
technologically monitor.
b. Illinois’ Prohibition on Monitoring
The Illinois statute (“Illinois Act”) prohibits monitoring of
“communications,” unmodified by the term “nonemployment,” and of
“nonemployment activities” in addition to prohibiting monitoring of
“associations, political activities, [or] publications.”163 It, thus, appears
to provide somewhat broader protection than the Michigan Act. Like the
Michigan Act, it provides an exception when the employee authorizes
the monitoring in writing.”164
Like the Michigan Act, the Illinois Act permits monitoring
“[a]ctivities that occur on the employer’s premises or during the
employee’s working hours” that165 “interfere with the performance of the
employee’s duties or the duties of other employees.”166 While a literal
reading of the Illinois Act suggests that there is no exemption to monitor
communications in any circumstances because only “activities” are
exempted, the legislature likely intended the exceptions to apply to all
the categories for which monitoring is prohibited.167 Also, like the
Michigan Act, any records permitted by this exception must be part of
the employee’s personnel record and subject to the employee’s
review.168
The Illinois Act, however, treats criminal conduct differently from
the Michigan Act. Rather than provide a right to monitor certain
criminal conduct without permitting review of the resultant records by
the employee, the Illinois Act permits monitoring of any criminal
conduct without review unless “the employer takes adverse personnel
action based on” the collected information.169 Information gathered
under exceptions for activities that “may reasonably be expected to harm

163. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/9 (2008).
164. Id.
165. Id. The statute says “which,” leading to a bit of ambiguity as to whether all on-duty
activities can be monitored, but the phrase appears to be limiting, not explanatory. See 40/9.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/10(g) (2008).
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the employer’s property, operations or business,” and activities that
could “cause the employer financial liability”170 are treated the same.
Unlike the Michigan Act, however, the remedial procedure
involves an administrative agency, the Illinois Department of Labor
(“Department”).
The employee must file a claim with the
Department.171 The Department can obtain a “subpoena to inspect the
files of the employer.”172 The Department will first attempt conciliation.
If conciliation is not successful and the Department “finds the employer
has violated the Act,” the Department may commence a court action,
including an action to obtain an injunction against prohibited
monitoring.173
If the Department elects not to file suit, then the employee may file
suit.174 The employee may obtain damages and injunctive relief.
Additional remedies like those of the Michigan Act are available for
willful violations. The Illinois Act also provides criminal sanctions and
an anti-retaliation provision.175
The Illinois Act permits an employee to review certain information
collected.176 The employer may require requests to be in writing on an
employer provided form.177 The right of review is for information that
is, has been, or is “intended to be used in determining that employee’s
qualifications for employment, promotion, transfer, additional
compensation, discharge or other disciplinary action . . . .” Employers
must grant at least two reviews per calendar year.178 In addition to
requirements like those in the Michigan Act regarding the time and
location of the review, the Illinois Act requires that the review take place
within seven “working days after the employee makes the request.” 179
The employer is also entitled when necessary to an additional seven-day
extension.180 In addition to requirements, like those in the Michigan
Act, permitting the employee to copy information, the Illinois Act
170. § 10(g).
171. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/12(b) (2008).
172. § 12(b).
173. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/12(b) (2008).
174. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/12(c) (2008). This is a traditional exhaustion requirement, but
the employer must assert failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense. See Robinson v. Morgan
Stanley, No. 06 C 5158, 2007 WL 2815839, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2007).
175. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/12(f) (2008).
176. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/2 (2008).
177. § 2.
178. § 2. The reviews must be “at reasonable intervals,” and a collective bargaining agreement
can provide for less than two reviews. Id.
179. See supra notes 153-154 and accompanying text; § 2.
180. § 2.
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requires the employer to let the designated representative of an employee
who is involved in a grievance review relevant information.181
The process for contesting information is similar to that in the
Michigan Act, but without a limit on the length of the statement an
employee may submit to contest information.182
The Illinois Act also contains a provision limiting disclosure of
“disciplinary action” to a third party.183
Like the Michigan Act, the Illinois Act contains extensive
procedures for review and contest of information that the Proposed Act
relies on as a model to ensure accuracy and reliability of information
collected by technological monitoring.184 Additionally, the Illinois Act
uses an enforcement procedure that involves an administrative agency.185
The Proposed Act also integrates an administrative agency into the
enforcement procedure on the rationale that involvement of an
administrative agency saves resources, permits employers more
flexibility, and is less costly for employees.186
The Illinois Act appears to protect more types of conduct from
monitoring than the Michigan Act and to provide employers more
flexibility to monitor. But the Illinois Act has several of the same
drawbacks as the Michigan Act, including the failure to extend
protection to monitoring of all employee behavior and the minimal level
of protection provided by authorization and a right to review.
3. Protection of Off-Duty Behavior
New York, North Dakota, and Colorado protect against discharge
or adverse action based on off-duty behavior.187

181. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/5 (2008).
182. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/6 (2008); see supra note 155 and accompanying text.
183. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/7 (2008).
184. See generally 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40 (2008).
185. See generally 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40 (2008).
186. See infra, Section VI. N.
187. Gely & Bierman, supra note 19, at 320. California has a provision that might be
interpreted as a similar statute prohibiting employers from discriminating on the basis of “conduct
occurring during nonworking hours away from the employer’s premises.” It permits the Labor
Commissioner to take assignment of any such claim filed by an employee. The provision has,
however, been interpreted by published California Court of Appeals decisions, to date, to provide
only a procedural means to vindicate constitutional privacy rights. Grinzi v. San Diego Hospice
Corp., 120 Cal. App. 4th 72, 86 (2004); Barbee v. Household Automotive Finance Corp., 113 Cal.
App. 4th 525, 532 (2003); see John S. Hong, Comment, Can Blogging and Employment Co-Exist,
41 U.S.F.L. Rev. 445, 462-65 (2007). Several employees have brought unsuccessful claims for
invasion of privacy under the California constitution pursuant to the statute when their employers
terminated them because of off-duty relationships. Barbee, 113 Cal. App. 4th at 531-32; Paloma v.
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a. New York’s Statute Prohibiting Discrimination against
Certain Off-Duty Activities
New York enacted a limited off-duty activities188 statute in 1992
(“New York Act”).189 The New York Act prohibits not only
termination, but also refusal “to hire, employ or license” and any
discrimination “in compensation, promotion or term, conditions or
privileges of employment” based on several categories of conduct.190
An employer is prohibited from discriminating against an employee
based upon the employee’s political activities, “legal use of consumable
products,” or legal recreational activities “outside work hours, off of the
employer’s premises and without use of the employer’s equipment or
other property.”191
“Recreational activity” is defined as “any lawful, leisure-time
activity, for which the employee receives no compensation and which is
generally engaged in for recreational purposes . . .”192 The definition
includes the following illustrative examples “sports, games, hobbies,
exercise, reading and the viewing of television, movies and similar

City of Newark, No. A098022, 2003 WL 122790, at *14 (Cal. App. Jan. 10, 2003); Agabao v. Delta
Design, Inc., No. D039642, 2003 WL 194950, at * 4 (Cal. App. Jan. 30, 2003); Tavani v. Levi
Strauss & Co., No. A095770, 2002 WL 31623684, at *17 (Cal. App. Nov. 21, 2002), and it appears
to be an open issue whether termination for other types of off-duty conduct would violate the
California constitutional right to privacy, Grinzi, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 80 n.3. A discussion of that
topic is beyond the scope of this article. Additionally, off-duty activity bills were introduced but did
not pass in Michigan and Pennsylvania. Sonne, supra note 18, at 176-77. Some states more
narrowly prohibit employers from restricting “employees’ freedom to shop, trade or patronize where
they will.” Sonne, supra note 18, at 172 & n.229. Connecticut provides protection for private
employees discharged for exercising the right to free speech about a matter of public concern. Jon
Darrow & Steve Lichtenstein, Employment Termination for Employee Blogging: Number One Tech
Trend for 2005 and Beyond, or a Recipe for Getting Dooced?, 2006 UCLA J.L. TECH. 4, at 50-59
(2006). Some scholars also classify Massachusetts’ statute that protects against “unreasonable . . .
interference with” privacy as a lifestyle discrimination statute. See, e.g., Sonne, supra note 18, at
177; Aaron Kirkland, Note, “You Got Fired? On Your Day Off?!”: Challenging Termination of
Employees for Personal Blogging Practices, 75 UMKC L. REV. 545, 556-57 (2006).
188. The types of statutes discussed in this section are commonly referred to as off-duty
activity or lifestyle discrimination statutes.
189. Some in New York refer to the New York Act as the Lawful Activities Law or the Legal
Activities Law.
190. Discrimination against the engagement in certain activities, N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2)
(McKinney 1992). One category is membership in a union or exercise of civil service rights.
191. § 201-d(2)(a) – (c). See id. § 201-d(1)(a) (defining “political activities”).
192. § 201-d(1)(b).
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material.” The definition also excludes discrimination because of other
employment.193
The definition of “recreational activities” is broad enough to
encompass much behavior that might be easily technologically
monitored, such as blogging, tweeting, or using Facebook.194 Blogging,
tweeting, and using Facebook are generally engaged in as a leisure
activity and, thus, would not run afoul of any interpretation of the New
York Act requiring that the activity be done for leisure.195 The New
York Act may not, however, extend to protect other types of behavior
that might be technologically monitored, such as dating someone of a
different race or associating with convicts, because this behavior may be
classified as a relationship rather than an activity. In fact, the New York
courts have generally read the statute restrictively to include only
activities like those listed and to exclude romantic relationships.196
The definition of work hours extends to “all time the employee is
actually engaged in work.”197 Thus an employer can discriminate
against an employee based on behavior that takes place at home while
working. For instance, if an employee is working on a computer at
home and smoking, the employer can terminate the employee for
smoking while working. Or, if an employee’s tweet stated the employee
is working and also engaging in behavior of which the employer
disapproves, the employee can be terminated for the disapproved
behavior or even for the tweeting itself. The definition also extends to
“paid and unpaid breaks and meal periods.”198 The inclusion of break
time is particularly problematic because if an employee engages in
political activity during break, the employee can be discriminated
against.
193. See Cheng v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 64 F. Supp. 2d 280, 285 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding claim
brought by employee whose duties included installing telephone equipment and who was installing
telephone equipment for personal profit was frivolous).
194. Cf. Cavanaugh v. Doherty, 243 A.D.2d 92, 100 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (“having alleged
that she was terminated as a result of a discussion during recreational activities outside of the
workplace in which her political affiliations became an issue, she has also stated a cause of action
for a violation of Labor Law § 201-d”); Richardson v. Saratoga Springs, 246 A.D.2d 900, 902 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1998) (“a reasonable factfinder could conclude he was discriminated against in
compensation and promotion because of his political activities outside of working hours.”).
195. While the statute requires only that the activity occur during leisure time, whether or not
done for leisure, one court has limited the activities to those done for leisure, linking the leisure and
recreational activity requirements. Kolb v. Camilleri, 02-CV-0117A(Sr), 02-CV-0117A, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 59549, at *36 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2008) (holding that picketing engaged in as a protest
is not a recreational activity because not engaged in “for his leisure”).
196. See infra note 211 and accompanying text; Hong, supra note 187.
197. § 201-d(1)(c).
198. § 201-d(1)(c).
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Finally, there are numerous exceptions, two of which warrant
further discussion.199 The exception for conflicts of interest exempts
activity which “creates a material conflict of interest related to the
employer’s trade secrets, proprietary information or other proprietary or
business interest.”200 Whether a material conflict with a business interest
is meant to be narrowly related to information similar to proprietary
information or expands the definition to encompass working for another
business in a related field is unclear. For instance, would a newspaper
reporter who freelanced for sports teams on which he reported be
engaged in activity creating a material conflict of interest with the
employer’s business interest?201 One federal court has interpreted the
exception broadly to permit “an employer” to discharge an employee
“for conduct that is detrimental to the company or that impacts an
employee’s job performance.”202
Another exception exempts employers who discriminate because
they believe that: 1) their actions are “required by statute, regulation,
ordinance or governmental mandate”; 2) their actions are “permissible
pursuant to an established substance abuse or alcohol program or
workplace policy, professional contract or collective bargaining
agreement”; or 3) the employee’s conduct was “deemed . . . illegal or to
constitute habitually poor performance, incompetency or misconduct.”203
Ascertaining how broad these exemptions are is difficult.204
An aggrieved employee may sue for “equitable relief and
damages.”205 Additionally, the attorney general may seek injunctive
relief and “a civil penalty in the amount of three hundred dollars for the
first violation and five hundred dollars for each subsequent violation.”206
Only one reported case addresses a situation where an employer
discovered some of the contested activity via technological

199. § 201-d(3).
200. § 201-d(3)(a).
201. See, e.g., St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1274 (2002) (Daly, Arb.).
202. Pasch v. Katz Media Corp., 94 Civ. 8554 (RPP), 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1574, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11153, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1995). But see McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance Am.
Corp., 237 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 2001). See also Aquilone v. Republic Nat’l Bank of N.Y., 98
Civ. 5451 (SAS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19531, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1998).
203. § 201-d(4).
204. One decision interprets the provision broadly to permit an employer to “discharge an
employee for conduct that is detrimental to the company or that impacts an employee’s job
performance.” Pasch, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11153 at *5. But see McCavitt 237 F.3d at 168. See
also Aquilone, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19531, at *17.
205. § 201-d(7)(b).
206. § 201-d(7)(a).
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monitoring.207 In Cheng, an employee whose job duties included
installing telephone equipment was discovered installing telephone
equipment for a number of competing businesses. One of the methods
used by the security investigator assigned to investigate the matter was
reviewing the employee’s “personal telephone billing records.”208 He
discovered through these records that the employee “had telephoned
from his home a competing telecommunications vendor.”209 Because
the case so clearly did not involve recreational activity, it does not
provide guidance on whether the New York Act would generally provide
any protection against employer technological monitoring of employees.
Many of the cases address the issue of whether, in various different
circumstances, an employer can terminate an employee for “a romantic
relationship” with a co-worker.210 The majority of courts have held that
an employer may do so,211 though not without some dissent.212 And one
federal district court decision suggested that an employer may not213 but
was impliedly overruled by the Second Circuit.214 While the issue is an
important one that the highest court of New York, the New York Court
of Appeals, has not yet addressed, it is not crucial when considering the
off-duty activities statutes as potential models for providing that
appropriate safeguards for employee privacy are in place when they are
technologically monitored by their employers.215

207. See Cheng v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 64 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
208. Id. at 282.
209. Id.
210. See infra note 211.
211. State v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 207 A.D.2d 150, 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (Yesawich, J.
dissenting); McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 495, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) aff’d 237 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2001); Hudson v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 283 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001); Bilquin v. Roman Catholic Church, 286 A.D.2d 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
212. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 207 A.D.2d at 152; see also McCavitt, 237 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2001)
(McLaughlin, J., concurring) (urging New York Appellate Court to adopt the position advanced in
Judge Yesawich’s dissent).
213. Pasch v. Katz Media Corp., 94 Civ. 8554 (RPP), 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1574, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11153 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 1995). But see McCavitt, 237 F.3d at 168. See also
Aquilone v. Republic Nat’l Bank of N.Y., 98 Civ. 5451 (SAS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19531, at
*17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1998) (holding that friendship is a protected recreational activity).
214. McCavitt, 237 F.3d at 168 (“To the extent that Pasch and Aquilone suggest a contrary
result, for the foregoing reasons, we disagree.”).
215. For instance, under the Proposed Act, firing someone for having a relationship would be
perfectly appropriate. In all of these situations reported in the New York decisions, the employer
learned of the relationship by some manner other than technological monitoring. The Proposed Act
would prohibit technological monitoring of off-duty relationships in the home and at times that offduty employees are in private areas. And in most instances, a relationship would not have a
concrete significant harm on the employer’s business and so an employee could not be
technologically monitored for off-duty relationships at all.
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The New York Act may provide some protection for an employee’s
privacy from being monitored off-duty because an employee could not
be disciplined for much behavior that might be discovered as a result of
monitoring, rendering the monitoring unnecessary. Yet, employees
would not have protection from any monitoring that led to a termination
for behavior that falls under the exceptions.216 In contrast, the Proposed
Act would permit technological monitoring to discover off-duty
behavior that would have a significant, concrete harm on the employer,
such as the employee who was working for competitors in the Cheng
case, but it would protect employees’ privacy by providing that
employers implement certain safeguards.
Furthermore, the nature of the invasion of privacy resulting from
the monitoring is not addressed by the off-duty activity statutes. Rather,
similar to many arbitration decisions in discharge cases, the focus is on
job security and correcting inequitable discipline. A statute more
focused on protecting employees’ privacy from technological
monitoring, such as the Proposed Act, would more clearly remedy the
invasion of privacy resulting from the monitoring itself.
b. North Dakota’s Statute Protecting Lawful Off-Duty
Activity
As part of its anti-discrimination statute, North Dakota prohibits
employers from “failing or refusing to hire a person,” discharging an
employee, or according “unequal treatment to” an employee “with
respect to . . . a term, privilege, or condition of employment . . .” because
of “participation in lawful217 activity off the employer’s premises during
nonworking hours218 which is not in direct conflict with the essential
business-related interests of the employer.”219 (“North Dakota Act”).

216. See, e.g., Reiseck v. Universal Commc’n of Miami, 06 Civ. 0777 (TPG), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26013, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2009) (deciding that an employer, located in New York
City, did not terminate an employee who traveled to Florida on the weekends “because she spent her
free time traveling as a leisure activity” but because the employer “believed that her job
performance would be impacted by the long-distance commute.”).
217. Hougum v. Valley Mem’l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 822 (N.D. 1998) (holding that there
was a factual question as to whether a plaintiff’s conduct was lawful).
218. See Jose v. Norwest Bank N.D., N.A., 599 N.W.2d 293, 298 (N.D. 1999) (holding that
participating in an internal employer investigation of another employee did not involve off-duty
activity).
219. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2008). The Supreme Court of North Dakota decided that,
in a case where a chaplain for a memorial home was terminated for masturbating in a Sears
restroom, there was a factual issue as to whether the plaintiff’s conduct directly conflicted with the
employer’s business–related interests. Hougum, 574 N.W.2d at 822.
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The broad ban would appear to reach much conduct that might be
technologically monitored. 220 It extends to protecting an employee’s
right to work at another job unless the other job is directly in conflict
with an essential interest of the employer.
An exception nevertheless permits an employer “to discharge” an
employee if participating in the lawful activity “is contrary to a bona fide
occupational qualification that reasonably and rationally relates to
employment activities and the responsibilities of a particular employee
or group of employees . . . .”221 The exception suggests employers may
terminate employees for a range of activity that is not contrary to the
employer’s essential business interest. And the Eight Circuit has
interpreted the requirement that the qualification relate to a particular
employee or group of employees, rather than all employees, to
encompass any activity that would not be problematic if done by some
other employee.222
Because the off-duty conduct prohibition is part of the larger antidiscrimination statute, an employee may elect either to file a claim with
the North Dakota Department of Labor or to file a suit.223 The employee
may obtain injunctive and equitable relief, including two years of back
pay. A court may grant the prevailing party attorney’s fees. The
Department is authorized to investigate complaints, conciliate, hold
hearings, and educate the public and employers. The statute also
contains an anti-retaliation provision.224
220. See Hong, supra note 187, at 470 (emphasizing that the conflict must be direct and must
relate to an essential business interest not simply any business interest); Lichtenstein & Darrow,
supra note 187, at 38 (noting blogging “could meet the statutory requisites of being carried out in a
lawful manner off the employer’s premises during non-working hours.”).
221. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-08 (2008). It also permits an employer to “fail or refuse to
hire” on the same basis. Id. In Hougum, the court also held there was a factual issue as to whether
the exception for a bona fide occupational qualification applied. 574 N.W.2d at 822. The court
must have reasoned that unlike a claim where a financial impact is at stake, the particular facts of
the business and the plaintiff’s role as a chaplain would need to be considered to determine if a
conflict existed or whether the exception applied. See id. Because it is part of the antidiscrimination statute there is also an exception for “a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production.” N.D. CENT. CODE § 1402.4-09 (2008).
222. Fatland v. Quaker Corp., 62 F.3d 1070, 1073 (8th Cir. 1995). Indeed the Eighth Circuit
interpreted the exception to encompass an employee’s violation of a conflict of interest policy when
he used his position that required interacting with clients to obtain information from the client that
he then used in his business that was in competition with the client’s business. Id. The court
reasoned that while the conflict-of-interest policy would apply to the janitor, engaging in an
analogous business would not be a conflict for the janitor because the janitor’s position would not
require interaction with clients. Id.
223. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-19(2) (2008).
224. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-18 (2008).
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Like the New York Act, the North Dakota Act may provide
employees some protection from technological monitoring. Because it
permits employees to elect whether to file claims with the Department or
in court, it likely provides employees who desire an efficient or
cooperative outcome a good process while also ensuring that employers
comply due to the threat of lawsuits.
Yet, also like the New York Act, the North Dakota Act is not
designed to adequately safeguard employees’ privacy. 225 As one
commentator has noted, the requirement that the off-duty conduct be
lawful does not appear to relate to the impact the conduct may have on
the employer’s business.226 The Proposed Act does not distinguish
between monitoring lawful and unlawful off-duty conduct but rather
requires that the conduct will cause a significant harm to the employer.
Additionally, the North Dakota Act’s use of the bona fide occupational
qualification exception creates confusion as to what off-duty behavior
employers may base disciplinary decisions on.227
c. Colorado’s “Legal Activities” Statute
The Colorado statute, enacted in 1990, prohibits employers from
terminating an employee for “engaging in any lawful activity off the
premises of the employer during nonworking hours . . .”228 (“Colorado
Act”).
There are three exceptions. First, an employer can terminate an
employee if the employee violates a “bona fide occupational
requirement.”229 It is unclear what is meant by “bona fide occupational
requirement.”230 Could an employer prohibit employees from blogging
about work, or sending an e-mail about work to a friend? In one case, a
federal district court indicated that a bona fide occupational requirement

225. See supra discussion in Section III.C.3.a.
226. Jason Bosch, Note, None of Your Business (Interest): The Argument for Protecting All
Employee Behavior with No Business Impact, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 639, 657 (2003).
227. Terry Morehead Dworkin, It’s My Life – Leave Me Alone: Off the Job Employee
Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 47, 82-83 (1997) (discussing how the use of the
term “bona fide occupational qualification” to substitute for “business necessity” rather than to
mean the extremely difficult standard to meet that it connotes in the Title VII context creates great
“possibilities for confusion.”).
228. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2007).
229. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a).
230. Dworkin, supra note 227, at 82-83; Gwin v. Chesrown Chevrolet, Inc., 931 P.2d 466, 471
(Colo. App. 1996) (holding that the exception did not apply when an employee demanded a refund
from a motivational speaker that the employer had encouraged, but not required, employees to
attend).
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includes a duty of loyalty to the company when engaging in public
communications.231 But the Colorado court of appeals stated that no
Colorado court has approved the holding that a duty of loyalty is a bona
fide occupational requirement.232
Second, an employer can terminate an employee if “the employee
violates a restriction reasonably and rationally related to the employment
activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or a particular
group of employees . . .”233 The federal court also indicated that the
exception relating to a particular employee or group of employees was
probably intended to apply to “certain high profile members” of an
employer’s staff and that to expand the exception “to include all
members of the workforce” would mean that the exception would
“swallow the general rule.”234
Third, an employer can terminate an employee to avoid the
appearance of or a conflict of interest “with any responsibilities of the
employer.”235 The exception appears very broad; an employer could
probably bar an employee from doing contract work or volunteering at
certain organizations. Yet, the federal district court interpreted it
narrowly to involve only situations where fiduciaries stand to obtain a
private gain or to disregard their duty to the employer because of private
interest or another duty.236
An aggrieved employee may sue in court for damages and for lost
wages and benefits.237 If successful, the employee is entitled to court
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees from the employer.238
Notably a statute of limitations is not specified, which led to
litigation over the appropriate statute of limitations.239
231. Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1458, 1463 (D. Colo. 1997). The employer
terminated the employee for writing a letter critical of the employer to the newspaper. Id. at 1460.
The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s letter was simply a “disgruntled worker venting his
frustrations” without using the proper internal channels. Id. at 1463; see Elizabeth R. Rita & Eric D.
Gunning, Navigating the Blogosphere in the Workplace, 35-MAY COLO. LAW 55, 57-58 (2006)
(concluding the statute probably protects blogging, but employees may violate the duty of loyalty by
blogging about work).
232. Watson v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 207 P.3d 860, 865 (Colo. App. 2008).
233. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a) (2007).
234. Marsh, 953 F. Supp. at 1463-64.
235. § 24-34-402.5(1)(b).
236. Marsh, 953 F. Supp. at 1464.
237. § 24-34-402.5(2)(a). But see Watson, 207 P.3d at 865 (interpreting the Colorado Act to
provide for back pay as the sole remedy).
238. § 24-34-402.5(2)(b)(I).
239. Galieti v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 F. Supp. 104, 105-06 (D. Colo. 1993)
(applying six-month statute of limitations); Galvan v. Spanish Peaks Reg’l Health Ctr., 98 P.3d 949,
951 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to follow Galieti and apply a six-month statute of limitations);
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Of the three states’ off-duty activity statutes, the Colorado Act has
arguably been interpreted by the courts in a manner that is most
protective of employees. Although it likely provides some protection
from monitoring of off-duty behavior, it suffers from the same
difficulties as the North Dakota Act. Additionally, it is limited to a
prohibition on termination so employers may be more likely to monitor
employees for the purpose of implementing discipline less than
termination.
D.

International Law

Legislation and other procedures that have been enacted by other
countries that protect employees from employer technological
monitoring are also helpful to consider as starting points for legislation.
Many regions and countries have laws governing how employers may
monitor their employees. And several articles have investigated one or
another of these systems.240
This section focuses on the laws of the European Union as a useful
source.241 While the history of both workplace rights and protection of
employees’ autonomy are different in Europe than in the United States,
both the United States and the member states of Europe are developed
Western countries242 and the United States Department of Commerce has
adopted principles to comply with European privacy principles.243
Moreover, recently, a group of large multi-national companies has called
for the United States to enact a comprehensive privacy protection law to
“harmonize” the United States’ approach with that of the European
Union.244

Keynen J. Wall & Jacqueline Johnson, Colorado’s Lawful Activities Statute: Balancing Employee
Privacy and the Rights of Employers, 35-DEC COLO. LAW. 41, 44 (2006) (stating that a two-year
statute of limitations applies).
240. See infra note 374.
241. It is beyond the scope of this article to investigate all the possible foreign models. Such
an investigation would likely be voluminous enough for a book.
242. Cf. Yohei Suda, Monitoring E-mail of Employees in the Private Sector: A Comparison
Between Western Europe and the United States, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 209, 213, 261
(2005) (concluding that “the level of employee privacy protection [from e-mail monitoring] is
similarly low in both Western Europe and the United States” but predicting that Western Europe
will likely “increasingly limit e-mail monitoring”).
243. Evans, supra note 18, at 1142 (noting that England shares a legal heritage with the United
States and has changed toward a European approach in privacy law and that “the very existence of
the EU and English law favoring protection of employee privacy is putting pressure on the United
States to adopt similar law.”).
244. Schwartz, supra note 25, at 904.
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The governing legislative bodies of the European Union, The
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, adopted a
Directive, designed to respect the fundamental right of privacy when
processing personal data, in 1995.245 The Directive was based on the
longstanding European understanding set out previously by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and correspondence”246 and by the
extension to respect of “communications” in the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union.247
The use of the word
“communications” in place of “correspondence” was to modernize the
principle to keep pace with advancing technology and the reality that
many now communicate online.248
The Directive’s Article 29 established an independent Working
Party on The Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data (Working Party) to serve an advisory role, including
drafting documents to deal with particular privacy situations.249 Several
have been issued that deal with workplace privacy and employer
technological monitoring.250 Additionally, the Directive mandated the
member countries to establish national privacy agencies.251
This section first discusses the Working Party documents, then the
rules governing establishment of national privacy agencies. Finally, it
discusses the framework adopted by the United States Commerce
Department to permit United States companies to continue to process
European personal data.

245. Council
Directive
95/46,
1995
O.J.
(L
281)
(EC),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf.
&
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part2_en.pdf. [hereinafter
Directive]; see also Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201/37) (EC); Council Directive
2006/24, 2006 O.J. (L 105/54) (EC) (amending Council Directive 2002/58, 2006 O.J. (L 105/54)
(EC).
246. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, WORKING DOCUMENT ON THE
SURVEILLANCE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE 7 (2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp55_en.pdf.
247. Id. at 10.
248. Id.
249. Directive, supra note 245, article 29.
250. See discussion infra Section III.D.1
251. See discussion infra Section III.D.2.
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1. The Working Party Documents
The Working Party functions as an advisory group. It fosters
uniformity in the implementation of the Directive across member
countries.252 Four of the Working Party documents are particularly
helpful to examine as potential models for an act protecting privacy from
employer technological monitoring.253 These address “the processing of
personal data in the employment context,” workplace surveillance of
electronic communications, video surveillance, and employee location
data.254
a. General Principles Governing Processing of Personal Data
One Opinion of the Article 29 Working Party addresses the
“processing of personal data in the employment context.”255 The
opinions are numbered, and this one is designated Opinion 8/2001.
Opinion 8/2001 deals with “the processing of personal information in the
employment context.”256 Opinion 8/2001 interprets the Directive as it
applies to the employment setting.257
These “data protection requirements apply to the monitoring” of
employees, including e-mail use, Internet use, “video cameras or
location data.”258
Opinion 8/2001 outlines seven “fundamental data protection
principles” that employers must comply with whenever monitoring
employee’s personal data.259 These principles are somewhat similar to
the safeguards that arbitrators in the United States use to protect
employees’ workplace privacy.260 The principles are: 1) finality; 2)

252. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 8/2001 ON THE PROCESSING
PERSONAL DATA IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT 2 n.1 (2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2001/wp48en.pdf.
253. See also ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, WORKING DOCUMENT ON
BIOMETRICS
(2003),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp80_en.pdf;
see
generally
ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION ON THE PROPOSALS AMENDING
DIRECTIVE 2002/58/EC ON PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS (E-PRIVACY DIRECTIVE)
(2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp159_en.pdf.
254. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 2.
255. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 2.
256. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 2.
257. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 2.
258. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 24.
259. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 3; see also Directive, supra note 245, art.
6, 7, 17.
260. See supra Section III.A for a discussion of the safeguards.
OF
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transparency; 3) legitimacy; 4) proportionality; 5) accuracy and retention
of data; 6) security; and 7) awareness of the staff.261
Finality requires that an employer collect data “for a specified,
explicit and legitimate purpose” and use the data only in a manner
compatible with that purpose.262 It is similar to the legitimate business
interest requirement for monitoring on-duty communications and
computer use imposed by the Proposed Act but requires additional
restrictions on use.
Transparency is a minimum requirement. Employers should
provide notice of the data they are collecting and the purposes of the
collection.263 Employers should also provide the employee access to the
collected data. Additionally, employers should notify the appropriate
national authority of the collection of the data.264 Transparency
encompasses concepts similar to the notice safeguards and the safeguard
of reliability and accuracy of records in the Proposed Act.
Legitimacy requires that the data processing be “‘necessary for’ the
achievement of the objective in question.”265 Examples include data
processing “necessary for the performance” of the employment contract;
data processing “necessary for compliance with a legal obligation” such
as reporting to the tax authorities; or data processing necessary “for the
purposes of the legitimate interest pursued by the” employer unless the
interest is outweighed “by the interests for fundamental rights” of the
employee.266 The latter is a balancing test that balances the employer’s
interests versus the employee’s interests, and the employee “retains the
right to object to the processing” when the employee has “compelling
grounds” to do so.267 The Legitimacy of processing certain types of data
is even more limited.268 These types of data reveal “racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, [or] trade
union membership” or concern “health or sex life . . . offences, criminal

261. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 3; see Herbert, supra note 25, at 403
(discussing these principles).
262. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 3; see also Directive, supra note 245, art.
6.
263. See Directive, supra note 245, art. 10.
264. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 3.
265. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 15.
266. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 15; see also Directive, supra note 245,
art. 7.
267. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 15; see also Directive, supra note 245,
art. 14.
268. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 16-17; see also Directive, supra note 245,
art. 8.
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convictions or security measures.”269 Alternatively, the employer can
obtain an employee’s “unambiguous consent” to the data processing.270
Consent is valid only where an employee may “withdraw consent
without prejudice.”271 If the loss of a job opportunity results from
refusing or withdrawing consent, the consent is not valid.272 Thus, the
Working Party advises employers not to rely on consent.273 While the
Proposed Act does not contain an analogous safeguard, the premise
underlying the Proposed Act is that it appropriately balances employees’
right to privacy and employers’ legitimate interests in technological
monitoring. Additionally, in some instances, under the Proposed Act,
employers must use the safeguard of exhaustion, which requires
exhaustion of other methods of verification or discovery before resorting
to monitoring.
Proportionality requires that the data be “adequate, relevant and not
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected.”274 It
further requires that the data processing “be fair” to the employee and
processed “in the least intrusive way.”275 While there is no analogous
safeguard in the Proposed Act, the framework of the Act which requires
more safeguards the more invasive the type of intrusion is intended to
limit excessive monitoring. Additionally, in some instances, under the
Proposed Act, employers may use the safeguard of limited monitoring,
which requires monitoring to be no more extensive than necessary.
Accuracy and Retention of the Data requires that employers keep
accurate records, erasing and rectifying information that is incorrect.276
The Proposed Act’s safeguards for accuracy and reliability of
information are designed to ensure correctness of maintained
information.
Security requires employers to maintain the information collected
in a secure manner by taking appropriate technological and personnel

269. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 16.
270. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 16. Consent for processing of the data
that are more highly protected must be “explicit.” ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at
23.
271. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 23.
272. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 23.
273. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 23.
274. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 3, 21; see also, Directive, supra note 245,
art. 6.
275. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 21.
276. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 21; see also Directive, supra note 245,
art. 6.
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measures.277 The Proposed Act contains a mandate for employers to
maintain information in a secure manner.
Awareness of the staff requires employers to properly train those
responsible for “processing of personal data.”278 The summary asserts
that “[w]ithout an adequate training of the staff handling personal data,
there could never be appropriate respect for the privacy of workers in the
workplace.”279 The Proposed Act does not mandate training though
many employers would likely train their employees to foster compliance
with the Proposed Act.
Employees have the right to damages for “any act incompatible
with data protection legislation.”280
b. Rules Governing Workplace Surveillance of Electronic
Communications
Supplementing Opinion 8/2001 is a May 2002 Working Document
on the Surveillance of Electronic Communications in the Workplace.281
The Document outlines the minimum requirements employers must
include in their policies governing e-mail and Internet use. Further
elaboration by employers in their policies “taking into account the
peculiarities of a given company” are appropriate.282
The Document begins with the precept that private life “is not
limited to life within home” and “does not exclude” an employee’s
professional life.283 The Document interprets the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
decisions284 under it by the European Court of Human Rights to establish

277. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 22; see also Directive, supra note 245,
art. 14.
278. ARTICLE 29 OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 22.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 24; see also Directive, supra note 245, art. 22, 23 (member countries must provide
judicial remedy, including compensation).
281. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, WORKING DOCUMENT ON THE
SURVEILLANCE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE (2002), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp55_en.pdf; see Herbert, supra
note 25 at 401-02 (discussing the working document).
282. SURVEILLANCE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE , supra note 281,
at 4.
283. SURVEILLANCE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 281,
at 6.
284. See generally Niemietz v. Germany, App. No. 13710/88, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep 97 (1992),
available
at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=13710/8
8&sessionid=27644349&skin=hudoc-en (holding that an attorney had a right of privacy in his
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three sub-principles. First, employees “have a legitimate expectation of
privacy at the workplace” that is not outweighed by use of an employer’s
The
“communication devices” or “other business facilities.”285
expectation may be reduced but not eliminated by providing notice of
private
correspondence
include
monitoring.286 Second,
“communications at the workplace,” including e-mail. Third, an
employer’s “legitimate need for surveillance measures” is limited by
employees’ right “to establish and develop relationships with other
human beings,” including in the workplace.287
The Document then interprets the Directive as applied to
monitoring of e-mail and Internet use. It requires compliance with each
of the seven principles described in Opinion 8/2001.288
The Document further elaborates on the meaning of transparency.
No covert e-mail monitoring is permitted except in limited
circumstances, such as to investigate a criminal act or where “national
laws” permit employers to monitor employees to detect workplace
infractions and provide “necessary safeguards.”289
The Document divides transparency into two aspects. The first is
the obligation to provide employees “with a readily accessible, clear and
accurate” statement of the policy on monitoring e-mail and Internet
use.290 The policy should: 1) describe in detail the extent to which
personal use of company technology is permitted; 2) provide the
“reasons and purposes for which surveillance . . . is being carried out”;
3) state the “details of the surveillance measures,” including who and
what will monitor, how the monitoring will work, and when the
monitoring will take place; and 4) provide “[d]etails of any enforcement
procedures outlining how and when workers will be notified of breaches
of internal policies and be given the opportunity to respond to any such
claims against them.”291 As to enforcement, the Working Party
recommends immediately notifying an employee “when misuse of

business which was searched by police); Halford v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 523, 551
(1997) (holding that intercepting an employee’s phone calls violated the convention).
285. SURVEILLANCE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 281,
at 9.
286. Id. at 17-18.
287. Id. at 8-9.
288. See supra notes 259-261 and accompanying text.
289. SURVEILLANCE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 281,
at 14.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 15.
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electronic communications” is detected.292
They suggest using
“software such as warning windows, which pop up and alert” the
employee “that the system has detected an unauthorized use of the
network.”293 The Working Party also mentions Directive 2002/14/EC
that requires “information and consultation of employees on decisions
likely to lead to substantial changes in work organization or in
contractual relations” and its applicability to monitoring electronic
communications.294
While this framework provides for somewhat more extensive
notice, particularly of enforcement procedures, than the Proposed Act,
the Proposed Act similarly makes extensive use of the safeguard of
notice, requires notice in most circumstances, and limits monitoring
without notice to situations where the employer provides other adequate
safeguards. The Proposed Act also incorporates employee participation,
although not to the extent of the Directive.
The second aspect of transparency provides employees a right of
access to information collected by electronic monitoring. The Document
quotes the Directive:
[E]very data subject is entitled to obtain from the controller (the
employer in this case):
a) without constraint at reasonable intervals and without
excessive delay or expense:
Confirmation as to whether or not data relating to the worker are
being processed and information at least as to the purposes of the
processing, the categories of data concerned, and the recipient or
categories of recipients to whom the data are disclosed,
Communication to him in an intelligible form of the data
undergoing processing and of any available information as to their
source,
Knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic processing of
data concerning him at least in the case of automated decisions;
b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the
provision of which does not comply with data protection law, in
particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data;
c) notification to third parties to whom the data have been
disclosed of any rectification, erasure or blocking carried out in

292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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compliance with the previous obligations, unless this proves
impossible or involves a disproportionate effort.295

The Proposed Act also grants a right of review and to contest
information.296 The right of review in the Proposed Act applies to
certain categories of information, rather than all information collected.
The rationale is that this permits the employee to review the information
the employee is most likely to be interested in, including that upon
which decisions about individual terms and conditions are made, but
reduces the administrative expense from that incurred to provide review
of all collected information.
The Document also provides specific guidance on proportionality
as applied to e-mail and Internet use. “Blanket monitoring of individual
e-mails and Internet use of all staff” is prohibited “other than where
necessary for the purpose of ensuring the security of the system.”297 The
Document suggests monitoring only “traffic data on the participants and
time of a communication rather than the contents.”298 The Document
further suggests that if necessary to monitor content, the employer
should include a warning that content is monitored on all outgoing
messages. As to Internet use, the Document recommends using
“blocking, as opposed to monitoring, mechanisms.”299 The Proposed
Act is not as inflexible in its requirements although it does guarantee that
in most instances blanket monitoring will not occur and that in other
instances other appropriate safeguards will protect employees’ privacy.
As to security, the Document states, “It is of great importance that
the system administrator and anyone else who has access to personal
data about workers in the course of monitoring, is placed under a strict
duty of professional secrecy with regard to confidential information, to
which they have access.”300 This requirement is similar to the Proposed
Act’s safeguard of confidentiality, which some employers may elect to
use.
The Document specifically enumerates another three mandatory
principles: 1) necessity; 2) notifying the supervisory authority before
carrying out automatic surveillance; and 3) providing employees access

295.
296.
297.
at 17.
298.
299.
300.

Directive, supra note 245, art. 12.
Directive, supra note 245, art. 12.
SURVEILLANCE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 281,
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
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to the fruit of the surveillance.301 The latter two requirements were
required by the Opinion 8/2001 but were not explicitly enumerated.
Necessity “means that the employer must check if any form of
monitoring is absolutely necessary for a specified purpose before
proceeding to engage in any such activity.”302 The Working Document
states, “Traditional methods of supervision, less intrusive for the privacy
of individuals, should be carefully considered and, where appropriate,
implemented before engaging in any monitoring of electronic
communications.”303 The requirement of necessity permits monitoring
an employee’s e-mail or Internet use only in “exceptional
circumstances,” such as to verify criminal activity or actions for which
the employer is liable or “to guarantee the security of the system.”304
Necessity also requires that an employer maintain the collected data no
longer than necessary.305 While this requirement is similar to the
exhaustion safeguard in the Proposed Act, the Proposed Act does not
limit the circumstances in which an employer may monitor to such a
great degree.
The Document also makes several other suggestions. The
Document suggests that employers provide employees “with two e-mail
accounts,” one for work use and one for personal use.306 The account for
work use could be monitored by meeting the requirements of the
Document. The account for personal use could “only be subject to
security measures and would be checked for abuse in exceptional
cases.”307 While the suggestion of permitting a personal account for
personal messages is appealing, there are several difficulties with it.
First, from the employee’s perspective, someone may send a personal
message to the employee on the work account. Additionally, the
employee may send a message containing both work and personal
information or may inadvertently send a personal message on the work
account. Second, from the employer’s perspective, there is no reason
that an employee could not engage in a host of problematic uses of the
personal e-mail account for which the employer would desire to monitor,
such as competitive activity, revelation of trade secrets, harassing or
defamatory statements.

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
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Id.
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Id. at 14.
Id. at 5. Alternatively, the employer could provide employees access to webmail. Id.
Id.
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The Document also suggests that technology should be used to
prevent Internet misuse and that “a blanket ban on personal use of the
The
Internet by employees does not appear to be reasonable.”308
Document reiterates three principles. First, “prevention should be more
important than detection.”309 Second, only when less invasive checks
such as of time spent on the Internet or of “sites most frequently visited
by a department” disclose potential misuse of the Internet should
additional monitoring be implemented.310 Third, employers should
“exercise caution” before determining an employee has engaged in
misuse because unintended visits to webpages happen for a variety of
reasons.311 The Proposed Act prohibits a ban on personal use of the
employer’s communications technology. This advice is all solid in light
of that prohibition although the Proposed Act provides considerable
flexibility to employers to decide whether or not to follow these
suggestions.
c. Rules Governing Video Surveillance
In 2004, the Working Party issued an opinion addressing
“processing of personal data by means of Video Surveillance.”312 It
contains a section on video surveillance “in the employment context.”313
It generally prohibits “video surveillance systems aimed directly at
controlling, from a remote location, quality and amount of working
activities . . . .”314 Video may, however, be used, “subject to appropriate
safeguards, to meet production and/or occupational safety
requirements . . . .”315 It further prohibits video surveillance in areas
“reserved for employees’ private use or . . . not intended for the
discharge of employment tasks—such as toilets, shower rooms, lockers
and recreation areas.”316
There are also restrictions on discipline and requirements for access
and reliability of the data. It prohibits using video images obtained “to
safeguard property” or “detect or prevent serious offenses” to “charge an
308. Id. at 4.
309. Id. at 24.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 4/2004 ON THE PROCESSING
OF PERSONAL DATA BY MEANS OF VIDEO SURVEILLANCE 1 (2004), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp89_en.pdf.
313. Id. at 24.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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employee with minor disciplinary breaches.”317 It requires that
employees can use the images “to lodge their counterclaims.”318
While more restrictive than the Proposed Act, the rules governing
video surveillance of on-the-job activity do contain some similarities.
Notice is a key safeguard before monitoring.319 Additionally, the
requirement of access and reliability of the data are similar to those
required by the Proposed Act. The Proposed Act does not restrict
employers from technologically monitoring work activity to determine
its quality or quantity. Thus, to the extent that silent video is
encompassed in the Working Party opinion, it is more restrictive than the
Proposed Act. Like the Proposed Act, video is prohibited in certain
areas reserved for private use, but the Proposed Act does not extend the
protection to recreation areas that are not typically used to change where
employees bodily integrity is not an issue.
d. Rules Governing the Use of Employee Location Data
The Working Party promulgated an opinion on the use of location
data with a view to providing value-added services in November
2005.320 The Opinion is not limited to the employment context but
contains a section on “location of employees.”321 The Opinion reiterates
the applicability of Opinion 8/2001. As noted by William Herbert, the
Working Party was particularly concerned with two issues: “the degree
of monitoring . . . that is acceptable” and “the illusive line between work
and private life.322
The Opinion states that “the processing of location data on
employees must correspond to a specific need on the part of the
company which is connected to its activity.”323 The Opinion provides
the following examples of permissive monitoring: monitoring an
employee who transports people or goods; monitoring with the goal of
improving “distribution of resources for services in scattered locations”;
and monitoring to maintain the security of the employee or property the
employee is responsible for. The Opinion provides the following

317.
318.
319.
320.

ARTICLE 29, OPINION 4/2004, supra note 312, at 25.
Id.
Id.
ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 11/2005 ON THE USE OF
LOCATION DATA WITH A VIEW TO PROVIDING VALUE-ADDED SERVICES 1 (2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp115_en.pdf.
321. ARTICLE 29, OPINION 11/2005, supra note 320, at 9.
322. Herbert, supra note 25, at 408.
323. ARTICLE 29, OPINION 11/2005 , supra note 320, at 10.
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examples of excessive monitoring: monitoring when “employees are
free to organize their travel arrangements as they wish,” and monitoring
“an employee’s work where [it] can be monitored by other means.”324
The Opinion prohibits employers from monitoring an employee’s
location “outside” the employee’s “working hours.”325 The Opinion
recommends “that equipment made available to employees, especially
vehicles that can also be used for private purposes, be equipped with a
system allowing employees to switch off the location function.”326
The Proposed Act uses a similar framework that permits more
extensive monitoring of employees activity via GPS when on-duty than
when off-duty. However, as to monitoring on-duty conduct via GPS, the
Proposed Act provides employers more leeway to monitor provided
appropriate safeguards, such as notice, are in place. As to off-duty
behavior, some monitoring is permitted in certain specified
circumstances.
2. Rules governing establishment of national privacy agencies
Under the Directive, each member state must establish “an
independent governmental entity, known as a supervisory authority, to
ensure compliance with the national legislation enacted consistent with
the Privacy Directive.”327 The supervisory authorities are similar to
federal and state administrative agencies.328 The supervising authority
must be “consulted when drawing up administrative measures or
regulations relating to the protection of individuals’ rights and freedoms
with regard to the processing of personal data.”329 Additionally, they
have the following powers: 1) “investigative powers”; 2) the power to
intervene, such as to block, erase, or destruct data, to impose “a
temporary or definitive ban on processing,” or to refer the matter to
higher authorities;330 3) the power to “hear claims” of violations of the
Directive;331 and 4) the power to “engage in legal proceedings” or to
bring violations “to the attention of the judicial authorities.”332 Those
aggrieved by the supervising authorities’ decisions may appeal to the

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Herbert, supra note 25, at 390; Directive, supra note 245, art. 28.
Herbert, supra note 25, at 390.
Directive, supra note 245, art. 28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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courts.333 The supervising authority must regularly issue public reports
concerning its activities.334 The “members and staff of the supervisory
authority” are subject to “a duty of professional secrecy.”335
The establishment of a federal agency and related state agencies
devoted to privacy issues related to new technologies may be ideal.336
But because establishment of such an agency is unlikely to pass as part
of employment legislation and because, in the United States, privacy
issues addressed in other areas are often neglected in the employment
sphere, the Proposed Act places responsibility for enforcement of the
Proposed Act with the DOL. The DOL is, however, bestowed with
broad adjudicatory, educational, advisory, and compliance guidance
responsibilities.
3. The U.S. Department of Commerce Safe Harbor Procedure
Because the United States does not provide an adequate level of
protection for personal data to satisfy the requirements of the Directive,
the European Commission negotiated a solution with the United
States.337 An agreement was reached in 2000.338
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally Schwartz, supra note 25.
Herbert, supra note 25, at 391; ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY,
OPINION 1/99 CONCERNING THE LEVEL OF DATA PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
ONGOING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT,
2
(1999)
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1999/wp15en.pdf.
There are other
means available for entities in the United States to ensure that data imported from Europe is in
compliance with the Directive. Schwartz, supra note 25, at 926. One means is for multi-national
companies or groups of affiliated entities to enter into Binding Corporate Rules. Binding Corporate
Rules are corporate codes that must integrate the principles of the Directive. While they must
contain provisions that it would be useful to consider relating to disclosure of personal information,
such as requiring a designated privacy officer, training of employees dealing with personal data, and
sanctions, such as discipline, for employees violating the principles of the Directive, their focus is
on enabling global transfer of information, an issue beyond the scope of this paper. See ARTICLE 29
DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, WORKING DOCUMENT ON FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
(FAQS)
RELATED
TO
BINDING
CORPORATE
RULES
(2008)
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2008/wp155_rev.04_en.pdf; ARTICLE 29
DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, WORKING DOCUMENT SETTING UP A TABLE WITH THE
ELEMENTS AND PRINCIPLES TO BE FOUND IN BINDING CORPORATE RULES (2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2008/wp153_en.pdf; ARTICLE 29 DATA
PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, WORKING DOCUMENT SETTING UP A FRAMEWORK FOR THE
STRUCTURE
OF
BINDING
CORPORATE
RULES
(2008),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2008/wp154_en.pdf; ARTICLE 29 DATA
PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, RECOMMENDATION 1/2007 ON THE STANDARD APPLICATION FOR
APPROVAL OF BINDING CORPORATE RULES FOR THE TRANSFER OF PERSONAL DATA (2007),

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

55

Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 1

LEVINSON - FINAL WESTERN.DOC

386

5/3/2010 11:28 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[43:331

As a result of the agreement, the U.S. Commerce Department
provides a “safe harbor framework.”339 An employer can certify that it
complies with the “safe harbor framework” to assure European Union
organizations that the employer provides adequate privacy protection.340
The Commerce Department maintains a “regularly updated” list of
companies “that have self-certified to the safe harbor framework” on a
publicly available webpage.341
To avail itself of the safe harbor framework, an employer must
adopt a “published privacy policy statement” that states its adherence to

available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/workinggroup/wpdocs/2007_en.htm;
ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, WORKING DOCUMENT ESTABLISHING A MODEL
CHECKLIST APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF BINDING CORPORATE RULES (2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp108_en.pdf; ARTICLE 29 DATA
PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, WORKING DOCUMENT ON TRANSFERS OF PERSONAL DATA TO
THIRD COUNTRIES: APPLYING ARTICLE 26(2) OF THE EU DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE TO
BINDING CORPORATE RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL DATA TRANSFERS (2003), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp74_en.pdf; See also Miriam
Wugmeister, Karin Retzer & Cynthia Rich, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Global Solution for CrossBorder Data Transfers: Making the Case for Corporate Privacy Rules, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 449
(2007). Another means is to enter into a standard contractual clause with the European entity
exporting the data to the United States. This framework is not discussed here because the
contractual obligation is not involved in establishing a legislative framework that applies directly to
United States companies; in other words, there is no contract between entities involved. See
Commission Decision 2001/497/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 181) 19 (on standard contractual clauses for the
transfer of personal data to third countries); Commission Decision 2002/16/EC, 2002 O.J. (C) (on
standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third
countries); Commission Decision 2004/915/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 385/74) (EC) (as of 27 December
2004 amending Decision 2001/497/EC as regards the introduction of an alternative set of standard
contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries); Commission Staff Working
Document SEC(2006) 95 on the implementation of the Commission decisions on standard
contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries (2001/497/EC and
2002/16/EC); ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 3/2009 ON THE DRAFT
COMMISSION DECISION ON STANDARD CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES FOR THE TRANSFER OF PERSONAL
DATA TO PROCESSORS ESTABLISHED IN THIRD COUNTRIES, UNDER DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC (data
controller to data processor) (2009).
338. ARTICLE 29, OPINION 1/99, supra note 337, at 2; Commission Decision 2000/520/EC,
2000 O.J. (L 215/7) pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related
frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce [hereinafter Commission
Decision]; Letter from John Mogg, Director European Commission, to Robert LaRussa, Under
Secretary for International Trade of the United States Department of Commerce, (July 17, 2000)
(available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018486.asp); Letter from Robert
Pitofsky, of the FTC, to John F. Mogg, Director European Commission (July 27, 2000) available at
http://www.export.gov/static/FTCLETTERFINAL_Latest_eg_main_018266.pdf.
339. Export.gov,
Safe
Harbor
Overview,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eg_main_018236.asp (last visited June 10, 2009).
340. Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 339.
341. Id.
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the safe harbor requirements.342 The employer must also “self certify
annually to the Department of Commerce in writing that it agrees to
adhere to the safe harbor’s requirements.”343 To ensure self-regulation,
the employer can join a self-regulatory privacy program that adheres to
the safe harbor’s requirements; or (2) develop its own self-regulatory
privacy policy that conforms to the safe harbor.344
The employers must comply with “seven safe harbor principles:” 1)
notice, 2) choice, 3) transfer to third parties, 4) access, 5) security, 6)
data integrity, and 7) enforcement.
First, notice requires that an employer notify employees “about the
purposes for which” the employer collects and uses information, how to
make an internal inquiry or complaint, “the types of third parties to
which it discloses the information,” and the means for limiting use and
disclosure.345
Second, choice requires that employees be provided an opportunity
to opt out of disclosure of personal information to third parties and of
use “for a purpose incompatible with the purpose for which it was
originally collected.” Choice also generally requires that employees opt
in to disclosure of sensitive information.346 There is an exception,
however, when processing is “necessary to carry out the organization’s
obligations in the field of employment law.”347
Third, transfers to third parties, or onward transfer, requires that
when disclosing information to agents, without notice and choice, the
agents “subscribe to the safe harbor principles,” are “subject to the
Directive or other adequacy finding,” or enter into a written agreement
to “provide at least the same level of privacy protection as required by
the relevant principles.”348
Fourth, access requires an employee have access to information
collected “and be able to correct, amend, or delete that information
where it is inaccurate” unless the burden “of providing access would be
disproportionate to the risks to the individual’s privacy” or “the rights of
persons other than the individual would be violated.”349

342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
347. Export.gov,
FAQ
–
Sensitive
Data,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018375.asp (last visited June 10, 2009). There are
also five other exceptions. Id.
348. Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 339.
349. Id.
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Fifth, security requires that the employer “take reasonable
precautions to protect personal information from loss, misuse and
unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and destruction.”350
Sixth, data integrity requires that information must be “relevant for
the purposes for which it is to be used,” accurate, complete, current, and
“reliable for its intended use.”351
Finally enforcement consists of three requirements. There must be
an affordable, independent, and “readily available” mechanism to
resolve disputes and, “where the applicable law or private sector
initiatives so provide,” award damages.352 There must be “procedures
for verifying that the commitments companies make to adhere to the safe
harbor principles have been implemented.”353 And, the employer must
be obligated to “remedy problems arising out of a failure to comply with
the principles.”354 “Sanctions must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure
compliance. . . .”355 “[T]hey must include publicity for findings of noncompliance and deletion of data in certain circumstances.”356
For human resources data, a Data Protection Panel (DPP),
“composed of representatives of various EU data protection authorities,”
serves as the dispute resolution mechanism.357 For other types of data, a
company may choose the DPP as the mechanism or may choose a
private dispute resolution mechanism.358
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) can seek “civil penalties of
up to $12,000 per day for violations” by self-certified companies subject
to its jurisdiction.359 The FTC has jurisdiction under Section 5 of the

350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Data Protection Panel (related to FAQ’s 5 and 9 issued by the US Department of
Commerce, and annexed to Commission Decision 2000/520/EC on the adequacy of the “safe
harbor”
privacy
principles)
July
25,
2005,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/adequacy/information_safe_harbour_en.pdf;
Export.gov,
Helpful
Hints
Prior
to
Self-Certifying
to
the
Safe
Harbor,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eg_main_018245.asp (last visited June 10, 2009); see also Jorg
Rehder & Erika C. Collins, The Legal Transfer of Employment-Related Data to Outside the
European Union: Is It Even Still Possible, 39 INT’ L LAW 129, 148 (2005).
358. Helpful Hints, supra note 357.
359. Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 339. The FTC does not have jurisdiction over “banks,
saving and loans and credit unions; telecommunications and interstate transportation common
carriers, air carriers and packers and stockyard operators, and some of the business of the insurance
industry.” Commission Decision, supra note 338, Annex VII, at *47. The Department of
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Federal Trade Commission Act over “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.”360 The FTC’s position is that “a
company’s failure to abide by a stated privacy policy is likely to be a
deceptive practice.”361 The FTC, however, does not “resolve individual
consumer disputes” so it would pursue an individual’s complaints only
when “the company has engaged in a pattern of improper conduct.”362
The FTC has nevertheless assured the Commission of the European
Union that it will give priority to claims “of non-compliance with safe
harbor principles from EU Member States.”363 The FTC can issue cease
and desist orders after conducting “a formal hearing” and it can “seek a
temporary restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in
U.S. district court.”364
Companies that “persistently fail” to comply with the safe harbor
principles will lose their certification.365
If the FTC, the DOT, or any other “body responsible for ensuring
compliance with the Principles implemented”366 is not enforcing the safe
harbor principles, the Commission can inform the Department of
Commerce and revoke agreement to the safe harbor framework as to the
companies who are under that agency’s jurisdiction.367
The safe harbor framework applies to “employment-related
data.”368 The FTC has concluded that it “has the same jurisdiction in the
employment-related data situation as it would generally under Section 5
of the FTC Act.”369 Thus, the FTC can take action in a case when “a
company that represents it complies with U.S. safe harbor principles . . .
transfers or uses employment-related data in a manner that violates these
principles.”370 Nevertheless, the majority of employment-related cases
Transportation has authority to enforce the safe harbor framework as to U.S. air carriers or ticket
agents. Helpful Hints, supra note 357.
360. Commission Decision, supra note 338, at *7.
361. Letter from Robert Pitofsky to John F. Mogg, supra note 338, at 5.; Commission Decision,
supra note 338, at *41.
362. Commission Decision, supra note 338, at *41.
363. Letter from Robert Pitofsky to John F. Mogg, supra note 338, at 2; Commission Decision,
supra note 338, at *40.
364. Export.gov,
Safe
Harbor
Enforcement
Overview,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018481.asp (last visited July 30, 2009).
365. Export.gov,
Safe
Harbor
Overview,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eg_main_018236.asp (last visited July 30, 2009).
366. Commission Decision, supra note 338, at *9.
367. Letter from Robert Pitofsky to John F. Mogg, supra note 338.
368. Id.
at
5;
Export.gov,
FAQ
–
Human
Resources,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018381.asp (last visited June 10, 2009).
369. Commission Decision, supra note 338, at *42.
370. Id.
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will be handled by the Data Protection Authority and the DPP.371 When
an organization refuses to comply with the advice of the Data Protection
Authority, the Data Protection Authority can ask the FTC to prosecute or
can revoke the self-certification of the organization.372
Like the safe harbor framework, the Proposed Act relies on
employers to adopt policies to protect employees’ privacy. The benefits
of flexibility for employers inherent in the framework are, thus, also
inherent in the Proposed Act. Also similar to the safe harbor framework,
which requires a fee to cover the expenses associated with certifying a
company, the Proposed Act includes a fee to cover the expenses
associated with providing opinions on whether a policy satisfies the
mandates of the Proposed Act. Additionally, the relatively successful
implementation of the safe harbor framework illustrates that employers
in the United States are able to adapt to and comply with a somewhat
sophisticated privacy regulation, particularly when guidance is provided
by an administrative agency, as in the Proposed Act.
Unlike the safe harbor framework, the Proposed Act does not rely
on a process of self-certification, which might create unnecessary
administrative burden. Rather, employers are expected to adopt policies
that comply with the law. The DOL will make available model policy
provisions that an employer can adopt and will provide opinions on
other policies that strive to incorporate greater protection than that
provided by the model policy provisions. Thus, an employer is provided
a level of assurance of compliance, similar to the safe harbor framework
certification.
IV. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS:
SCHOLARS ADDRESS THE PROBLEM
Various academic proposals address how to best protect
employees’ privacy at work, some of which propose legislation that
would protect employees from technological monitoring.373 Some
371. See Export.gov, supra note 368; Data Protection Panel, (related to FAQ’s 5 and 9 issued
by the US Department of Commerce, and annexed to Commission Decision 2000/520/EC on the
adequacy of the ‘safe harbor’ privacy principles) supra note 357.
372. Export.gov, FAQ – The Role of the Data Protection Authorities,
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018378.asp (June 10, 2009).
373. Sherman, supra note 18, at 653 (“employers should be allowed unfettered monitoring of
email transmitted over their own email systems. However, the characteristics of webmail support a
parallel conclusion that employers should not be permitted to monitor email communications when
workers use their webmail.”); Jacobs, supra note 37, at 878 (suggesting federal statute based on the
Workers Act that contains provisions for “notice, audit, and remedies.”); William A. Wines &
Michael P. Fronmueller, American Workers Increase Efforts to Establish a Legal Right to Privacy
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scholars rely on the law of other countries as a foundation for legislation
in the United States.374 Others endorse the Workers Act,375 and several
recommend notice provisions similar to those in the Notice Act or those
currently in force in Connecticut and Delaware.376 Many authors
address protecting employees from discharge based on off-duty activity,
in a manner similar to the off-duty activity statutes,377 although the
proposals generally do not address monitoring of such activity.378
as Civility Declines in U.S. Society: Some Observations on the Effort and Its Social Context, 78
NEB. L. REV. 606, 642 (1999) (proposing, among other requirements, good cause for termination
and monitoring only with notice and consent); see generally Thomas R. Greenberg, Comment, EMail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U.L. REV. 219
(1994) (proposing amendments to the ECPA); McCartney, supra note 97, at 891 (proposing federal
legislation “that provides a generalized protection for the right to privacy” and establishes a Data
Protection Board to administer the Act).
374. Michael L. Rustad & Sandra R. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee E-mail and Internet
Usage: Avoiding the Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop: Insights from Europe, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 829, 884-90 (2005); Robert G. Schwartz, Jr., Privacy in German Employment Law, 15
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 135, 167 (1992) (proposing German example as a “useful
guide”); Evans, supra note 18, at 1148 (proposing federal legislation based on English law); Ray
Lewis, Comment, Employee E-mail Privacy Still Unemployed: What the United States Can Learn
from the United Kingdom, 67 LA. L. REV. 959, 962 (2007) (proposing “abandonment of the ECPA
and the adoption of legislation that mirrors the provisions, ideas, and foundations of electronic
privacy law of the United Kingdom—the Data Protection Act.”); see also Fiore & Weinick, supra
note 3 at 529 (relying on European concept of dignity to justify proposed federal legislation
regulating employers who use video surveillance).
375. Amanda Richman, Note, Restoring the Balance: Employer Liability and Employee
Privacy, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1337, 1360-61 (2001); see generally Julie A. Flanagan, Note, Restricting
Electronic Monitoring in the Private Workplace, 43 DUKE L.J. 1256 (1994) (supporting Workers
Act with only minor revisions); David Neil King, Note, Privacy Issues in the Private-Sector
Workplace: Protection from Electronic Surveillance and the Emerging Privacy Gap, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 441, 471-73 (1994) (endorsing Workers Act with only two misgivings); see generally Note,
Addressing the New Hazards of the High Technology Workplace, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1898
(endorsing PCWA with only minor revisions); see also Kevin J. Conlon, Privacy in the Workplace,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 285, 294-95 (1996) (proposing provisions similar to the Workers Act but
more protective of employees privacy); see generally Susan Ellen Bindler, Note, Peek & Spy: A
Proposal for Federal Regulation of Electronic Monitoring in the Work Place, 70 WASH. U. L.Q.
853 (1992) (proposing substantial changes to the Workers Act); Boehmer, supra note 18, at 812-19
(proposing substantial changes to the PCWA).
376. Frayer, supra note 103, at 874 (2002); Nathan Watson, Note, The Private Workplace and
the Proposed “Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act”: Is “Notice” Enough?, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 79,
(2001); Lois R. Witt, Comment, Terminally Nosy: Are Employers Free to Access our Electronic
Mail?, 96 DICK. L. REV. 545, 569-70 (1992) (endorsing notice provisions of Workers Act).
377. William A. Herbert, The Electronic Workplace: To Live Outside the Law You Must be
Honest, 12 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 49, 104 (2008) (suggesting that state laws could place
“express statutory limitations on the scope of employer electronic surveillance” of off-work
activities); see generally Hong, supra note 187, (proposing lifestyle discrimination statutes as a
means to protect employee’s privacy to blog when off-duty).
378. See generally Shelbie J. Byers, Note, Untangling the World Wide Weblog: A Proposal for
Blogging, Employment-At-Will, and Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 245
(2007) (proposing lifestyle discrimination statutes be extended to cover speech as well as activity
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In addition to these statutory solutions that are reflected in the
previously discussed proposed legislation or law, some scholars have
proposed activity-specific regulation,379 such as laws targeted to protect
blogging or e-mailing, and others have proposed regulation of a
particular means of monitoring, such as by video or GPS.380 While these
solutions are practical, they fail to address the problem of technological
monitoring of employees in a comprehensive manner. 381
A few scholars have previously proposed broader legislation to
address employees’ privacy, including from technological monitoring.382
For example, one proposal recommends federal legislation with a
business-necessity test for collection of information about employees.383
The proposal would require “notice of the type of information that will
be collected and the purpose for which it will be collected”384 and would
require the use of the least intrusive manner of collection.385 It
and conduct as a means to protect employees from termination from adverse employment action
based on blogging); Ann L. Rives, Note, You’re Not the Boss of Me: A Call for Federal Lifestyle
Discrimination Legislation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553 (2006) (proposing federal lifestyle
discrimination statute that covers personal relationships as well as other conduct); see also Kirkland,
supra note 187 (proposing federal lifestyle discrimination statute); Dworkin, supra note 227, at 84
(proposing use of a “reasonable business necessity standard” to justify termination based on an
employee’s associations); Hill & Delacenseri, supra note 42, at 55 (proposing just cause as solution
to problem of lack of privacy for off-duty activity).
379. See generally Gely & Bierman, supra note 19 (legislation to protect blogging); Gantt,
supra note 37 (proposing legislation to protect use of e-mail at work); Hong, supra note 187
(proposing lifestyle discrimination statutes as a means to protect employee’s privacy to blog when
off-duty); Peter J. Isajiw, Comment, Workplace E-Mail Privacy Concerns: Balancing the Personal
Dignity of Employees with the Proprietary Interests of Employers, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
73, 99 (2001); Rodriguez, supra note 98, at 1442 (proposing “statutory presumption, whereby an
employee would be presumed to have reserved her right to e-mail privacy unless expressly waived,
as a possible means for strengthening the right to e-mail privacy in the private sector workplace.”);
Peter Schnaitman, Comment, Building a Community Through Workplace E-Mail: The New Privacy
Frontier, 5 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 177, 214 (1998-1999) (proposing federal legislation
that requires employers to adopt e-mail policies.).
380. See Yung, supra note 37 (legislation to address monitoring via GPS); Fiore & Weinick,
supra note 3 (legislation to address monitoring via video surveillance); Cf. Robert Sprague,
Rethinking Information Privacy in an Age of Online Transparency, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
395, 416 (2008) (suggesting amending “‘lawful conduct’ statutes to prohibit employers from using
publicly available personal information that could be obtained through Internet search in their hiring
decisions or imposing requirements similar to those applicable to credit reports on the use of such
information).
381. Levinson, supra note 14, at 628.
382. Wilborn, supra note 18, at 876 (proposing “a comprehensive federal statute based on our
broad constitutional principles of privacy”); Pincus & Trotter, supra note 115; see also Lee, supra
note 50, at 171 (proposing federal legislation governing use of employers’ communication
technology that would require monitoring to be reasonable).
383. See generally Pincus & Trotter, supra note 115.
384. Id. at 86.
385. Id.
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additionally incorporates a confidentiality requirement386 and some
The
limitations on disclosure of information to third parties.387
comprehensive nature of the proposal is exemplary, and the Proposed
Act contains similar safeguards, as well as additional protections for
employee privacy from technological monitoring. But the Proposed Act
is intended to allow employers more flexibility to monitor than a
proposal with across-the-board requirements for business necessity and
use of the least intrusive manner of collection.
Moreover, despite the variety of proposals to address the problem,
few scholars have proposed an actual draft of an act, 388 and the majority
that have done so propose off-duty conduct statutes.389 An actual draft is
important to show how protections could be put into practical effect. A
draft statute may help those suggesting various methods of protecting
employees’ privacy from workplace technological monitoring think
more concretely about the particulars of how to protect workplace
privacy. Thinking about the particulars may cause scholars to refine, or
even reconsider the workability of, prior proposals that sketch their ideas
about workplace privacy protection in broader strokes.390 Additionally,
an actual draft may be helpful in pushing legislatures to adopt real
change. Providing a legislature with a draft rather than only ideas may
result in a more receptive audience because a draft appears to provide a
more definite course for reform and to be less onerous than starting from
scratch. The legislature may have to assess every provision and may
decide to change every one, but by providing a starting point, the process
of beginning may be made easier.391

386. Id. at 87.
387. Id. at 88.
388. Blackowicz, supra note 37, at 105-06 (proposing a draft of a section amending the ECPA
that would “address the proper scope of disclosure.”).
389. Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not at Work? Limiting the Use
of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
625, 680-82 (2004) (proposing an off-duty conduct statute); Byers, supra note 378 (proposing
lifestyle discrimination statutes extended to cover speech as well as activity and conduct as means to
protect employees from termination from adverse employment action based on blogging); Rives,
supra note 378 (proposing federal lifestyle discrimination statute that covers personal relationships
as well as other conduct); Kirkland, supra note 187 (proposing federal lifestyle discrimination
statute); Hong, supra note 187, at 460 (draft language of a lifestyle discrimination statute that
specifically includes protection for “engaging in Internet communications”).
390. Cf. Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will
Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 84 (2008) (describing how she changed her
thoughts about how to best protect employees from unwarranted terminations when she drafted a
proposed statute).
391. See Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 2, at 358 (“it is imperative to have a discussion of
concrete legislative solutions to privacy problems” to “provide useful guidance to legislators”).
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTION: AN ACT TO ENSURE PRIVACY FOR
EMPLOYEES FROM TECHNOLOGICAL MONITORING
A draft of the Proposed Act is set out in this section, V. The
Proposed Act is annotated with footnotes to disclose the specific
sources, most of which have been discussed above, from which the
language or ideas are drawn. In the next section, VI., some of the major
considerations that went into the choices underlying the proposal, which
may not be apparent from the text of the Proposed Act, are discussed.
More minor choices are included in the footnotes annotating the statute
in this section, V.
The Proposed Act is not necessarily intended as a model but rather
as a deliberate effort to draft statutory language that appropriately
balances the need of employers to monitor with the right of employees to
appropriate safeguards for their privacy. The author believes that further
academic scholarship, the wisdom of practitioners, and the expertise of
legislatures and their staffs, will further refine the proposal into a piece
of legislation that can fill an important legal gap. The author also
believes that the Proposed Act would be only one step in addressing the
privacy issues raised by new technologies, in the employment setting, at
a comprehensive level.
A.

Short Title
This Act may be cited as the Privacy Protection in Employment

Act.
B.

Purpose and Findings

1. Purpose. This Act safeguards the privacy of employees who
are or may be technologically monitored by their employers.
2. Findings. Current law fails to adequately protect employees’
privacy when the employees are technologically monitored by their
employers.392
An estimated 77 percent of employers technologically monitor their
employees.
Approximately, 14 million “are under ‘continuous’
surveillance . . . for their Internet access or e-mail usage.”393 Yet,
approximately two out of every three “corporate workplaces have no

392. See supra note 18.
393. Levinson, supra note 14, at 616.
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policy requiring their employees to manifest consent to electronic
monitoring or acknowledging their workplace monitoring activities.”394
The European Union considers current United States law
inadequate to protect employees’ privacy.395
Technological monitoring involves interstate commerce and is of
cross-border concern.
Many of the communications or actions
monitored, such as e-mail messages or Internet hits, occur across
interstate lines. The issue is, thus, one of national importance.396
C.

Definitions

Technological Monitoring. Technological monitoring is the collection
of information about an employee “conducted by a [means] other than
direct observation by another person.”397 Technological monitoring
includes electronic monitoring, monitoring by means of a computer,
telephone, wire, radio, camera, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, photooptical system, GPS, RFID, and video surveillance whether or not
silent.398
Employer. Employer means any person, including “any individual,
corporation, partnership, [firm], labor organization, unincorporated
association, or any other legal business”399 who is engaged in commerce
and for whom an individual performs work “for more than one quarter of
the year”400 and any agent of such a person.401 Employer excludes the
Federal Government and any State or political subdivision thereof.
Employee. Employee means any person who works, including parttime, for an employer “in exchange for financial remuneration.”402
394. Rustad & Paulson, supra note 374, at 830 (quoted in Levinson, supra note 14, at 616).
395. See supra note 25.
396. See infra note 512.
397. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, S. 984, 103d Cong. § 2(2)(A) (1993). See also
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d (2008) (defining electronic monitoring as “the collection of
information on an employer’s premises concerning employees’ activities or communications by any
means other than direct observation, including the use of a computer, telephone, wire, radio,
camera, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photo-optical systems . . .”).
398. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d (2008); MODEL ELECTRONIC PRIVACY ACT, supra note 122,
at § 1(a).
399. S. 984; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(a) (2008).
400. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02(8) (2008).
401. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.501(2)(b) (2008).
402. MODEL ELECTRONIC PRIVACY ACT, supra note 122, at § 1(b). The Proposed Act does not
cover applicants for employment. The focus of this article is rectifying the failure of the law to
adequately protect employees from technological monitoring. Monitoring of applicants raises
issues different than monitoring of employees, which are beyond the scope of this article. See
Boehmer, supra note 18, at 814-15 (discussing how more liberty to monitor applicants may lead to
less monitoring of employees).
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Employee includes persons “subject to recall after layoff or leave of
absence with a right to return” to a position with the employer.403
On Duty. On duty means all time an employee is “expected to be
engaged in work” or is “actually engaged in work.”404 If not working, an
employee is not on-duty during breaks, including meal period breaks, or
during leaves of absence, including time for family medical leave or
disability leave.
Off Duty. Off duty means any time an employee is not engaged in, or
expected to be engaged in, work.
D.

Monitoring On-Duty Behavior

An employer must not technologically monitor an employee’s onduty behavior unless it institutes the following safeguards:
1. Notice of Monitoring. The employer must provide the employee
individualized advance notice in writing that technological monitoring
will take place. The notice must be clear and conspicuous and
reasonably calculated to provide the employee actual notice of the
monitoring. 405 A notice that provides monitoring “may” take place or
that the employer “reserves the right” to monitor will not suffice.
2. Notice of Type of Monitoring. The notice must specify the type of
monitoring that will occur, such as specifying that e-mail will be
monitored by software or by periodic review of the mail server, that
content on the computer screen will be monitored by keystroke
monitoring technology, that e-mail stored on the server will be reviewed
in response to court-ordered discovery, or that video surveillance will
occur.
3. Notice of Information Collecting. The notice must specify the type
of information that will be obtained.406
4. Notice of Intended Use. The notice must specify how the employer
will use the obtained information.407
5. Notice of Infractions. The notice must specify the types of
infractions that, if discovered via the monitoring, will result in
discipline.408

403. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/1(a) (2008).
404. NY McKinney’s Lab. Law Sec. 201-d.
405. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. § 2711(b) (2000).
406. H.R. 4908, at § 2711(b)(2).
407. Id. § 2711(b)(4). For instance, it might describe the manner in which it will be used to
gauge productivity or how it will be used for disciplinary purposes.
408. Levinson, supra note 14, at 644. While other rules or policies may describe potential
infractions, it is easy enough to reference those other rules or policies in the notice.
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6. Annual Notice of Monitoring. When monitoring continues for more
than a year, the employer must provide annual individualized written
notice that the monitoring continues to take place and must specify the
type of monitoring, the type of information that will be collected, and the
intended use of the information.409
7. Accurate and Reliable Records. To ensure accuracy and reliability
of information collected via technological monitoring, the employee
must have the right to review, copy, and contest the information as set
forth below.
a. Right to Review. The employer must provide each employee a
“reasonable opportunity to review and, upon request, [obtain] a copy
of”410 any information collected that has been or will be used to make
employment decisions about the employee, including promotions,
transfer, counseling, assignments, compensation, scheduling, or
discipline, including discharge.411 This information does not include
“materials relating to the employer’s staff planning with respect to more
than one employee,”412 such as across-the-board “salary increases,
management bonus plans,”413 “business’ development, expansion,
closing or operational goals.”414
Upon completion of the monitoring or upon initiating the process of
making an employment decision, whichever occurs first, the employer
must provide each employee” a “reasonable opportunity to review and,
upon request, [obtain] a copy of” the required documentation and any
information collected about the employee during monitoring without
notice on reasonable grounds, under sections E (Monitoring On-Duty
Actions Without Notice), G (Monitoring of On-Duty Communications
Without Notice), or I.3 (Monitoring Off-Duty Behavior—Other
Places).415
The employer must provide each employee” a “reasonable
opportunity to review and, upon request, [obtain] a copy of” any
information collected about the employee through which the employee is
identifiable that will be released to a third party, such as through court
discovery.416

409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
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See H.R. 4908, at § 2711(a)(2) (2000) (providing for annual notice).
Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, S. 984, 103d Cong. § 7(a) (1993).
See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/2 (2008).
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.501(2)(c)(ii) (2008).
§ 423.501(2)(c)(ii).
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/10(c) (2008).
S. 984, at § 7(a).
S. 984, at § 7(a).
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“The employer shall grant at least two inspection requests by an
employee in a calendar year when requests are made at reasonable
intervals.”417
“The employer shall provide the employee with the inspection
opportunity within [seven] working days after the employee makes the
request or if the employer can reasonably show that such deadline
cannot be met, the employer shall have an additional [seven] days to
comply.”418
“The review shall take place at a location reasonably near the
employee’s place of employment and during normal office hours. If a
review during normal office hours would require an employee to take
time off from work with that employer, then the employer shall provide
some other reasonable time for the review. The employer may allow the
review to take place at another time or location that would be more
convenient to the employee.”419
b. Right to Copy. “After the review . . . an employee may obtain a copy
of the information or part of the information . . . . An employer may
charge a fee . . . limited to the actual [cost of copying, for providing a
copy of the information]. If an employee demonstrates that he or she is
unable to review his or her personnel record at the employing unit, then
the employer, upon that employee’s written request, shall mail a copy of
the requested record to the employee.”420
c. Right to Contest. “If there is a disagreement with information . . . ,
removal or correction of that information may be mutually agreed upon
by the employer and the employee. If an agreement is not reached, the
employee may submit a written statement explaining the employee’s
position.”421 The statement must be maintained with the original
information “as long as the original information” is maintained and
“included when the information is divulged to a third party.”422
d. Right to Agent. The employee has the right to choose an agent,423
such as a co-worker, union representative, or attorney, to conduct the
review of the information with the employee or to contest the accuracy
of the information.

417. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/2 (2008).
418. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/2 (2008).
419. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.503 (2008).
420. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 423.503-423.504 (2008).
421. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.505 (2008).
422. § 423.505.
423. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, S. 984, 103d Cong. § 7(B)(1) (1993) (uses the
term “authorized agent”).
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Monitoring On-Duty Actions without Notice

Notwithstanding the requirements of Section D, 1-6, “if the
employer has reasonable grounds to believe that” 424 an employee has
engaged in a violation of a written work rule or written work policy, a
violation of law, or behavior that has significantly and concretely
harmed the employer, an employer may technologically monitor,
without complying with Section D, 1-6, an employee or a suspected
group of employee’s on-duty actions or “an area [on the employer’s
premise] in which the” infraction occurred425 by complying with the
below safeguards and adopting and complying with a policy that adopts
model provisions promulgated by the DOL for monitoring of on-duty
actions without notice.426
1. Documentation. The employer must document in writing, before
monitoring, the behavior suspected and the intended means of
monitoring. The statement should include the grounds for suspicion,
such as the names of witnesses and a summary of their testimony or a
summary of relevant documentary evidence. Upon completion of
monitoring, the employer must document in writing the means of
monitoring used and the length of time of the monitoring. The
documentation must be retained for three years or until any claim or suit
brought under this Act is resolved.427
2. Qualification. An employer may not monitor under the provisions of
this section, E., when the employer already has sufficient evidence,
obviating the need to monitor, that a particular employee has committed
an infraction.

424. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. § 2711(c) (2000).
425. S. 984, at § 5(C)(1)(B).
426. Rather than use a “reasonable suspicion standard” the Proposed Act uses a “reasonable
grounds” standard. The standard should not be confused with the Fourth Amendment standard,
which may require particularized suspicion before monitoring an individual. Rather, if a known
violation, such as theft or smoking, has occurred, the employer may monitor the area and any
employees who enter the area. Relatedly, commentators have noted in relation to the Workers Act
that:
If notice needs to be given to employees who are not under suspicion, but who will be
monitored, many complications are foreseeable. An example of this is a manufacturer
who has reasonable suspicion that an employee is stealing merchandise. Although the
employer can justify putting a hidden camera in the employee’s area without informing
the employee under suspicion, the Bill requires the employer to inform all other
employees that may appear in the camera’s range of the monitoring. It is reasonable to
assume in many instances that the employee’s friends will inform the suspect of the
monitoring and the employer will not be able to discipline the wrongdoer.
Baxi & Nickel, supra note 97, at 146.
427. S. 984, at § 5(C)(2)(C).
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Monitoring On-Duty Communications

An employer must not technologically monitor an employee’s use
of the employer’s communications technology, including computers, or
an employee’s on-duty communications unless the employer has a
legitimate business interest in prohibiting communications or use of the
employer’s communications technology that is likely to negatively
impact the business or workplace. The employer must also comply with
the below safeguards and must technologically monitor only pursuant to
a written policy that adopts and complies with model provisions
promulgated by the DOL for engaging in noticed monitoring of the
employer’s communications technology and on-duty communications.
1. Presumptions. The following types of use of an employer’s
technology or on-duty communications are presumed likely to
negatively impact the business or workplace and to provide an employer
a legitimate business interest for monitoring.
a. Unlawful Use.
Unlawful use of the employer’s technology,
including unlawful use of a computer, and unlawful communications,
such as downloading images of child pornography or making
defamatory statements.
b. Offensive Communication. Viewing or making statements of a
racially or sexually offensive nature.
c. Proprietary Information. Personal use of the employer’s proprietary
information.
d. Solicitation. Requesting donations for organizations for personal
use.428
e. Disrespect. Communications that are disrespectful of management or
criticize the employer.429
2. Minimal Negative Impact. When the negative impact on the
business or workplace is likely to be minimal, the employer must
mitigate the level of discipline imposed on a first-time violator, from that
which would normally be imposed for any discovered infraction, in
consideration of the private nature of the communication or use. The
employer should consider the degree to which the prohibited information
was kept private, such as whether it was shared with no one, shared only
with the employee’s friends or acquaintances, or the number of others
with whom it was shared. The level of discipline imposed should be

428. This presumption does not include requests to join or support organizations and is not
intended to change the protected nature of certain solicitations under the NLRA.
429. This is not intended to change the protected nature of certain disrespectful statements
under the NLRA.
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mitigated more considerably the more private the nature of the
communications or use.
Presumptions. The types of use of an employer’s communications
technology or on-duty communications listed in F.1.d. & e. (Solicitation
and Disrespect) are presumed to only minimally negatively impact the
business or workplace.
3. Monitoring of Employee’s Communications Technology on
Employer’s Property. An employer must not monitor an on-duty
employee’s employee-owned technological communications devices
located on the employer’s property, such as a cell phone or pager,
without complying with the safeguards set forth in section I.3
(Monitoring of Off-Duty Behavior—Other Places).
Nothing in this Act prohibits an employer from banning employees’
personal communications technology from the workplace or from
prohibiting use of such technology in certain areas or at certain times.
G.

Monitoring of On-Duty Communications without Notice

Notwithstanding the requirements of Section D, 1-6, “if the
employer has reasonable grounds to believe that”430 an employee has
engaged in a violation of a written work rule or written work policy that
is likely to negatively impact the business or workplace, a violation of
law, or behavior that has significantly and concretely harmed the
employer, an employer may technologically monitor, without complying
with Section D, 1-6, an employee’s use of the employer’s
communications technology, including computers, or an employee’s onduty communications by complying with the below safeguards and
adopting and complying with a policy that adopts model provisions
promulgated by the DOL for monitoring of the employer’s
communications technology and monitoring of on-duty communications
without notice.431 The employer must also comply with Section E.1.
(Documentation).
1. Excessive Use. An employer may only monitor without notice for the
purpose of discovering an employee’s excessive use of the employer’s
communication technology when the employer has reasonable grounds
to believe that the employee is engaged in excessive personal use of the
technology that is likely to detrimentally impact the employee’s job
performance. The employer must exhaust other methods of verification

430. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. § 2711(c) (2000).
431. S. 984, at § 4.
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or discovery before resorting to the reasonable grounds surreptitious
monitoring.
2. Qualification. An employer may not monitor under the provisions of
this section, G., when the employer already has sufficient evidence,
obviating the need to monitor, that a particular employee has committed
an infraction.
H.

Monitoring Prohibited on Premises

An employer must not technologically monitor in: “(1) bathrooms;
(2) locker rooms;” 432 (3); “dressing rooms”; 433 (4) “shower facilities”;
or (5) “other similar private” changing “areas.”434
I.

Monitoring Off-Duty Behavior

1. Homes. An employer must not technologically monitor its employees
when they are inside their homes, except as provided in section I.4
(Monitoring the Employer’s Property). This prohibition applies equally
to technological monitoring of employees who are on-duty inside their
homes.
2. Off Duty in Seclusion. An employer must not technologically
monitor its employees who are off duty and either outside or at a private
residence and who are alone or with only a few435 other people.
3. Other Places. An employer must not technologically monitor an offduty employee’s behavior in circumstances other than those mentioned
in Sections H.1 & 2 unless the employer “has reasonable grounds to
believe that”436 the employee is engaging in behavior that will cause a
significant concrete harm to the employer and must do so only pursuant
to a written policy that adopts and complies with model provisions
promulgated by the DOL for engaging in monitoring off-duty behavior.
The employer must also comply with Sections D.7 (Accuracy and
Reliability) and E.1 (Documentation).
a. Presumptions of Significant Harm. The following types of off-duty
behavior are presumed to cause a significant concrete harm to the
employer.

432. Id. § 10(b).
433. Id.
434. MODEL ELECTRONIC PRIVACY ACT, supra note 122, at § 5.
435. “Few” is left purposefully somewhat vague to account for differing circumstances. An
actual number could easily be inserted instead.
436. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. § 2711(c) (2000).
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i. Competition. Behavior “in direct conflict with the essential businessrelated interests of the employer”;437
ii. Reduction in Work. Behavior that causes a verifiable reduction in
the quality or quantity of the employee’s work;
iii. Harassment. Behavior that harasses another employee or the
employee’s family because of the employee’s work-related actions;
iv. Obscene Role Models. Behavior by a children’s role model that is
obscene;
v. Financial Harm. Behavior that causes a verifiable financial harm
which is more than minimal;438
vi. Complaints. Behavior that results in customer or client complaints;
vii. Refusal to Work. Behavior that results in co-employees refusing to
work with the employee.
b. Presumptions of Insignificant Harm. The following types of offduty behavior are presumed not to cause a significant concrete harm to
the employer.
i. Office Morale. Behavior that negatively impacts office morale but
does not cause a verifiable reduction in the quality or quantity of the
employee’s work;
ii. Injury to Reputation. Behavior that will potentially damage the
company’s reputation but has not resulted in customer or client
complaints or cessation of business;
iii. Appearance of Conflict of Interest. Behavior that may result in a
perception of an employee having a conflict of interest when the quality
and quantity of the employees work is unaffected and there are no
complaints from customers or clients.
c. Qualification. An employer may not monitor under the provisions of
this sub-section, I.3., when the employer already has sufficient evidence,
obviating the need to monitor, that a particular employee has committed
an infraction.
4. Monitoring the Employer’s Property. An employer may monitor
the use of its own property by an off-duty employee, such as a computer
or vehicle, including when the employee is located at home. In order to
monitor such property, the employer must comply with the requirements
set forth in sections F (Monitoring On-Duty Communication) or G
(Monitoring of On-Duty Communications Without Notice). Monitoring

437. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02(6) (2008).
438. The term “minimal” leaves it for the decision makers to consider the particular facts, but a
dollar amount could easily be inserted if the legislature preferred.
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the property does not permit monitoring of behavior unrelated to use of
the property.439
J.

Employee Participation

1. Methods of Consultation. Before instituting a policy in compliance
with this Act, an employer must consult with the employees, to whom
the policy will be applicable, regarding which model policy provisions
to adopt and which additional provisions, if any, to include. Methods of
consultations that satisfy this requirement include the following:
1. Consultation with an exclusive bargaining representative;440
2. When employees are not represented by an exclusive bargaining
representative, anonymous poll;
3. When employees are not represented by an exclusive bargaining
representative, an employee or workplace committee with responsibility
for workplace privacy or workplace technology issues;441
4. When employees are not represented by an exclusive bargaining
representative, consultation with an attorney or union representative
selected by the employees to assist them with providing input.442
2. Notice. Before instituting a policy in compliance with this Act, an
employer must provide employees who are not represented by an
exclusive bargaining representative notice of the right to consult
regarding the policy and of the various methods available for
consultation. The notice must be clear and conspicuous and reasonably
calculated to provide the employee actual notice of the monitoring.
K.

Maintenance of Records

1. Time Period. An employer must maintain any document that the
employee has the right to review pursuant to Section D.7 (Accurate and

439. See Yung, supra note 37, at 213 (recommending that employer be permitted to monitor its
asset “for the sole purpose of protecting the asset”).
440. This provision does not abrogate any responsibility under the NLRA or a collective
bargaining agreement to negotiate over the terms of the policy with the union.
441. Javier Thibault Aranda, Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: The Role of
Worker Representatives, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 533, 536-37 (2002) (recommending a more
robust system of consultation through joint committees, similar to those used for health and safety
issues in Spain that investigate and negotiate).
442. The latter three methods are not intended to abrogate the prohibition on employer support
and domination under § 8(a)(2) of the NLRA. Instead, these methods are intended to be carried out
in a manner that complies with that provision.
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Reliable Records) for a reasonable period of years, not fewer than
three.443
2. Security. All records resulting from technological monitoring and
maintained by the employer that contain information identifiable to
individual employees must be maintained in a secure manner.
3. Disposal. All records resulting from technological monitoring that
contain information identifiable to individual employees must be
disposed of in a manner that eliminates risk of use of the information by
others.
L.

Disclosure of Information Collected

“[A]n employer” must “not disclose” information about an
employee, through which the employee is identifiable, obtained through
technological monitoring to third parties except in the following
circumstances:444
(1) “to a law enforcement agency pursuant to a warrant issued under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, an equivalent state warrant, a
grand jury subpoena, or an administrative subpoena authorized by a
Federal or State statute.”445
(2) “pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.”446
(3) “to the exclusive bargaining representative, if any.”447
An employer must notify third parties to whom the data have been
disclosed of any erasure or correction to or of any employee statement
responding to previously released information, pursuant to section D.7
(Accurate and Reliable Records), unless notification would be unduly
burdensome.
M. Anti-Retaliation Provision
“No employer may” “discharge, discipline, or in any manner
discriminate against an employee with respect to the employee’s

443. See Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, S. 984, 103d Cong. § 5 (1993).
444. S. 984, at § 10 (1993).
445. S. 984, at § 10.
446. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, H.R. 1218, 102d Cong. § 9 (B)(c)(1992).
Typically parties to a civil suit are entitled to discover information relevant through discovery that is
not specifically ordered by a court, including in some jurisdictions mandatory initial disclosures.
This provision will require employers to obtain a court order before providing such information in
discovery. A different solution that protects employees’ privacy and enables court suits to progress
with more efficiency may be possible. But the details of disclosure protections are beyond the
scope of this article.
447. S. 984, at § 10(D)(4).
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compensation or terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because
the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request of the
employee) has—448
(A) instituted [or is about to institute]449 any proceeding relating to a
violation of this Act,” 450
(B) “participated in enforcement actions under this”451 Act,
(C) disclosed information that the employee reasonably believes
evidences a violation of this Act,452
(D) “assisted other employees in asserting their rights”453 under this Act,
including acting as a representative pursuant to Section D.7.D (Right to
Agent),
(E) participated in providing employee input into development of a
policy in compliance with this Act pursuant to Section J (Employee
Participation).
N.

Responsibilities Designated to the Department of Labor

1. Office of Employee Privacy. The Office of Employee Privacy is
hereby created within the Department of Labor. The Office of
Employee Privacy will “be under the direction of an [a]dministrator . . .
appointed by the President, by and with advice and consent of the
Senate.”454 The Department of Labor, acting through the Office of
Employee Privacy, is charged with the following responsibilities.
2. Safe-Harbor Policies. The Department of Labor will draft model
policy provisions for adoption by employers.
a. On-Duty Actions without Notice. The DOL will promulgate at least
three sets of model policy provisions for monitoring of on-duty actions
without notice. Each set of model policy provisions will incorporate
notice of the requirements of Section D.7 (Accurate and Reliable
Records).
i. First Set of Model Policy Provisions. The first set of model policy
provisions will include provisions implementing the following
safeguards:

448. S. 984, at § 11(4).
449. See WILLIAM A. HERBERT, ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT RETALIATION ISSUES 5 (2005),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=william_herbert (discussing
29 C.F.R. 24.2(b) using language “about to commence”).
450. S. 984, at § 11(4).
451. MODEL ELECTRONIC PRIVACY ACT, supra note 122, at § 7.
452. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, S. 984, 103d Cong. § 11(4) (1993).
453. MODEL ELECTRONIC PRIVACY ACT, supra note 122, at § 7.
454. 29 U.S.C. §204(a).
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a) Notice of Monitoring. The employer must provide individualized
advanced notice in writing to employees that they will be monitored
when the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that an employee
has engaged in a violation of a written work rule or written work policy,
a violation of law, or behavior that has significantly and concretely
harmed the employer. The notice must be clear and conspicuous and
reasonably calculated to provide the employee actual notice of the
potential monitoring.455 A notice that provides monitoring “may” take
place or that the employer “reserves the right” to monitor will not
suffice.
b) Notice of Infractions. The notice must delineate the types of
infractions for which such reasonable grounds monitoring will occur.
c) Explanation of Reasonable Grounds. The notice must explain what
constitutes reasonable grounds, such as a statement from an identified
co-worker456 or evidence of an infraction that is not attributable to a
particular individual.457
d) Annual Notice. If the employer continues to monitor based on
reasonable grounds, it must provide the requisite notice annually.
e) Consistent Enforcement. The employer must consistently enforce
the policy.
ii. Second Set of Model Policy Provisions. The second set of model
policy provisions will include provisions implementing the following
safeguards:
a) Exhaustion.
The employer must exhaust other methods of
verification or discovery before resorting to the reasonable grounds
surreptitious monitoring.
b) Bonus. After completion of the reasonable grounds surreptitious
monitoring, the employer must provide a bonus, within a year’s time, to
the employee to compensate for the invasion of privacy. The minimum
amount of the bonus will be set out by schedule developed by the DOL
and will account for the level of intrusiveness of the monitoring, by
considering the means of monitoring, the behavior monitored, and the
length of time monitoring occurs. The minimum amount must be no less
than the equivalent of $300.00 in 2010, adjusted for inflation.
iii. Other On-Duty Model Policy Provisions. The other set(s) of
model policy provisions for monitoring of on-duty conduct without
notice must provide a minimum level of protection for employee’s
455. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. § 2711(b) (2000).
456. The term identified is intended to mean that the statement must not be anonymous. It is
not intended to prevent the employee who supplies the statement from remaining confidential.
457. This may be necessary when there is evidence of theft or smoking, for instance.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

77

Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 1

LEVINSON - FINAL WESTERN.DOC

408

5/3/2010 11:28 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[43:331

privacy equivalent to the level of protection provided by the above
mandates.
b. On-Duty Communications with Notice. The DOL will promulgate
at least four sets of model policy provisions for monitoring of
employee’s use of the employer’s communications technology and
monitoring of on-duty communications with notice.
i. First Set of Model Policy Provisions. The first set of model policy
provisions will include provisions implementing the following
safeguards and the safeguard set out in N.2.a.i(e) (Consistent
Enforcement).
a) Particulars of Monitoring. The notice must describe with
particularity the method of monitoring.458 It should include information
about which parts of a communication or use are monitored, such as the
heading or the body of an e-mail message or URL addresses; whether
specified words are searched for; if so, the basis upon which those words
are determined, whether the words are subject to change, and upon what
basis; the frequency with which the communications or use are
monitored;459 and any type or number of collected data that leads to a
higher level of monitoring.
The notice must specify “whether
communications or computer usage not related to the employer’s
business are likely to be monitored.”460
b) Notice of Type of Use or Communication. The notice must
delineate the types of communication or use for which such legitimate
business interest monitoring will occur.
c) Confidential or Limited Monitoring. The employee or agent
responsible for performing the monitoring must either retain personal
information in confidence461 or the review must be limited in scope.
1) Confidential Monitoring. The monitoring employee or agent must
not disclose to anyone, including management, any personal

458. For instance, rather than stating only that Internet use is monitored to insure pornography
is not downloaded, the policy would state that every hit on a website is monitored for a list of
inappropriate words. It would provide examples of such words and notify the user that they are
subject to change based on identified employee use of sites that are inappropriate but contain
different words. The policy would notify the employees that when an employee hits a designated
number, perhaps twenty, of sites with inappropriate words, then the full content of every site being
visited by the employee is monitored.
459. H.R. 4908, at § 2711(b)(2).
460. H.R. 4908, at § 2711(b)(2).
461. Commentators have endorsed the idea of requiring a “data protection officer.” See, e.g.,
Aranda, supra note 441, at 23. BCR’s often require that a privacy officer or office be established by
each company or a responsible employee be designated. Wugmeister, supra note 337, at 485.
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information, communication, or use that does not negatively impact the
business or workplace.462
2) Limited Monitoring. The monitoring must be tailored to that
necessary to discover only information, communications, or use related
to the noticed legitimate business reason. The monitoring must be
limited by part of the communication or use searched, search terms,
time, duration, and frequency to that necessary to determine if
communications or use negatively impacting the business or workplace
are occurring.
ii. Second Set of Model Policy Provisions. The second set of model
policy provisions will include provisions implementing the following
safeguards and the safeguard set out in N.2.a.i(e) (Consistent
Enforcement).
a) Automatic, Generalized Monitoring.
The employer must use
technology, and not human review, to monitor communications or use
for the specified type or types of legitimate business reasons.463 The
monitoring must be limited to discovery of terms or parts of the
communication, such as a URL address or e-mail “to” line. The actual
content of an individual employee’s communications or uses must be
scrutinized further only when a particular term is located or a certain
limit is reached.464
b) Confidential or Limited Monitoring. The employee or agent
responsible for performing the monitoring must either retain personal
information in confidence or the review must be limited in scope.
1) Confidential Monitoring. The employee or agent responsible for
scrutinizing the actual content of the communication or use must not
disclose to anyone, including management, any personal information,
communication, or use that does not negatively impact the business or
workplace.465
2) Limited Monitoring. The employee or agent responsible for
scrutinizing the actual content of the communication or use must review
the content only of those communications or uses that triggered the
higher level of scrutiny.

462. For instance, if while monitoring for pornography, a reviewer found that an employee had
paid an electric bill or checked library hours, this information would be held in confidence.
463. For instance, the program might monitor for all uniform resource locators (URLs) on a list
of prohibited pornographic sites or for all e-mails that contain a certain term that might indicate
proprietary information is enclosed in an e-mail.
464. Such as identifying twenty instances of attempting to access a pornographic site.
465. For instance, if while monitoring for pornography a reviewer found that an employee had
paid an electric bill or checked library hours, this information would be held in confidence.
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c) Mitigation of discipline. The employer must mitigate the level of
discipline for a first-time offender, from that which would normally be
imposed for any discovered infraction, in consideration of the private
nature of the communication or use. The employer should consider the
degree to which the prohibited information was kept private, such as
whether it was shared with no one, shared only with the employee’s
friends or acquaintances, or the number of others with which it was
shared. The level of discipline imposed should be mitigated more
considerably the more private the nature of the communications or use.
iii. Other Noticed Communication Model Policy Provisions. The
other sets of model policy provisions for monitoring of employer’s
communication technology and on-duty communications with notice
must provide an intermediate level of protection for employee’s privacy
equivalent to the level of protection provided by the above mandates.
c. On-Duty Communications without Notice.
The DOL will
promulgate at least four sets of model policy provisions for monitoring
use of employer’s communications technology and of on-duty
communications without notice. Each set of model policy provisions
will incorporate notice of the requirements of Section D.7 (Accurate and
Reliable Records).
i. First Set of Model Policy Provisions. The first set of model policy
provisions will include provisions implementing the following
safeguards and the safeguards in sections N.2.a.ii(a)(Exhuastion),
N.2.a.ii(b)(Bonus) and N.2.b.ii(c)(Mitigation of Discipline).
a) Notice of Infractions. In advance of the monitoring, the employer
must have provided the employee individualized notice in writing that is
clear and conspicuous and reasonably calculated to provide actual notice
that the type of infraction, for which the employer will monitor, is a
violation of work rules or policy.
b) Notice of Discipline. The notice must include the potential level of
discipline for engaging in the infraction.
c) Confidential or Limited Monitoring. The employee or agent
responsible for performing the monitoring must either retain personal
information in confidence or the review must be limited in scope.
1) Confidential Monitoring. The monitoring employee or agent must
not disclose to anyone, including management, any personal
information, communication, or use that does not negatively impact the
business or workplace.
2) Limited Monitoring. The monitoring must be tailored to that
necessary to discover only information, communications, or use related
to the suspected infraction. The monitoring must be limited by part of
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the communication or use searched, search terms, time, duration, and
frequency to that necessary to verify whether the infraction has occurred.
ii. Second Set of Model Policy Provisions. The second set of model
policy provisions will include provisions implementing the following
safeguards and the safeguards in sections N.2.a.i(e) (Consistent
Enforcement), N.2.b.i(a) (Particulars of Monitoring), N.2.c.i(a) (Notice
of Infractions), N.2.c.i(b) (Notice of Discipline), and N.2.c.i(c)
(Confidential or Limited Monitoring). It must also institute either the
safeguards in section N.2.a.ii(b) (Bonus) or N.2.b.ii(c)(Mitigation of
Discipline).
a) Notice of Monitoring. The employer must provide individualized
advanced notice in writing to employees that they will be monitored
when the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that466 an
employee has engaged a violation of a written work rule or written work
policy that is likely to negatively impact the business or workplace, a
violation of law, or behavior that has significantly and concretely
harmed the employer. The notice must be clear and conspicuous and
reasonably calculated to provide the employee actual notice of the
potential monitoring.467 A notice that provides monitoring “may” take
place or that the employer “reserves the right” to monitor will not
suffice.
iii. Other Un-Noticed Communication Model Policy Provisions. The
other sets of model policy provisions for monitoring of employers’
communication technology and on-duty communications without notice
must provide an intermediate level of protection for employees’ privacy
equivalent to the level of protection provided by the above mandates.
d. Monitoring Off-Duty Behavior. The DOL will promulgate at least
three sets of model policy provisions for monitoring of off-duty
behavior. Each set of model policy provisions must incorporate the
safeguards set forth in section D.7 (Accuracy and Reliability).
i. First Set of Model Policy Provisions. The first set of model policy
provisions will include provisions implementing the following
safeguards and the safeguards in sections N.2.a.i(e) (Consistent
Enforcement), D.2 (Notice of Type of Monitoring), D.3 (Notice of
Information Collecting), D.4 (Notice of Intended Use), E.1.B.i.
(Exhuastion), N.2.a.i(b) (Notice of Infractions), and N.2.a.ii(b) (Bonus).
a) Confidential Monitoring. The monitoring employee or agent must
not disclose to anyone, including management, any behavior, including

466. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. § 2711(c) (2000).
467. Id. § 2711(b).
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actions or communications, that does not evidence the infraction for
which a reasonable grounds to monitor was documented. Other
infractions incidentally discovered must not be disclosed.
The
monitoring employee or agent must disclose information that does
evidence the infraction for which reasonable grounds to monitor was
documented only to those with a need to know.
b) Limited Monitoring. The monitoring must be tailored to that
necessary to discover only behavior related to the infraction for which
reasonable grounds to monitor have been documented. The monitoring
must be limited by type of action or communication monitored, part of
the communication or use searched, search terms, time, duration, and
frequency to that necessary to determine if the suspected infraction is
occurring.
c) Notice of Monitoring. The employer must provide individualized
advanced notice in writing to employees that they will be monitored
when the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that468 an
employee is engaging in off-duty behavior that will cause a significant
concrete harm to the employer. The notice must be clear and
conspicuous and reasonably calculated to provide the employee actual
notice of the potential monitoring.469 A notice that provides monitoring
“may” take place or that the employer “reserves the right” to monitor
will not suffice.
d) Particulars of Monitoring. The notice must describe with
particularity the method of monitoring.
When employees’
communications will be monitored, the notice should include
information about which parts of a communication or use are monitored,
such as the heading or the body of an e-mail message or URL addresses;
whether specified words are searched for; and if so, the basis upon
which those words are determined, whether the words are subject to
change, and upon what basis; the frequency with which the
communications or use are monitored;470 and any type or number of
collected data that leads to a higher level of monitoring.
e) Mitigation of Discipline. The employer must mitigate the level of
discipline for a first-time offender, from that which would normally be
imposed for any discovered infraction, in consideration of the private
nature of the behavior. The level of discipline imposed should be
mitigated more considerably the more private the nature of the behavior

468. Id. § 2711(c).
469. Id. § 2711(b).
470. Id.
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monitored.
When the infraction results from an employee’s
communications, the employer should consider the degree to which the
prohibited information was kept private, such as whether it was shared
with no one, shared only with the employee’s friends or acquaintances,
or the number of others with which it was shared.
ii. Second Set of Model Policy Provisions. The second set of model
policy provisions will include provisions implementing the following
safeguards and the safeguards in sections N.2.a.i.(e) (Consistent
Enforcement), D.2 (Notice of Type of Monitoring), D.3 (Notice of
Information Collecting), D.4 (Notice of Intended Use), E.1.B.i.
(Exhaustion) N.2.a.ii(b) (Bonus), N.2.d.i(a) (Confidential Monitoring),
N.2.d.i(b) (Limited Monitoring), and N.2.d.i(d) (Particulars of
Monitoring).
a) Notice of Monitoring. After the discovery of the potential infraction
and before monitoring the employee, the employer must provide the
employee notice in writing that the employee will be monitored. The
notice must be clear and conspicuous and reasonably calculated to
provide the employee actual notice of the monitoring. 471
b) Notice of Infraction. The notice must inform the employee of the
infraction that is being monitored for with sufficient specificity to
provide the employee actual notice of the particular problem.
c) Potential Discipline. The notice must inform the employee of the
potential level of discipline for the alleged infraction.
d) Consistent Discipline. Similar infractions must be similarly
disciplined.
iii. Other Off-Duty Model Policy Provisions. The other set(s) of
model policy provisions for monitoring of employees’ off-duty behavior
must provide must provide a high level of protection for employees’
privacy equivalent to the level of protection provided by the above
mandates.472
3. Opinion Letters. Employers who decide to adopt policies containing
additional provisions designed to provide greater protection than the
model provisions promulgated by the DOL may contact the DOL for an
opinion as to whether the policies comply with the Act. The
representative of the employees, pursuant to Section J, may also request
an opinion. The DOL will provide informal and formal opinion

471. Id.
472. In Europe, the European Commission, the executive branch of the European Union, sets
out “standard contractual clauses” that employers in countries outside Europe can adopt in order to
comply with the European standards. ARTICLE 29, OPINION 8/2001, supra note 252, at 26.
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letters.473 A fee to cover administrative expenses will be charged for
each opinion letter requested. The fee will be set by the DOL but will be
no less than the equivalent amount of $100.00 in 2010 adjusted for
inflation.
4. Best Practices. The DOL will make recommendations as to best
practices for employers on its Web page. The DOL will also provide
compliance guidance on the Web474 and via the DOL phone hotline.475
5. Education. The DOL will, through its web page and presentations at
public venues, such as public libraries, educate the public about the
privacy issues raised by employer technological monitoring.
6. Resolution of Disputes. The DOL will use procedures similar to
those used under FLSA and for retaliation claims to resolve disputes
arising under the Act. The DOL will investigate disputes and issue
notices of determination and, when a violation is found, an order,
including cease and desist orders, reinstatement orders, and orders for
payment of back wages and damages.476 The DOL must issue a notice
of determination within sixty days of the filing of a claim with the DOL.
A party who wishes to contest the notice of determination must file a
request for an administrative hearing according to procedures analogous
to those used in retaliation claims. The time limits and resultant hearing
will also be conducted in accordance with those procedures.477 The
hearing must be conducted within thirty days of the filing of the request
for an administrative hearing. A party who wishes to appeal the
administrative law judge’s recommended decision may petition for
review with the Administrative Review Board (ARB) by following timelimits and procedures analogous to those used in retaliation claims.478
The ARB will issue a final binding decision within the ninety day time
limit applicable to retaliation claims.479

473. The DOL, Wage & Hour Division currently issues unofficial and official interpretations.
See Final Rulings and Opinion Letters, http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/opinion.htm.
474. For an example of the current compliance guidance provided by the DOL, Wage & Hour
Division, see Compliance Assistance - Laws of the Wage and Hour Division,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/ca_main.htm.
475. The DOL, Wage & Hour Division currently uses a help line, 1-866-4USWAGE, see id.
476. Herbert, supra note 449, at 6. Under the FMLA and the FLSA, the DOL receives,
investigates,
and
attempts
to
resolve
complaints
of
violations.
See
http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/regs/statutes/fmla.htm#SEC_107_ENFORCEMENT; FLSA § 6 & 7,
29 U.S.C. § 206 & 207.
477. See Herbert, supra note 449, at 8 (discussing hearing in front of administrative law judge).
478. 29 CFR § 24.8; Herbert, supra note 449, at 9 (discussing review procedure).
479. Id. The ideal process would be an efficient binding agency adjudication process similar to
that used by the California Department of Industrial Relations in wage and hour cases. The DOL’s
adjudicatory process most closely resembles this ideal. See infra notes 564-567 and accompanying
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7. Investigative Authority. “The Administrator, or [the
Administrator’s] designated representatives may investigate and gather
data regarding . . . conditions and practices of employment in any
industry subject to this [Act], and may enter and inspect [and make
copies of] . . . records, question . . . employees, and investigate . . . facts,
conditions, practices or matters as [the Administrator] deems necessary
or appropriate to determine whether any [employer] has violated” this
Act or to “aid in the enforcement of” this Act.480 State and local
agencies may be collaborated with in the same manner as described in
section 11(b) of the FLSA.481
8. Subpoena Power. The DOL “may issue a subpoena to compel [a]
witness to appear or a subpoena duces tecum to compel the witness to
appear and produce relevant book, record, document, data, or other
object.”482 “If a person refuses to obey a subpoena [or subpoena duces
tecum, a federal district court of competent jurisdiction] “may issue to
the [witness] an order requiring that [witness to] appear and give
evidence or otherwise produce documentary evidence requested by the
department regarding the matter under investigation.”483
9. Staffing. The Administrator will staff the office in the same manner
as is required by subsection (b) of section 4484 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The DOL will hire at least one expert in technology, at
least one expert in the area of privacy, and at least one expert in labor
relations.485
10. Regulations. “The Secretary shall, within [six] months after the date
of enactment of this Act, issue regulations to carry out this Act.”486

text. Some commentators have suggested, however, that agencies cannot issue self-enforcing
orders. See, e.g., Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth is Out There: Revamping Federal
Antidiscrimination Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP & LAB. L.
(2008) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1142979. If the described adjudicatory process is, thus,
likely to lead to numerous appeals to court and long delays, as a practical matter, then an informal
recommendation process similar to that used under the FMLA could be substituted for the
adjudicatory process.
480. 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (2009).
481. 29 U.S.C. § 211(b).
482. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-22(2); 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (2008).
483. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-22(3).
484. 29 U.S.C. § 204.
485. See McCormick, supra note 479 (discussing use of experts in new agency to enforce Title
VII).
486. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, S. 984, 103d Cong. § 14 (1993).
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Remedies

1. Administrative Claim or Civil Action. Any employee “whose
rights under this [A]ct have been abridged,”487 including by a failure of
an employer to adopt a policy in compliance with this Act or by the
failure of an employer to comply with the provisions of a policy adopted
in compliance with this Act,488 may file a claim with the DOL or “file a
civil action”489 “against the employer in any Federal or State court of
competent jurisdiction.”490
Any employee who refuses to be subject to technological
monitoring which is inconsistent with an employer’s written policy
adopted pursuant to this Act and is terminated or otherwise disciplined
for refusing the monitoring may file a claim with the DOL or “file a civil
action” “against the employer in any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction.”491
2. Damages. Any employer who violates this Act is liable for actual
damages incurred by the employee. Compensatory damages for a single
violation may not exceed492 the equivalent of $20,000 in the year 2010,
adjusted for inflation. Additionally, an employer who violates this Act
is liable to the affected employee for an amount equivalent to “any
profits made . . . as a result of the violation.”493
3. Equitable Relief. An employee is entitled to equitable relief,
including mitigation or removal of any discipline imposed,
reinstatement, promotion, back pay, and lost benefits.
4. Injunctive and Declarative Relief. “Any employer that commits, or
proposes to commit, an act in violation of any provision of this Act may
be enjoined therefrom by any court of competent jurisdiction.”494
5. Punitive Damages. An employer who engages in willful repeat
violations of the act is liable for punitive damages.495
487. MODEL ELECTRONIC PRIVACY ACT, supra note 122, at § 8(b).
488. This section is intended to establish a claim for violation of the Proposed Act when an
employer fails to comply with provisions required by the Proposed Act. However, in order not to
discourage employers from adopting policies with greater protection than that provided for by the
Proposed Act, this section is not intended to establish a claim for violation for failure to comply
with additional provisions, beyond those required by the Proposed Act, that are provided for in an
employer’s policy.
489. MODEL ELECTRONIC PRIVACY ACT, supra note 122, at § 8(b).
490. S. 984, at § 12(c)(2); Schwartz, supra note 25, at 944 (discussing how without a private
cause of action, “there is likely to be significant underenforcement of privacy interests”).
491. Kim, supra note 160, at 676 (“My central argument here is that any meaningful protection
of employee privacy requires limitation of an employer’s power to fire at will.”).
492. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. §2711 (d)(3)(A) (2000).
493. Blackowicz, supra note 37, at 107.
494. MODEL ELECTRONIC PRIVACY ACT, supra note 122, at § 8(c).
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6. Attorneys Fees. “If the prevailing party in a civil action is the
plaintiff [employee], the court [must] award the plaintiff court costs and
a reasonable attorney fee.”496
7. Representative Suit. The DOL may bring a civil action on behalf of
an employee in the manner described in paragraphs 1-6. All “sums
recovered” “on behalf of an employee”497 “must be held in a special
deposit account”498 and must be “paid to the employee [or employees]
affected” by the violation.499 “Any such sums not paid to an employee
because of inability to do so within a period of three years shall be”
deposited into the Treasury of the United States and will be “credited to
a separate nonlapsing appropriation to the”500 DOL for use by the DOL,
Office of Privacy.
8. Affirmative Defense. An employer has a full defense to any claim
for failure to mitigate if it has taken the following actions.
a. Prior to disciplining the employee, the employer provided the
employee with a written statement of what level of discipline would
have been imposed prior to mitigation.
b. The statement describes the manner in which the private nature of
the conduct was considered by the employer in determining the
appropriate discipline.
c. The statement describes the level to which the discipline was
mitigated as a result.
This defense does not apply to a claim of failure to consistently
enforce a policy adopted in compliance with this Act or to consistently
discipline infractions thereunder.
P.

Civil Penalties

The DOL “may levy a civil penalty against” any employer the DOL
“finds to be in violation of” this Act, “in an amount not more than
$10,000”501 as of 2010 adjusted for inflation, after a hearing.502 To
determine the amount of the penalty, the DOL must “take into account”

495. See Blackowicz, supra note 37, at 107.
496. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(2)(b)(I).
497. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c).
498. Id.
499. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 §107, 29 U.S.C. §2601 (2008), available at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/statutes/fmla.htm.
500. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-69a(b).
501. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, S. 984, 103d Cong. § 16(C)(1) (1993).
502. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 31-48d(c).
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“the gravity of the violation” and “the previous record of the employer’s
compliance” or noncompliance with the Act.503
The DOL will hold the hearing and collect the penalty “in the same
manner as is required by subsections (b) through (e) of section 503 of
the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (29 U.S.C.
1853) with respect to civil penalties assessed under subsection (a) of
such section.” The penalty assessed will be held by the Treasury of the
United States and will be “credited to a separate nonlapsing
appropriation to the”504 DOL for use by the DOL, Office of Privacy.505
Q.

Nonwaiver of Rights

“The rights and procedures provided by this Act may not be waived
by contract or otherwise, unless such waiver is part of a written
settlement agreed to and signed by the parties to a pending action or
complaint under this Act.”506
R.

Liberal Construction

This statute is intended as a remedial statute and should be
construed liberally in favor of protecting employees’ privacy.
S.

Minimum Standards

“The provisions of this [Act] shall not be deemed to be an exclusive
remedy and shall not otherwise limit or bar any person from pursuing
any other remedies available under any other law, state or federal statute,
or the common law.”507
T.

Statute of Limitations

No claim may be filed or “action may be commenced more than”
three “years after the date –
(A) the employee . . . knew of, or
(B) the employee . . . could reasonably be expected to know of, the
alleged violation.”508

503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

S. 984, at § 12(a).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 31-69a(b).
Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1853(e).
S. 984, at § 16(D).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(d) (2008).
S. 984, at § 12(c)(3)(B).
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VI. EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED SOLUTION: CONSIDERATIONS
INVOLVED IN DRAFTING THE ACT
This section, VI, discusses some of the major considerations that
went into the choices underlying the language in the Proposed Act,
which may not be apparent from the text of the Proposed Act. More
minor considerations are included in the footnotes annotating the draft of
the Proposed Act.
A.

Short Title—Federal Legislation

The common law has failed to adequately address the problem of
employer technological monitoring of employees.509 Development of a
case-by-case approach under the current default rules that provide little
protection for employee privacy would be too slow to deal with the
rapidly changing technology, even if it could provide some adequate
level of protection.510 It is, thus, preferable to address the problem in a
timely manner and to change the existing default rules and the balance
between employer and employee concerns through legislation.511 Thus,
the Proposed Act is for federal legislation that provides a floor of
protection, permitting state counterparts to provide similar or more
significant protections.
Several rationales suggest that federal legislation is necessary.
First, the problems relating to technological monitoring are national, and
even international, in scope, suggesting that some level of consistency
and coordination between states is necessary. Electronic mail, for
instance, passes easily from an employee in California to one in
Kentucky. Federal legislation is the most effective way to obtain such
consistency and coordination.512
Second, because employers are well-organized while employees
generally are not,513 state-by-state legislation is likely to be obtained at a

509. See supra note 18.
510. Cf. Herbert, supra note 35, at 470 (discussing how ad hoc guidance of court decisions
under the Fourth Amendment provides inadequate guidance for public employers).
511. But see Corbett, supra note 18, at 96.
512. Gantt, supra note 37, at 411 (“First, state legislation would be insufficient because only
federal legislation can address E-mail communications that cross state lines.”); Corbett, supra note
18, at 117 (noting that “most commentators hold out little hope for state legislative solutions for
reasons such as . . . the ill fit between law limited by state boundaries and technology that realizes
boundariless communication”).
513. With the potential exceptions of union-represented employees and those supported by the
tobacco lobby.
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slower rate over a more extended time period than federal legislation.514
While several states have passed legislation addressing or pertaining to
the problem, legislation directly addressing the problem has been
proposed twice at the federal level. Continuing to press for federal
legislation will ensure, if passed, that protections are obtained
nationwide at an equivalent time.515
Third, states that desire to pass workplace privacy protections are
more likely to do so once federal legislation is in place.516 Often times,
providing protections for employees on a state-by-state basis can cause
“a race to the bottom.” States perceive that employers will prefer to do
business in a state that does not heavily regulate employers. States will
thus be reluctant to regulate employers more heavily than other states
do.517 Additionally, some states may even adopt less restrictive rules
than other states with the purpose of luring business to their states.518
The oft-mentioned example of such state purpose is that of Delaware in
the incorporation context. 519
Fourth, a level of consistency provided by federal legislation
benefits employers who desire to protect their employees’ privacy.520
Some employers already provide notice of monitoring, protect
employees’ personal data from breach, or take other measures designed
514. Corbett, supra note 18, at 117 (noting that “most commentators hold out little hope for
state legislative solutions for reasons such as business groups’ lobbying”); Evans, supra note 18, at
1147 (noting that despite a strong employer lobby at the federal level, “comprehensive federal
legislation has been possible in the medical and educational fields under HIPPA and FERPA”). But
see Schwartz, supra note 25, at 932-33 (arguing that federal law is likely to pass only after state
laws “because of the slow and sometimes difficult process of enacting federal legislation”).
515. Gantt, supra note 37, at 411 (“[S]tate legislative efforts are more likely to be undermined
by the apparent ability of prominent corporations to stymie state legislation that strengthens
protections from employee privacy interests.”).
516. See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 933 (discussing how “state law makers will act in reaction
to federal activity when it occurs, and a process of experimentation, drawing on involvement by
advocacy groups and other stakeholders, will continue”).
517. Boehmer, supra note 18, at 812 (“The potential financial impact on a state due to lost
business resulting from the enactment of such controversial legislation makes it unlikely that a
comprehensive solution will be achieved in the states.”); Porter, supra note 19, at 105
(“Furthermore, a federal statute would eliminate states having to compete for an employer’s
business.”); Note, Addressing the New Hazards of the High Technology Workplace, supra note 375,
at 1908-09 (discussing how some businesses warned they might leave the state of Massachusetts if
the state adopted a law similar to the PCWA).
518. Wilborn, supra note 18, at 862 (“Attempted legislative action on the state level has been
repeatedly blocked by company threats to move their business to a state without the proposed
restrictions.”).
519. Evans, supra note 18, at 1144 (“The law of corporations provides an example of this
phenomenon—most corporations now incorporate in Delaware because of its lenient laws.”).
520. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 25, at 923 (discussing how “omnibus laws . . . level the
regulatory playing field”).
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to ensure a pleasant and productive work atmosphere for their
employees.521 When other employers use “sweatshop” type practices to
achieve a short term gain over these employers, those employers already
engaging in sound monitoring practices are disadvantaged. Ensuring
that all employers must meet some minimum guidelines tends to level
the playing field for the employers who are looking toward long-term
sustainability of the company and following sound monitoring practices
on their own initiative.
Fifth, to some degree, federal legislation minimizes the
administrative burden on employers. Rather than needing knowledge
about widely divergent practices in different states, some of which may
deviate atypically from the norm,522 employers will know the minimum
obligations in all states.523 Of course, federal legislation with a
preemptive effect that does not permit states to pass higher standards
would achieve the goal of minimizing the administrative burden on
employers to a greater degree.524 But the benefit of enabling states to
adopt practices tailored to their own states,525 of allowing
experimentation in a rapidly evolving field (because of the rapidly
evolving nature of the monitoring technology),526 and of sharing
resources527 outweighs that higher level of administrative consistency.528
Much has recently been written about the ultimate inability of federal
schemes which preempt an entire area of employee protections from

521. See James J. Cappel, Closing the E-mail Privacy Gap, J. SYSTEMS MGMT., Dec. 1993, at 2
(discussing companies that place great emphasis on employee privacy in managing their e-mail
systems); Schwartz, supra note 25, at 904 (listing companies calling for federal privacy regulation).
522. Such as Montana’s “just cause for termination” requirement.
523. See Boehmer, supra note 18, at 812 (“Also this is an area in which nationwide uniformity
is critical to aid business compliance without undue hardship.”); Porter, supra note 19, at 105
(discussing how a federal statute “increases consistency between states” from which nationwide
companies benefit by adopting “standardized rules.”). But see Schwartz, supra note 25, at 904-05
(discussing how a coalition of companies seeks a broad privacy regulation on the collection of
information but only if it includes broad preemption of state laws governing privacy).
524. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89, 91
(2008).
525. See Corbett, supra note 18, at 117 & n.168 (noting that one commentator suggested
passage of NEMA could serve as ‘‘the foundation . . . for more expansive state . . . legislation’”)
(citing Frayer, supra note 103, at 874).
526. Schwartz, supra note 25, at 905, 928 (discussing how a privacy statute with strong
preemption would negatively impact “experimentation in . . . state sectoral laws” and the statute
itself would “ossify”); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1527, 1574 (2002).
527. Schwartz, supra note 25, at 944 (discussing how “limited resources” and advantages of
collaboration support “joint federal-state governance”).
528. See generally Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375
(2007).
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keeping pace with a rapidly changing workplace environment.529 The
anticipated related state laws, might, on the other hand, preempt tort
causes of action for invasion of privacy. Workers compensation
schemes provide an example of that type of preemption system as does
the Montana Lawful Discharge Act.530
B.

Purpose and Findings—Private Sector

The Proposed Act is applicable only to the private sector. Its
provisions are tailored to the private sector and additional provisions that
would be necessary for an act that also extends to the public sector are
beyond the scope of this article. Significantly, if the Proposed Act is
extended at any time to encompass public sector employers, it is
necessary for the legislation to thoroughly document the problem
addressed.531
C.

Definitions

The definition of technological monitoring is purposefully broad to
enable the statute to cover yet-to-be discovered technologies.532 The
broad definition has the related benefit of ensuring that employers will
not simply turn to using methods of technological monitoring other than
those addressed by the legislation. Thus, the Proposed Act errs on the
side of overbreadth rather than underinclusiveness.

529. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 526.
530. See Andrew P. Morriss, The Story of the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment
Act: A Drama in 5 Acts, in EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES 237 (Samuel Estreicher & Gillian Lester,
eds., Foundation Press, 2007).
531. Harper Jean Tobin, The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008; A Case
Study of the Need for Better Congressional Responses to Federalism Jurisprudence, 35 J. OF LEG.
(forthcoming) (explaining that, to extend jurisdiction to states, federal bills should express the intent
to create remedies against states, require waiver of state immunity, and specifically enumerate
remedies); Porter, supra note 19, at 106 (stating that Eleventh Amendment immunity will not likely
be abrogated, preventing public employees from suing “state employers for money damages.”).
532. See Wilborn, supra note 18, at 852 (“[T]o be effective, any federal statutory scheme must
be adaptable to changes in technology. Any legislation which defines protection in terms of specific
types of monitoring equipment will inevitably be rendered obsolete by newer employee-monitoring
technology . . .”); Bindler, supra note 375, at 882-83 (suggesting that Congress should avoid
defining the scope of protective legislation in terms of specific types of monitoring equipment).
Such definitions inevitably render any monitoring legislation obsolete; rather the legislation should
define “monitoring employers” in terms of the act of impersonal observation. Id. Boehmer, supra
note 18, at 812 (If “device-specific” legislation is enacted, little will be accomplished). Employers
will simply shy away from the regulated device and turn to other devices that may present even
greater concerns. Id.
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The definitions of employer and employee are also purposefully
broad. The legislature might decide after further consideration to limit
the definition by exempting employers who employ under a certain
number of employees. But the rationale of the broad definition is that no
employer is too small to take adequate protections to safeguard its
employees’ privacy. The literature dealing with defining employees is a
complicated topic in its own right. The rationale behind the broad
definition is to safeguard the privacy of as many employed individuals
as possible. The legislature might decide, however, to limit the scope of
persons covered to a narrower category more traditionally defined as
employees, such as by using the right-of-control test or otherwise
excluding independent contractors.
D.

Monitoring On-Duty Actions

The safeguards to ensure accuracy and reliability are limited in two
major ways. First, the procedure to ensure accuracy is simply document
review by the employee and the employee’s agent. Second, the scope of
the information that must be disclosed is limited to three categories of
information. The European framework, and even the Workers Act,
suggest a broader framework should be implemented to ensure the
accuracy of all data collected. Additionally, several scholars have called
for more comprehensive assurances of the accuracy of the collected
information, such as requiring employers to provide summaries of the
collected data533 to employees or requiring arbitration to settle disputes
over the accuracy of the data.534 While more comprehensive protection
is certainly a laudable long-term goal, given limited employer resources,
use of summaries would be wasteful because the manpower used to
compile the summaries could be better used to provide notice of the
monitoring, consistently enforce the monitoring policy, document the
behavior suspected when conducting monitoring without notice, and
foster employee input into adoption of the policies.535 Additionally,
while a decision by a neutral third party, a data protection authority, or a
court as to the accuracy or reliability of data would be more definitive,
the resources expended in such proceedings do not warrant the added
advantage over permitting the employee to place a response alongside
the allegedly erroneous information.

533. Jacobs, supra note 37, at 878.
534. Boehmer, supra note 18, at 818.
535. Some employees may not be interested in the summaries. Rather, many employees will
be interested in the data only when it is relied upon to make a decision which impacts them directly.
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Moreover, the right to choose an agent to help review and contest
records is intended to ensure that the employee can make sense of the
material but also serves the larger goal of encouraging collaboration and
self-governance in the workplace. A federal agency may have difficulty
finding resources to spot-check employers, but permitting employees to
review their information with assistance is likely to provide a relatively
high level of enforcement.536 The right is modeled on the Weingarten537
right provided under the NLRA. The Weingarten right guarantees an
employee who is suspected of wrongdoing to have a union
representative or co-employee present during any investigatory
interview, and the National Labor Relations Board has often extended
the right to non-unionized employees.538 While the requirement could
be eliminated and the Proposed Act would still arguably provide a
minimal level of satisfactory privacy protection, making sense of
complicated data is often difficult for one employee.539 Normally,
having more than one mind helps in assessing information.
Additionally, contesting information may be uncomfortable for one
employee because an employer generally holds more power over the
employee than the reverse.
Having a co-employee or union
representative stand with the employee makes it more likely that
employees will use the process.540 Indeed, some existing legislation
provide for such an agent in the review process.541
E.

Monitoring On-Duty Conduct without Notice

The Proposed Act, like other proposals, creates flexibility for
employers by permitting technological monitoring, subject to certain
safeguards, of on-duty employees without notice when the employer has
536. Cf. Catherine L. Fisk, Union Lawyers & Employment Law, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 58 & n.2 (2002) (discussing how OSHA is under-enforced in non-union workplaces).
537. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
538. Epilepsy Found. Of Northeast Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676, at 677 (2000), overruled by IBM
Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1290 (2004).
539. Aranda, supra note 441, at 539.
540. Aranda, supra note 441, at 539.
In addition to the above, I would suggest that it would be highly beneficial to allow
worker representatives to become involved in the exercise by individual workers of their
rights under data protection laws (such as the right of access to, and rectification and
cancellation of, their personal data.) Clearly, it is difficult for workers to make use of
such rights on their own, not only because they are inevitably in a position of weakness
when faced with the computing power enjoyed by employers, but also because many
workers simply do not understand the processes to which their data is subjected.
Id.
541. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/5 (2008).
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“reasonable grounds to believe”542 certain infractions have occurred. It
additionally permits monitoring of “an area [on the employer’s premise]
in which the”543 infraction occurred. This provision permits employers
flexibility to monitor even those employees who are not suspected of
misconduct or who are off-duty but enter the area being monitored. An
employer may need to do so, for example, in situations where someone
is known to be smoking in a nonsmoking area544 or stealing from a
certain stockpile.545
Putting these provisions in the context of the entire Proposed Act is
helpful. An off-duty employee who enters a monitored area under this
provision will be monitored subject to the low level of safeguards
provided for monitoring of on-duty conduct. But, otherwise, an
employee who is off-duty and on the employer’s premises can only be
monitored when the employer “has reasonable grounds to believe that”
the employee is engaging in conduct that will cause a significant
concrete harm to the employer and only subject to the high level of
safeguards provided for monitoring of off-duty employee’s behavior,546
or for use of the employer’s equipment subject to the intermediate level
of protection provided for such use.547
F.

Monitoring On-Duty Communications

One of the safeguards an employer can implement when monitoring
on-duty communications is requiring that any information collected via
the monitoring be kept in confidence by the employee performing the
monitoring or review of the gathered information. Some privacy
protection regulations require that a privacy office or officer be
established by each company, in part to ensure employees who perform
monitoring or data review are adequately trained in the requirements of
542. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. § 2711(c) (2000).
543. H.R. 4908, at § 2711(c) (2000).
544. See, e.g., Montgomery Gen. Hosp., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 949 (2006) (Coyne, Arb.).
545. Commentators criticized the Workers Act on these grounds:
If notice needs to be given to employees who are not under suspicion, but who will be
monitored, many complications are foreseeable. An example of this is a manufacturer
who has reasonable suspicion that an employee is stealing merchandise. Although the
employer can justify putting a hidden camera in the employee’s area without informing
the employee under suspicion, the Bill requires the employer to inform all other
employees that may appear in the camera’s range of the monitoring. It is reasonable to
assume in many instances that the employee’s friends will inform the suspect of the
monitoring and the employer will not be able to discipline the wrongdoer.
Baxi & Nickel, supra note 97, at 146.
546. See supra part VI.I.3.
547. See supra part VI.I.4.
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confidentiality,548 and several scholars have endorsed this
requirement.549 While a privacy office or officer in each company is a
laudable long-term goal, especially in light of the serious security
concerns raised by leakage of certain information, confidentiality is not
an across-the-board requirement of the Proposed Act, and employers are
permitted flexibility in determining whether to adopt a policy requiring it
and how to insure confidences are maintained.
G.

Monitoring of On-Duty Communications without Notice

One of the safeguards that an employer can implement when
monitoring on-duty communications without notice is mitigation of any
discipline imposed as a result of the monitoring. The intent of the
provision is that because the employees are not on notice they are being
monitored and, thus, likely believe the communication is private from
their employer, this private nature of the communication renders it less
problematic than a publicly acknowledged communication would be.
The intent, however, is not to leave employers wide open to claims by
employees that an inappropriate level of discipline was imposed.550 In
other words, the safeguard does not impose a “just cause requirement” or
a “proportionality” requirement. Thus, an affirmative defense is
provided in relation to this safeguard.551 As long as the employer
mitigates the discipline imposed in light of the private nature of the
communication and documents its actions, the purposes of the mitigation
safeguard are met.
H.

Monitoring Prohibited on Premises

The Proposed Act prohibits monitoring in areas where employees
typically undress. Many people consider monitoring of people’s private
bodily parts to be a severe intrusion on privacy. The need to protect
such privacy outweighs an employer’s countervailing need to
technologically monitor in such areas in certain limited instances, such
as to identify the perpetrator of a theft. The employer can investigate
548. Some binding corporate resolutions require that a privacy officer or office be established
by each company or a responsible employee be designated. ARTICLE 29, TRANSFERS OF PERSONAL
DATA TO THIRD COUNTRIES, supra note 337, at 16; Wugmeister, supra note 337, at 485.
549. Several commentators have endorsed the idea of requiring “data protection officer.” See,
e.g., Aranda, supra note 441, at 540.
550. Employees who are treated disparately or are disciplined for refusal to permit monitoring
that is out of compliance with the adopted policy may bring claims that inappropriate discipline or
an inappropriate level of discipline was imposed.
551. See supra part V.O.8.
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such circumstances through alternative means such as stationing a
security officer in the area or monitoring the entrance or exit to the area.
I.

Monitoring of Off-Duty Behavior

The Proposed Act prohibits monitoring of employees who are offduty and in secluded locations.552 While more robust privacy protection
would be provided by also restricting monitoring of on-duty behavior in
secluded locations, employers whose employees work away from the
employer’s premise in secluded locations, such as customers’ homes,
may need to monitor their employees’ on-duty behavior. For this
reason, when an employee is working at a friend’s house or other
secluded location, the employee will be adequately protected by the
safeguards applicable to monitoring of on-duty actions and
communications.
The Proposed Act also prohibits monitoring off-duty employees for
behavior that will potentially damage the company’s reputation but has
not resulted in customer or client complaints or cessation of business.
While arbitrators and scholars are divided over whether harm to an
employer’s reputation can justify termination or other discipline,553
nothing in the Proposed Act prohibits employers from disciplining,
including terminating, an employee based on such behavior. Rather the
Proposed Act simply prohibits monitoring for that purpose. The
significant level of intrusion into an employee’s right to privacy incurred
by off-duty monitoring outweighs the employer’s need to monitor based
on a speculative harm to reputation.554
J.

Employee Participation

Several scholars have noted the benefits to employees and
employers of employee participation in “defining workplace” policies.555
552. See supra part V.I.2.
553. Hill & Delacenseri, supra note 42, at 151 (“Indeed, some arbitrators have viewed
‘business reputation’ as too nebulous a concept to be useful, although these arbitrators are in the
minority.”).
554. Yung, supra note 37, at 213 (noting employers’ “amorphous” interest in reputation).
555. Kesan relies on microeconomic agency principle models to recommend that employees
participate in “defining workplace e-policies.” Kesan, supra note 18, at 326. Employee
participation benefits employers because it increases the employees’ commitment to the policy.
Kesan, supra note 18, at 327. Employees benefit because it ensures their “point of view is heard
and accommodated.” Kesan, supra note 18, at 327. See Ford, supra note 160, at 154 (proposing that
“procedural model imposing duties to provide information to workers and, above all, requirements
of collective consultation” is a better solution than minimum rights legislation.”); Note, Addressing
the New Hazards of the High Technology Workplace, supra note 375, at 1915 (proposes modifying
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While the protections offered by the Proposed Act would be significant
even without employee involvement, employee involvement is important
for at least two reasons. First, input from employees is more likely to
result in a policy that appropriately safeguards employees’ rights. When
an employer alone is responsible for drafting the policy, there is a higher
likelihood the policy will be biased toward the employer’s need to
monitor. Second, litigation may be less likely to result when employees
feel invested in the development of the policy.
From the vantage point of ensuring employee participation and
increasing enforcement, a system by which employees would gain the
equivalent of union representation for the purposes of consultation
would be preferable to that in the Proposed Act.556 However, effectively
implementing such a requirement would be an extensive endeavor that is
beyond the scope of this article.
K.

Maintenance of Records

Ideally, maintenance of records resulting from technological
monitoring, as well as other records which contain identifiable
information about employees, will be the subject of separate legislation,
or perhaps a comprehensive scheme to protect employees’ privacy.
Indeed, some state and federal laws already require secure maintenance
of a variety of different types of employment records.557 Fully
addressing the topic is beyond the scope of this article.
L.

Disclosure of Information Collected

The disclosure limitations in the Proposed Act mirror those
contained in the Workers Act. Other potential models558 as well as some
commentators559 call for more restrictive disclosure prohibitions. These
include limiting disclosure to only those with a need to know the

the PCWA to “guarantee some employee participation in monitoring system design and
implementation”).
556. See Aranda, supra note 441, at 537.
557. See Joseph J. Lazzarotti, The Emergence of State Data Privacy and Security Laws
Affecting Employers, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 483 (2008).
558. MODEL ELECTRONIC PRIVACY ACT, supra note 122, at § 6(b) (limiting disclosure without
the employee’s consent to those with “a legitimate need for the information”).
559. Blackowicz, supra note 37, at 105-06 (limiting disclosure to certain categories of people
including supervisors who have a “valid business interest” in the information); Boehmer, supra note
18, at 818 (recommending that “access should be limited to a discrete group with the need to know”
and that confidentiality procedures that will guarantee this in-house confidentiality should be
mandated).
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information. That limitation is provided under certain of the policies set
out in the Proposed Act. But requiring it in all circumstances for all
monitoring would reduce the flexibility provided by the Proposed Act
and reduce the likelihood that employers would support passage of the
Proposed Act. Requiring confidentiality in all circumstances places a
considerable training burden on employers.560 Additionally, in order to
enforce it, the law might have to require discipline or other sanction of
those employees who breach their duty of confidentiality.561 Such a
framework would add additional complexity to the Proposed Act. While
such internal disclosure limitations may appear more realistic in the
United States at a later time, an approach limited to restricting disclosure
to third parties appears more likely to gain support at this juncture.
M. Anti-Retaliation Provision
The reach of the anti-retaliation provision is purposefully broad to
encourage employees to advocate for and enforce their rights to privacy.
N.

Responsibilities Designated to the Department of Labor

Delegating responsibility for enforcement of the Proposed Act to an
administrative agency rather than solely to the courts 1) allows a more
proactive approach, such as through education, opinion letters, and safe
harbor policies; 2) likely reduces the financial costs to the parties who
need not elect costly litigation and to the federal government
administering the Proposed Act; and 3) permits decision makers with
expertise in the area to be involved.
The responsibility for enforcement of the Proposed Act is placed in
an existing agency because a new office, similar to the European data
protection offices, that has responsibility for privacy issues generally
would not likely be created as part of legislation targeted at addressing
an employment issue.562 Moreover, it makes sense to have an agency

560. See Boehmer, supra note 18, at 818. Binding Corporate Resolutions that provide
adequate protection by European standards, for instance, require that employees be trained as to the
policy before handling data. ARTICLE 29, TRANSFERS OF PERSONAL DATA TO THIRD COUNTRIES,
supra note 337, at 16
561. Binding Corporate Resolutions that provide adequate protection by European standards,
for instance, require that employees who mishandle data be sanctioned, usually by discipline.
Wugmeister, supra note 337, at 485. This ensures “a policy is known, understood and effectively
applied.” ARTICLE 29, TRANSFERS OF PERSONAL DATA TO THIRD COUNTRIES, supra note 337, at
16; Wugmeister, supra note 337, at 485.
562. Additionally, while a sub-department with expertise in workplace issues of an agency
devoted to privacy issues might be ideal, it may be more realistic in terms of funding and political
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that already has expertise with workplace issues administer the Proposed
Act because privacy protections available in other contexts are often
absent in the employment context.563
Among the potential agencies, the DOL is most likely to use an
enforcement mechanism that is well suited to protecting employees’
right to privacy. The agency already has in place mechanisms to provide
compliance guidance, opinion letters, recommendations as to resolving
disputes, and adjudicatory administrative hearings. While filing a claim
with the DOL permits an employee a low cost means to settle a dispute,
filing with the DOL is not generally a prerequisite to filing in court.
Thus, employees are provided the option of a court suit rather than
agency dispute resolution should they so prefer. The two other federal
agencies that currently provide such adjudication, the EEOC564 and the
NLRB, are not known for the efficiency of their processes.565 And use
of their processes is, in most instances, mandatory before proceeding to
court.566 Additionally, while the EEOC certainly has expertise in
dealing with workplace policies and ensuring that they are implemented
in accordance with the law, the focus of the statutes it implements is on
invidious discrimination, which differs from the across-the-board
minimum-level protections guaranteed by the Proposed Act. As a law
guaranteeing minimum protections, it is more similar to those

will to place the responsibilities with the DOL. See Herbert, supra note 35, at 469-70; Evans, supra
note 18, at 1145.
The United States may not be ready for an agency with the same powers of registration
and enforcement as the English Information commissioner, due to American aversion to
regulation of businesses. Nonetheless, some agency or governmental department could
be designated to fill an advisory role similar to that of the English Commissioner under
the Data Act. Employers would appreciate a resource to turn to for guidance in these
issues.
Id. But cf. Schwartz, supra note 25, at 926 (suggesting that establishing “a federal information
privacy agency” might go further toward having Europe recognize the United States as providing
adequate privacy safeguards than establishing a “federal omnibus law”).
563. For this reason, the FCC, though having expertise in privacy issues, was not selected to
administer the Act. One commentator suggests the FCC as a potential agency because of its
experience regulating privacy rights related to personal information. Yung, supra note 37, at 218.
564. Yung, supra note 37, at 216-17 (suggesting that the EEOC would be a possible agency
with the advantage of providing an administrative hearing).
565. Yung, supra note 37, at 217 (noting that “the EEOC has been characterized as a
cumbersome roadblock to the timely resolution of discrimination claims”); Arlen Specter & Eric S.
Nguyen, Representation without Intimidation: Securing Workers’ Right to Choose Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311, 322 (2008) (discussing delays at the
NLRB).
566. There are exceptions in the NLRA context. An employee can, for instance, file a suit for
breach of the duty of fair representation and a related breach of contract claim against the employer
directly in court.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss2/1

100

Levinson: Carpe Diem: Privacy Protection in Employment Act

LEVINSON - FINAL WESTERN.DOC

2010]

CARPE DIEM: PRIVACY PROTECTION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

5/3/2010 11:28 AM

431

administered by the DOL, such as the FLSA. And while the NLRB
certainly has expertise in interpreting workplace policies, in
guaranteeing minimum workplace rights (such as to associate and
organize), and in fostering employee participation and self-governance
(even in non-union settings), the limitations of its processes focusing
primarily on adjudication make it an unlikely candidate for the type of
educational and compliance role that the agency administering the
Proposed Act will need to take.567
O.

Remedies

The Proposed Act provides for equitable, compensatory, injunctive,
and declaratory relief. It does, however, cap compensatory damages in
an effort to create a level of certainty for employers. It provides for
attorneys’ fees for prevailing employees so that employees will be able
to obtain representation in such actions, which is particularly necessary
in light of the damages cap.568
P.

Civil Penalties

In order to somewhat defer the cost of creating the office of privacy
and of administering the Proposed Act, the Proposed Act provides for
civil penalties. The Proposed Act also provides for a fee to cover the
administrative cost of providing an opinion letter.
Q.

Nonwaiver of Rights

Because the Proposed Act is designed to provide a minimum level
of adequate protection for employees’ right to privacy from
technological monitoring, the rights and procedures provided may not be
waived except as part of the settlement of a pending proceeding. The
nonwaiver provision extends to the procedures, in addition to the rights,
because the procedures are part of the comprehensive effort to fairly
balance the employees’ right to privacy against employers’ need to

567. Another option would be to provide for private arbitration of claims rather than agency
resolution or court action. The merits of private arbitration in the employment context are hotly
contested, and full consideration of the topic is beyond the scope of this article. Compare Estlund,
supra note 138, at 209 (“By the same token, defusing the fear of litigation, as some seek to do
through mandatory arbitration, threatens to stall the engines of reform.”) with Theodore J. St.
Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 812
(2008) (“Overall, my conclusion is that, whatever may be the contrary appeal of the siren song of
perfection, mandatory arbitration is indeed better than it looks.”).
568. Porter, supra note 19, at 113.
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monitor. The Proposed Act provides enough flexibility to permit
employers to adopt different safeguards when monitoring for different
purposes that a prospective waiver of rights is not necessary.
R.

Liberal Construction

This section is simply to emphasize that the statue is remedial and
to insure that courts interpret it liberally.
S.

Minimum Standards

For reasons discussed above in Section A, the Proposed Act sets a
floor rather than preempting other potentially applicable laws.
T.

Statute of Limitations

A discovery rule is used because employees are unlikely to know at
the time of the occurrence of many violations of the Proposed Act, such
as surreptitious monitoring without reasonable grounds, failure to
document reasonable grounds for monitoring, or failure to provide for a
confidential review, that a violation has occurred.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article describes the problem of the lack of legal protection for
employees’ privacy from technological monitoring by their employers.
It proposes federal legislation to address the problem. By proposing an
actual draft of the legislation, the intent is to aid scholars and those
involved in the legislative process to think more concretely about precise
issues which must be addressed. The intent is also to ease passage of
legislation, because an actual draft of legislation provides a clear starting
point upon which to base legislation.
While passage of legislation protecting employees’ privacy from
employer technological monitoring may face an uphill battle, it is
possible and should be done. The lack of current adequate protection is
well-documented, and the failure of the Workers Act and the Notice Act
should not deter another attempt at passage of legislation. Drafting
legislation that effectively protects employees yet allows employers
necessary flexibility is difficult. But the Proposed Act serves as an
excellent starting point for drafting such legislation. While the greatest
challenge facing passage of such legislation may be the current lack of
interest groups pushing for such legislation and a corresponding lack of
broad-based support for such legislation among the public, a wide range
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of entities, as different as the ACLU and Microsoft, are joining scholars
in the call for legislation that addresses the need for privacy in the face
of rapidly changing technologies. The lack of protection from employer
monitoring is relatively easy to explain to the public, and the new
technologies might actually help by providing low-cost means, such as
the Internet and electronic mail, to raise awareness of the problem.
Whatever legislation is ultimately proposed, whether all encompassing
legislation or a series of separate acts addressing the interrelated privacy
problems, the hope is that employees will not be left out.
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